At 2:15 PM -0500 4/1/03, Ian Grigg wrote:
Some comments from about a decade ago.
The way it used to work in the Army (that I
was in) within a battalion, is that there was
a little code book, with a sheet for a 6 hour
stretch. Each sheet has a simple matrix for
encoding letters, etc. Everyone had
While Googling for material on SINCGARS, I found an article about
crypto in the India/Pakistan conflict. Old style cryptanalysis isn't
dead yet:
http://www.tactical-link.com/india_pakistan.htm
Arnold Reinhold
-
The Cryptograph
At 2:10 PM -0500 3/31/03, reusch wrote:
...
Nosing around on the same site, one finds
"How military radio communications are intercepted"
http://www.aeronautics.ru/news/news002/news071.htm
Searching for SINCGARS indicates that all US military radios have
encryption capabilities, which can be turne
At 11:43 PM -0800 3/10/03, Bill Stewart wrote:
At 09:14 AM 03/10/2003 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
On the other hand, remember that the earliest Tempest systems
were built using vacuum tubes. An attacker today can carry vast amounts
of signal processing power in a briefcase.
And while some of
At 9:35 PM -0500 3/8/03, Dave Emery wrote:
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 10:46:06PM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
The next more complex version sends the same random screen over and over in
sync with the monitor. Even more complex versions change the random screen
every-so-often to try to frustrate recov
At 10:46 PM -0800 3/7/03, Bill Frantz wrote:
It has occurred to me that the cheapest form of protection from tempest
attacks might be an active transmitter that swamps the signal from the
computer. Such a transmitter would still be legal if its power output is
kept within the FCC part 15 rules.
Ta
At 4:57 PM -0500 3/5/03, John S. Denker wrote:
Tim Dierks wrote:
In order to avoid overreaction to a nth-hand story, I've attempted to
locate some primary sources.
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines:
> http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/9th/case/9955106p&exact=1
[US v Councilman:]
http://pacer.mad
At 2:18 PM -0800 2/19/03, Ed Gerck wrote:
Anton Stiglic wrote:
> The statement was for a plaintext/ciphertext pair, not for a random-bit/
> random-bit pair. Thus, if we model it terms of a bijection on random-bit
> pairs, we confuse the different statistics for plaintext, ciphertext, keys
an
At 5:45 PM -0600 2/18/03, Matt Crawford wrote:
> ... We can ask what is the
probability of a collision between f and g, i.e. that there exists
some value, x, in S such that f(x) = g(x)?
But then you didn't answer your own question. You gave the expected
number of collisions, but not the pro
At 1:09 PM +1100 2/18/03, Greg Rose wrote:
At 02:06 PM 2/17/2003 +0100, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann wrote:
"For each AES-128 plaintext/ciphertext (c,p) pair there
exists exactly one key k such that c=AES-128-Encrypt(p, k)."
I'd be very surprised if this were true, and if it was, it might
have bad i
At 11:21 AM -0500 2/11/03, Trei, Peter wrote:
...
>
I totally agree that WEP has/had problems well beyond the export issue,
but that's not my point. A product which cannot be exported will not be
developed, generally speaking.
I quote from AC2 (Schneier), page 615 (which was published in 1996):
At 6:12 PM -0500 2/10/03, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message , David Wagner writes:
Trei, Peter wrote:
The weird thing about WEP was its choice of cipher. It used RC4, a
stream cipher, and re-keyed for every block. . RC4 is
not really intended for this application
I took a look at the "MIT Guide to Lock Picking" August 1991 revision at
http://www.lysator.liu.se/mit-guide/mit-guide.html
It says:
"9.10 Master Keys
Many applications require keys that open only a single lock and keys
that open a group of locks. The keys that open a single lock are
called ch
At 6:16 PM -0800 1/23/03, Harvey Acker wrote:
The content, once extracted, was interesting to
someone who did not know how locks worked, but the
attack was obvious as soon as one read the description
of how master keys worked.
I knew how master keys worked. I had one when I was at MIT and I've
At 10:48 PM -0500 11/29/02, Donald Eastlake 3rd wrote:
Arnold,
If you want to play with this as in intellectual exercise, be my guest.
