At 01:59 PM 1/14/02 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Saying that SSL without certificates is fine as long as you
don't have active attacks is kind of like saying that leaving
your front door open is fine as long as noone tries to break
in.
No, its more. SSL sans certs is like using envelopes to
On Tue, 15 Jan 2002, D. A. Honig wrote:
[Moderator's note: Except that's precisely the point: Modulo MIM
attacks is like saying we're all immortal, modulo death. The
question isn't some sort of mystification of identity -- it is being
able to know that you're talking to the same Dear Abby
[The
question isn't some sort of mystification of identity -- it is being
able to know that you're talking to the same Dear Abby your friends
have talked to and that you talked to last week.
Here you're talking about reputation of nyms, which doesn't require
third parties or certs, just
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Michael Sierchio wrote:
Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your credit card info goes to Palm
Eric Rescorla writes:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Michael Sierchio wrote:
Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Eric Rescorla writes:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
And most (all?) commercial CAs then disclaim any responsibility for
having actually checked that right correctly...
While this is true, I'd point out that all the security software
you're using
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Eric Rescorla writes:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If an automaker disclaimed liability for a vehicle, and a negligent
design or manufacture resulted in injury or loss, it is my
understanding that the liability disclaimer notwithstanding, the
automaker
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If an automaker disclaimed liability for a vehicle, and a negligent
design or manufacture resulted in injury or loss, it is my
understanding that the liability disclaimer notwithstanding, the
automaker would be held responsible. Why do we believe that the same
Eric Rescorla wrote:
Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Michael Sierchio wrote:
Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your
Does a user of ssl services care to know absolutely that they are
communicating verifiably with whom they believe they have contacted, or does
the user care to know absolutely that their communication is completely
private?
I believe that the latter is most important; transparency through
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
People running around in business selling
products and services and then disclaiming any liability with regard
to their performance _for_their_intended_task_ is, IMHO, wrong.
IMHO this presents an unsophisticated notion of
right versus wrong.
By way of analogy:
At 10:49 AM 1/12/02 -0800, Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your credit card info goes to Palm
Computing, right? Check the certificate.
More
- Original Message -
From: Eric Rescorla [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; SPKI Mailing List
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, January 14, 2002 12:44 PM
Subject: Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Does a user
Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Does a user of ssl services care to know absolutely that they are
communicating verifiably with whom they believe they have contacted, or
does
the user care to know absolutely that their communication is
At 09:44 AM 1/14/2002 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Does a user of ssl services care to know absolutely that they are
communicating verifiably with whom they believe they have contacted, or does
the user care to know absolutely that their communication is
Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
At 09:44 AM 1/14/2002 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Stef Caunter [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Does a user of ssl services care to know absolutely that they are
communicating verifiably with whom they
At 02:47 PM 1/14/2002 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Meanwhile, the information that the user
really looks at to make a security decision (the Palm logo and the
little padlock) aren't related at all.
No possible security system can protect people who trust
whatever logo happens to be
Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
At 02:47 PM 1/14/2002 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
Meanwhile, the information that the user
really looks at to make a security decision (the Palm logo and the
little padlock) aren't related at all.
At 05:45 PM 12/26/2001 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
Phillip Hallam-Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Methinks you complain too much.
PKI is in widespread use, it is just not that noticeable when you
use it. This is how it should be. SSL is widely used to secure
internet payment
Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your credit card info goes to Palm
Computing, right?
No. It means that your credit card info
Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your credit card info goes to Palm
Computing, right? Check the certificate.
To be fair, most commercial
Michael Sierchio [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Carl Ellison wrote:
If that's not good enough for you, go to https://store.palm.com/
where you have an SSL secured page. SSL prevents a man in the middle
attack, right? This means your credit card info goes to Palm
Computing, right? Check
to be fair ... most commercial CA's have to verify with the domain name
infrastructure as to the owner of the domain name ... before issuing a SSL
domain name server cert. Note however, one of the justifications for having
SSL domain name server cert is because of concerns with regard to domain
Russ Neson writes:
3. Cryptography, and therefore PKI, is meaningless unless you first
define a threat model. In all the messages with this Subject, I've
only see one person even mention threat model. Think about the
varying threat models, and the type of cryptography one would propose
to
one of the largest financial networks ... slightly different kind
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#22
again financial ... discussion of additional kinds of risks/threats
Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs86.htm
Intro ...
