It's a nice idea, and it's probably as safe as RSA with a modulus having
two prime factors, but it seems like Rivest-Shamir and Adleman already
thought about it. Indeed, the Handbook of Applied Cryptography
(which by the way is a great book, and is even online:
http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/ha
Pete Chown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> suggested a PKC formulation:
>>>Whereas in RSA you form a modulus n as the product of two primes p and
>>>q, in my scheme you set n = pqr, where all three are prime. The order
>>>of the multiplicative group modulo n is now (p - 1)(q - 1)(r - 1).
>>>You cho
>>Whereas in RSA you form a modulus n as the product of two primes p and
>>q, in my scheme you set n = pqr, where all three are prime. The order
>>of the multiplicative group modulo n is now (p - 1)(q - 1)(r - 1).
>>You choose e and find d such that de is congruent to 1 modulo
>>(p - 1)(q - 1)(r
According to well-informed sources in Her Majesty's Government,
Pete Chown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>This is a bit late since the patent expires in September. However,
>what do people think about this scheme? Firstly is it
>cryptographically reasonable, and secondly does it genuinely
This is a bit late since the patent expires in September. However,
what do people think about this scheme? Firstly is it
cryptographically reasonable, and secondly does it genuinely avoid the
scope of the patent?
Whereas in RSA you form a modulus n as the product of two primes p and
q, in my s