But the probability of changing the underlying IEEE 802.11i draft
standard, which would take a 3/4 majority of the voting members of IEEE
802.11, or of making th
At 12:48 AM +0100 11/30/02, Niels Ferguson wrote:
There will be a stronger variant of WPA: The TGi AES-based protocol. It
just isn't finished yet.
Is this 802.11i or something that will be available sooner?
Arnold
-
The Cryp
At 4:57 AM +0100 11/19/02, Niels Ferguson wrote:
At 21:58 18/11/02 -0500, Arnold G Reinhold wrote:
...
Third, a stronger variant of WPA designed for 11a could also run on
11b hardware if there is enough processing power, so modularization is
not broken.
But there _isn't_ enough proce
[please ignore previous mesage, sent by mistake -- agr]
On Sat, 16 Nov 2002, Niels Ferguson wrote:
> At 18:15 15/11/02 -0500, Arnold G Reinhold wrote:
> >I agree that we have covered most of the issues. One area whre you have
> >not responded is the use of WPa in 802.11a. I see n
I agree that we have covered most of the issues. One area whre you have
not responded is the use of WPa in 802.11a. I see no justification for
intoducing a crippled authentication there.
Also here is one more idea for possibly improving Michael.
Scramble the output of Michael in a way that depend
At 11:40 PM +0100 11/11/02, Niels Ferguson wrote:
At 12:03 11/11/02 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
[...]
One of the tenets
of cryptography is that new security systems deserve to be beaten on
mercilessly without deference to their creator.
I quite agree.
I hope you won't mind another
Here are some thoughts that occur to me for improving the security of
802.11 WPA message authentication (MIC), based on what I read in
Jesse Walker's paper
http://cedar.intel.com/media/pdf/security/80211_part2.pdf.
One approach is to second guess Niels Ferguson and try to find a
different comb
I appreciate Niels Ferguson responding to my concerns in such detail.
I don't want to give the impression that I object to WPA on the
whole. That is why I said "major and welcome improvement" in my
opening sentence. I am particularly mollified by Niels' statement
that "most existing cards will
lving into something like the fire
protection regulations that every architect has to either follow or
request a waver.
Arnold Reinhold
At 6:38 AM -0500 11/4/02, Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
I'm answering this publicly, because there is a surprise in the answer.
On Sun, 2002-11-03 at
The new Wi-Fi Protected Access scheme (WPA), designed to replace the
discredited WEP encryption for 802.11b wireless networks, is a major
and welcome improvement. However it seems to have a significant
vulnerability to denial of service attacks. This vulnerability
results from the proposed rem
See the following two Intel links with detailed discussions of TKIP
and Michael which i found via Google:
Increasing Wireless Security with TKIP
Forwarded from: "eric wolbrom, CISSP", sa ISN-a...
http://www.secadministrator.com/Articles/Index.cfm?ArticleID=27064
Mark Joseph Edwards
October 23,
I'd have to agree with Jim. I have some WW II military radios in my
basement and they look pretty pristine on the inside. Military
equipment is built for long shelf life. Even stuff that's seen a lot
of service often cleans up nicely. Also the (unmet) minimum bid for
the M-209 on Ebay was $3
At 4:52 PM +0100 10/22/02, Adam Back wrote:
Remote attestation does indeed require Palladium to be secure against
the local user.
However my point is while they seem to have done a good job of
providing software security for the remote attestation function, it
seems at this point that hardware s
At 10:52 PM +0100 10/21/02, Adam Back wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so
At 7:15 PM +0100 10/17/02, Adam Back wrote:
Would someone at MIT / in Boston area like to go to this [see end] and send a
report to the list?
I went. It was a good talk. The room was jam packed. Brian is very
forthright and sincere. After he finished speaking, Richard Stallman
gave an uninvite
At 8:40 AM -0700 10/11/02, Ed Gerck wrote:
>"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
>
>> I can see a number of problems with using mobile phones as a second
>> channel for authentication:
>
>Great questions. Without aspiring to exhaust the answers, let me comment.