The PAIIN model (privacy, authentication, identification, integrity,
non-repudiation) is inadequate to represent the uses of cryptography.
Besides the distinction between privacy and confidentiality, I'd like
to point out some additional uses of cryptography which either don't
fit at all or
Lynn,
I think you should specify confidentiality as another issue to be
addressed. Perhaps you include confidentiality in your privacy or
security subsections, but I've found that many people think (and
mean) different things when they use these two terms. For example, is
privacy necessarily
well PAIN is out of some standards organization (as is 3-factor
authentication) i agree that privacy and confidentiality is sometimes
thot of as different but others argue that it reduces to the
effectively the same requirements ... even tho different people have
different connotations
aka ... lots of people seem to equate privacy with personal privacy (as
well as legislative specification) ... while confidentiality has more of a
non-personal connotation
there seems to be 3-4 postings from yesterday that are still lost in the
ether ... they are recorded at
Andrew Odlyzko writes:
1. Cryptography does not fit human life styles easily.
2. Novel technologies take a long time to diffuse through society.
to which I would add:
3. Cryptography, and therefore PKI, is meaningless unless you first
define a threat model. In all the messages with this
somewhat as an aside ... the requirement(s) given the X9A10 financial
standards working group for the development of the X9.59 standard was
* to preserve the integrity of the financial infrastructure for all retial
electronic payments without the use of encryption
ALL didn't just mean internet
sometimes the principles of security are referred to as PAIN or sometims
PAIIN
see
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/security.htm
and click on PAIN PAIIN in the acronym section of the glossary.
Doing a threat model ... would include not only end-to-end issues but
what aspects of PAIIN are
another aspect that overlaps PKIs and quality is the difference between
application code and service code turning an application into a
service can be hard possibly writing 4-10 times as much code as in the
base application infrastructure and very high-quality code
dealing
somewhat as an aside the gift cards (and other flavors) that you see
at large percentage of retail check-out counters in the US are effectively
digital cash ... although the current incarnation results in a different
card at every retailer. however, they are online, magstripe-based digital
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The EWR monorail had been shut down for the better part of a year to correct a
pesky track corrosion problem (it's hard to get all the bugs out of a system
that is not widely used).
Thus making it a perfect analogy for PKI [0].
Peter.
[0] Before
everyday life has a lot of cryptography ... for instance ... there is quite
a bit of cryptography involved in every debit transaction (every time you
get money from ATM machine or use point-of-sale terminal).
a lot of PKI revolves around the business process of strong authentication
where
]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: 27 December 2001 21:42
Subject: Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
As I never tire of saying, PKI is the ATM of security.
Naah, it's the monorail/videophone/SST of security. Looks great at the
World
Fair, but a bit difficult to turn
On Thu, 27 Dec 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
given that authentication is being performed as part of some business
process or function ... then it is normally trivial to show it is easier
to have authentication (even digital signature authentication) integrated
into such business processes
]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: 27 December 2001 21:42
Subject: Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
As I never tire of saying, PKI is the ATM of security.
Naah, it's the monorail/videophone/SST of security. Looks great at the
World
Fair, but a bit difficult to turn into a reality outside the fairgrounds
, December 28, 2001 2:34 PM
To: Peter Gutmann; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: CFP: PKI research workshop
Let us see.
Monorails are commonplace in airports these days.