>
I can see a number of problems with using mobile phones as a second
channel for authentication:
1. It begs the question of tamper resistant hardware. Unless the
phone contains a tamper resistant serial number or key, it is
relatively easy to clone. And cell phones are merging with PDAs. If
yo
It might be possible to get the same effect using a conventional
silicon chip. I have in mind a large analog circuit, something like a
multi-stage neural network. Random defects would be induced, either
in the crystal growing process or by exposing the wafer at one or
more stages with a spray
At 12:20 PM -0700 7/29/02, David Honig wrote:
>
>"Whether there is a need for very high bandwidth RNGs" was discussed
>on cypherpunks a few months ago, and no examples were found.
>(Unless you're using something like a one-time pad where you need
>a random bit for every cargo bit.) Keeping in min
At 3:39 PM -0700 7/22/02, David Honig wrote:
>At 04:24 PM 7/22/02 -0400, John S. Denker wrote:
>>
>
>...
>>A detuned FM card is a bad idea, because it is just
>>begging the opponent to sit next door with an FM
>>transmitter.
>
>So work in a Faraday cage...
>
At 8:21 PM -0400 7/22/02, John S. Denke
Language wars have been with us since the earliest days of computing
and we are obviously not going to resolve them here. It seems to me
though, that cryptographic tools could be use to make to improve the
reliability and security of C++ by providing ways to manage risky
usages.
I have in mi
Human memorable test vectors are a great idea and very much in the
spirit of Ciphersaber, which is to enable oral transmission of strong
cryptography. Test vectors are vital, particularly for a string
cipher, because even an erroneous implementation will decrypt the
ciphertext it produces.
T
At 12:23 PM -0700 3/24/02, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
or just security proportional to risk ...
While a valid engineering truism, I have a number of issues with that dictum:
1. It is too often used as an excuse for inaction by people who are
poorly equipped to judge either risk or cost. We've a
r a major
>university I can say that ALL physical systems can be broken. No
>exception. The three laws of thermodynamics apply to security systems as
>well.
>
>There is ALWAYS a hole.
>
>On Thu, 21 Mar 2002, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>
>> It's not clear to me what
At 8:52 PM -0800 3/20/02, Mike Brodhead wrote:
> > The usual good solution is to make a human type in a secret.
>
>Of course, the downside is that the appropriate human must be present
>for the system to come up properly.
It's not clear to me what having the human present accomplishes.
While the
An historical note: In the early 1970's I did some contract
programming work at the Air Force Cambridge Research Lab at Hanscom
Field in Bedford, Mass. Their main computer was a CDC 6600, a super
computer in its day (60-bit words, 10 MHz clock).
http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/cdc6600.html
Th
At 11:49 AM -0800 2/25/02, bear wrote:
>...
>The "secure forever" level of difficulty that we used to believe
>we got from 2kbit keys in RSA is apparently a property of 6kbit
>keys and higher, barring further highly-unexpected discoveries.
Highly-unexpected? All of public key cryptography is bu
At 4:42 PM -0500 2/17/02, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig2/bamfordreport.html
>
>
>Report on a
>James Bamford Talk at Berkeley
>
>James Bamford is the author of The Puzzle Palace and Body of Secrets, books
>about the National Security Agency. He is visiting Berkeley in the S
At 5:12 PM +0100 2/8/02, Jaap-Henk Hoepman wrote:
>I think there _are_ good business reasons for them not wanting the users to
>generate the keys all by themselves. Weak keys, and subsequent
>compromises, may
>give the CA really bad press and resulting loss of reputation (and this
>business is bu
At 6:18 PM -0500 2/5/02, Ryan McBride wrote:
>On Tue, Feb 05, 2002 at 11:16:40AM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:
>> I expect you could initialize the random data in that memory during
>> manufacture with little loss of real security. (If you are concerned about
>> the card's manufacturer, then you have
I'd argue that the RSA and DSA situations can be made equivalent if
the card has some persistent memory. Some high quality randomness is
needed at RSA key generation. For the DSA case, use 256 bits of
randomness at initialization to seed a PRNG using AES, say. Output
from the PRNG could be th
At 7:38 AM -0800 1/29/02, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>> BTW, I don't see why using a passphrase to a key makes you vulnerable to
>> a dictionary attack (like, you really are going to have a dictionary of
>> all possible 1024 bit keys cro
There is some interesting information at http://www.finger-scan.com/
They make the point that finger scanning differs from finger printing
in that what is stored is a set of recognition parameters much
smaller than a complete fingerprint image. So there is no need for a
lengthily process to a
The cryptographic hash function MD5 is often used to authenticate
software packages, particularly in the Unix community. The MD5 hash
of the entire package is calculated and its value is transmitted
separately. A user who downloads the package computes the hash of the
copy received and matches
Prodded by comments about password cracking in another thread, I've
added a table to my Diceware FAQ
http://world.std.com/~reinhold/dicewarefaq.html#tables for selecting
random characters out of the ninety five printable symbols in 7-bit
Ascii. The intent is to provide a practical and secure w
At 5:16 PM -0500 1/21/02, Will Rodger wrote:
>Arnold says:
>
>>You can presumably write your own programs to decrypt your own
>>files. But if you provide that service to someone else you could
>>run afoul of the law as I read it. The DMCA prohibits trafficking
>>in technology that can be used t
At 8:57 PM -0800 1/20/02, Karsten M. Self wrote:
>...
>Note that my reading the language of 1201 doesn't requre that the work
>being accessed be copyrighted (and in the case of Afghanistan, there is
>a real question of copyright status), circumvention itself is
>sufficient, regardless of status of
At 7:38 PM -0500 1/19/02, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>In message
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Sampo
> Syreeni writes:
>>On Thu, 17 Jan 2002, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>>
>>>For one thing, in Hebrew (and, I think, Arabic) vowels are not normally
>>>written.
>>
>>If something, this would lead me to believe
At 4:12 PM -0500 1/18/02, Will Rodger wrote:
>>This law has LOTS of unintended consequences. That is why many
>>people find it so disturbing. For example, as I read it, and I am
>>*not* a lawyer, someone who offered file decryption services for
>>hire to people who have a right to the data, e
At 9:41 AM -0500 1/18/02, Will Rodger wrote:
>Arnhold writes:
>
>>Another interesting question is whether the reporters and the Wall
>>Street Journal have violated the DCMA's criminal provisions. The al
>>Qaeda data was copyrighted (assuming Afghanistan signed one of the
>>copyright conventions
At 9:15 AM -0500 1/16/02, Steve Bellovin wrote:
>A couple of months ago, a Wall Street Journal reporter bought two
>abandoned al Qaeda computers from a looter in Kabul. Some of the
>files on those machines were encrypted. But they're dealing with
>that problem:
>
> The unsigned report, pro
At 7:10 PM -0500 1/15/02, Adam Fields wrote:
>"Arnold G. Reinhold" says:
>> This result would seem to raise questions about SHA1 and MD5 as much
>> as about the quality of /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Naively, it
>> should be difficult to create input to these has
This result would seem to raise questions about SHA1 and MD5 as much
as about the quality of /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Naively, it
should be difficult to create input to these hash functions that
cause their output to fail any statistical test.
Arnold Reinhold
At 3:23 PM -0500 1/15/02, T
At 12:09 PM -0500 1/14/02, John S. Denker wrote:
>...
>Returning to PKI in particular and software defects in
>particular: Let's not make this a Right-versus-Wrong
>issue. There are intricate and subtle issues here.
>Most of these issues are negotiable.
>
>In particular, you can presumably get s
The PAIIN model (privacy, authentication, identification, integrity,
non-repudiation) is inadequate to represent the uses of cryptography.
Besides the distinction between privacy and confidentiality, I'd like
to point out some additional uses of cryptography which either don't
fit at all or ar
At 2:59 PM -0800 12/30/01, John Gilmore wrote:
>
>Along these lines I can't help but recommend reading one of the best
>crypto books of the last few years:
>
> Between Silk and Cyanide
> Leo Marks, 1999
>This wonderful, funny, serious, and readable book was written by the
>chief crypt
At 2:47 PM -0800 12/28/01, Bill Stewart wrote:
>...
>So tracing a single transmission may be hard, but tracing an ongoing pattern
>is easier, unless there's a trusted Usenet site in some
>country where you don't have jurisdiction problems.
>That means that A.A.M + PGP is fine for an occasional
>"A
At 4:33 AM -0500 12/28/01, Niels Provos wrote:
>In message <v04210101b84eca7963ad@[192.168.0.3]>, "Arnold G. Reinhold" writes:
>>I don't think you can conclude much from the failure of your
>>dictionary attack to decrypt any messages.