Web cams for online chat are used by millions of teenagers
SST ? What
both atm debit network and domain name infrastructure care capable of local
caching so that timelyness is within seconds to minutes (or a few hrs
as parameter within the needs of the infrastructure). the offline world for
certificates is the analogy of the letters of credit from the days of
Several of the comments about the slow uptake of PKI touch on what
seem to be two basic factors that are responsible for this phenomenon:
1. Cryptography does not fit human life styles easily. As an example,
truly secure systems would stop secretaries from forging their boss's
signatures, and
for the most part HTTPS SSL is certificate manufactoring (a term we coined
a couple years ago) infrastructure typically implies the
administrative and management which would require (at a minimum) CRLs
for a certificate-based PKI.
the interesting thing about the use of SSL domain name
Nelson Minar wrote:
Of course, client side certificates barely even exist, although
people made substantial preparation for them early on in the history
of all of this.
I used to be puzzled by this. Then a couple of years ago I went
through the process of getting a client-side certificate
it isn't that you move it to a central authority you move it to an
authority that typically is already established in association with
authorization ... aka in normal business operation, a business relationship
is established that typically consists of creating an account record that
has
As I never tire of saying, PKI is the ATM of security.
Naah, it's the monorail/videophone/SST of security. Looks great at the World
Fair, but a bit difficult to turn into a reality outside the fairgrounds.
Peter (who would like to say that observation was original, but it was actually
Nelson Minar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The thing that makes me the most sad is that the PKI situation only seems to
be getting worse, not better.
The reason for this is that as we work on PKI deployment, we discover more and
more (previously unknown) problems which need to be solved. If you
It seems to me that a very similar argument can be made regarding the
need (or lack there of) for a national identity card. Organizations
that require biometric identity can simply record that information in
their own databases. The business most widely cited as needing
national ID cards,
As I never tire of saying, PKI is the ATM of security.
Meaning that has a certain niche relevance, but is claimed by
proponents to be the answer to every need, and is the current magic
word for shaking the money tree.
-
The
Ray,
if you look at PKI as a financial mechanism (like credit cards),
then I see two major problems:
1. the PKI vendors aren't financial institutions, so they aren't in a
position to assume risk and make money from that
2. the current PKI thinking (e.g., with rebuttable
note that the certificate-based PKI is an offline model it is the
credit card model pre-1970. the certificate-based PKI tends to bear a lot
of other resumblance to pre-1970 offline credit-card model the CRLs
invention is very similar to the paper booklets that were mailed out to
possibly not the ATM you were thinking of certificate-less digital
signature authentication by NACHA/ATM/debit networks
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads
specific web page:
http://internetcouncil.nacha.org/Projects/ISAP_Results/isap_results.htm
financial industry standard for
again, why would the financial industry be interested in regressing (at
least) 30 years to a certificate-based offline model?
they do authentication of transactions that they also need to do
authorization for in a model that has prior business relationship
between the parties.
Methinks you complain too much.
PKI is in widespread use, it is just not that noticeable when you use it.
This is how it should be. SSL is widely used to secure internet payment
transactions. S/MIME use is significant and growing.
The financial industry is not looking at offline PKI models in
on Wed, Dec 26, 2001 at 07:45:13AM -0800, Carl Ellison ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
Ray,
if you look at PKI as a financial mechanism (like credit cards),
then I see two major problems:
1.the PKI vendors aren't financial institutions, so they aren't in a
position to assume risk
Phillip Hallam-Baker [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Methinks you complain too much.
PKI is in widespread use, it is just not that noticeable when you use it.
This is how it should be. SSL is widely used to secure internet payment
transactions.
HTTPS SSL does not use PKI. SSL at best has this
HTTPS SSL does not use PKI. SSL at best has this weird system in which
Verisign has somehow managed to charge web sites a toll for the use of
SSL even though for the most part the certificates assure the users of
nothing whatsoever.
To be fair, Verisign *is* a PKI. It's not the one a lot of us
PHB:
PKI is in widespread use, it is just not that noticeable when you use it.
This is how it should be. SSL is widely used to secure internet payment
transactions.
PM:
HTTPS SSL does not use PKI.
Could someone define PKI (beyond just what it stands for, Public Key
Infrastructure)? It
58 matches
Mail list logo