>We are offering var
It seems to me that a very similar argument can be made regarding the
need (or lack there of) for a national identity card. Organizations
that require biometric identity can simply record that information in
their own databases. The business most widely cited as needing
national ID cards, the
This is an nice piece of work, but I have a couple of comments:
1. The paper asserts "Even if the majority of passwords used to hide
content were strong, there would be a small percentage of weak
passwords ... and we should have been able to find them." That might
be true if there are a large
At 12:18 AM -0600 12/11/01, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Mon, 10 Dec 2001, John Gilmore wrote:
>
>> NSA's export controls. We overturned them by a pretty thin margin.
>> The government managed to maneuver such that no binding precedents
>> were set: if they unilaterally change the regulations tomorrow t
At 10:50 PM -0800 12/8/01, Paul Krumviede wrote:
>while not really cryptography related, i'd suggest a reading of the chapter
>"prologue to pearl harbor" of herbert bix's "hirohito and the making of
>modern japan" before taking seriously anything other than the finding that the
>japanese may have
This story smells of revisionism. The events leading up to Pearl
harbor are throughly chronicled in the first chapter of David Kahn's
classic, The Codebreakers. In particular:
o The Tojo government, regarded as militarist, came into power in
October 1941 (Togo was Tojo's foreign minister)
o
Noah Silva recently brought this interesting 1994 article on DMV data
exchange by Simson Garfinkel to the attention of the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] list:
>http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.02/dmv_pr.html
The article discusses the AAMVAnet system and the extent to which
the threat of revocation o
[More alarmist than I would expect from Ms. Kolata. Many sources
quoted who claim to have seen lots of stego, but won't give details.
-- agr]
Veiled Messages of Terrorists May Lurk in Cyberspace
October 30, 2001
By GINA KOLATA
Investigators say terrorists may be using a stealthy method
of s
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011026/pl/tech_smartcards_military_dc_1.html
...
"The U.S. defense department has ordered chip-based ID cards for 4.3
million military
personnel over the next 18 months to tighten security on access to
buildings, including the
Pentagon (news - web sites),
At 10:04 AM -0400 10/22/2001, Adam Shostack wrote:
>On Sun, Oct 21, 2001 at 04:11:19PM -0700, Jeff Simmons wrote:
>| On Sunday 21 October 2001 02:52 pm, you wrote:
>|
>| >Designing protocols is a hard field, and
>| >there seem to be lots of mistakes made when people use RC4. Is that
>| >because i
At 12:09 AM + 10/16/2001, David Wagner wrote:
>It seems the FBI hopes the law will make a distinction between software
>that talks directly to the modem and software that doesn't. They note
>that PGP falls into the latter category, and thus -- they argue -- they
>should be permitted to snoop
I too am very nervous about the prospect of national ID cards. I
have an idea for a possible compromise, but I have not made up my
mind on it. I'm interested in hearing other people's opinions.
The idea is a federal standard for secure drivers' licenses. These
would be cards containing a chi
At 11:10 AM -0800 1/5/2001, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
>> I have found significant information about PKI as it exists today,
>> but am looking for some background information. I'm looking for
>> information about the history of PKI, how and where it started, how it
> > dev
There is an interesting article in Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2001/0910/news-nsa-09-10-01.asp that
says NSA planning a major effort to modernize the nation's
cryptoystems "which are rapidly growing obsolete and vulnerable."
They quote Michael Jacobs, head of NSA's in
Here are a few suggestions:
o Use mini-CD-R's for key storage. There is even a rectangular,
credit-card sized format available. (Note that mini-CDs are not
compatible with slot loading CD drives.)
o Perform all encryption, signing, etc. on a lap top or palm top that
is kept in a safe or on yo
At 10:34 AM -0400 9/20/2001, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>"R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>> [1] "New encryption technology closes WLAN security loopholes"
>> Next Comm has launched new wireless LAN security technology called
>> Key Hopping. The technology aims to close security gaps in W
The big argument for a crypto ban is "the need for intelligence." Yet
Jane Garvey, the head of the FAA, was quoted on the radio (WBUR) this
morning as saying the FAA's security measures were not designed to
stop someone who was willing to die in an attack. If the steady
stream of suicide bomb
At 9:20 AM +0300 9/13/2001, Amir Herzberg wrote:
>...
>
>In fact, if giving up crytpto completely would help substantially to protect
>against terror, I'll support it myself. But...
>
>The real argument is simple: there is no evidence or convincing argument why
>shutting down crypto will substanti
There are a number of implementations listed on the Rijndael home
page http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ including a
GPL'd 80186 version by Rafael R. Sevilla . It says
;; Note that the only 80186 instructions here are shr/shl instructions
;; with multibit counts, and these only
At 9:27 PM -0400 9/8/2001, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
>On Sat, 8 Sep 2001, Harald Koch wrote:
>
>> > It would be a civil offense to create or sell any kind of
>> > computer equipment that "does not include and utilize certified
>> > security technologies" approved by the federal government.
Today's Boston Globe and New York Times report that the CIA is
funding Sefeweb technology that lets users surf the Web anonymously.
The parent agency of the Voice of America is negotiating a license
for the technology to use in bypassing China's 'Net censorship.
"The US-funded network of proxy
At 5:33 PM -0500 8/15/2001, Jim Choate wrote:
>On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote:
>
>> To be clear, I am *NOT* arguing for key escrow. Just saying that since
>> I'm against it, I accept that there may be scope for judicious,
>> paper-trail oriented, key logging.
At 9:25 AM -0400 8/1/2001, Derek Atkins wrote:
>There are many alternative conferences than Crypto, and many of them
>are already outside the US. Indeed, the IACR already runs EuroCrypt
>and AsiaCrypt.
>
>Personally, I think that trying to move Crypto is just an
>over-reaction to the current situ
At 11:20 AM +0200 7/29/2001, Alan Barrett wrote:
>The DMCA said:
> > 1201(a)(1)(A):
>>No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
>>controls access to a work protected under this title.
>
>What does "effectively" mean here?
The law attempts to define it:
'1201(a)(
At 1:56 AM -0400 7/27/2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>On Thu, Jul 26, 2001 at 10:53:02PM -0400, David Jablon wrote:
>> With these great new laws, there is no longer any risk of being legally
>> criticised for using even the most glaringly flawed cryptography
>>-- just use it
>> for Copy Protection
A draft paper by Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir was
released on July 25, 2001 and announces new attacks on the RC4 cipher
that is the basis for CipherSaber-1. Some of these attacks
specifically involve the use of an IV with a secret key, the very
scheme used in CipherSaber. Prof.
At 11:09 AM -0700 7/12/2001, Jurgen Botz wrote:
...
>Set up a PC with CA software and a smart card reader and put
>your CA cert/key on a smart card and you have your tamperproof
>CA master... the only weak link in the certificate generation
>process is the CA's secret key, so that's really the on
At 12:16 PM +0200 6/20/2001, Barry Wels wrote:
>Hi,
>
>In James Bamford's new book 'Body of Secrets' he claims the NSA is
>working on some FAST computers.
>http://www.randomhouse.com/features/bamford/book.html
>---
>The secret community is also home to the largest collection of
>hyper-powerful c
At 8:57 AM -0700 6/12/2001, John Young wrote:
>The Supreme Court's decision against thermal imaging appears
>to be applicable to TEMPEST emissions from electronic devices.
>And is it not a first against this most threatening vulnerability
>in the digital age? And long overdue.
>
>Remote acquisitio
At 11:24 PM -0400 6/3/2001, Dan Geer wrote:
>| >> GET OVER IT, PART TWO - THE CASE AGAINST ABSOLUTE PRIVACY
>| >> Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems, who earlier stated that
>| >> there is no privacy and that people should get it over it,
>| >> now claims in a Washington Post editorial that
At 4:54 PM +0100 5/31/2001, Matthew Pemble wrote:
>"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
>>
>> Why do I have to be tracked 7/24?
>>
>> Arnold Reinhold
>>
>
>You don't. You (and I) should have the choice, whether it is to use
>another car leasing
At 10:10 AM -0400 5/30/2001, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>At 9:01 AM -0400 on 5/30/01, BNA Highlights wrote:
>
>
>> GET OVER IT, PART TWO - THE CASE AGAINST ABSOLUTE PRIVACY
>> Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems, who earlier stated that
>> there is no privacy and that people should get it over it,
>> now
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