<http://www.adn.com/outdoors/story/5849296p-5765085c.html>
Computerized outdoors idea serves users virtual baloney
(Published: November 28, 2004)
A Texas businessman wants to rig a robotic, high-power rifle to a Webcam
in a game park so people can punch buttons and "hunt''
At 11:35 AM 4/17/2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Adoption of anonymous e-money is to great degree hindered by the lack of
infrastructure to convert this currency to/from "meatspace" money.
However, there is possible a method, using offshore gambling companies.
You're trying too hard.
Gambling has alwa
Adoption of anonymous e-money is to great degree hindered by the lack of
infrastructure to convert this currency to/from "meatspace" money.
However, there is possible a method, using offshore gambling companies.
There may be a special kind of "gamble", that looks from the "outside"
like regular b
There is plenty of space available in the form of (normally unused)
payload of TCP SYN, SYN/ACK, and ACK packets. Could they be used to
announce the intention/capabilities for an encrypted connection,
eventually serve for authenticating the connection?
This way there would be virtually no overhea
On Tue, 20 Jan 2004, Brian Minder wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 19, 2004 at 11:58:56PM -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote:
> >
> > IDEA seems to be completely missing from everything everywhere :-( Does
> > nybody know how to enable openssl for IDEA (no, I don't require the
>
IDEA seems to be completely missing from everything everywhere :-( Does
nybody know how to enable openssl for IDEA (no, I don't require the
commercial license for this)?
Thanks!
--
Yours,
J.A. Terranson
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Unbridled nationalism, as distinguished from a sane and
While I agree with much of what you say I don't think it's likely that any
kind of advanced SIGINT operation was what brought him down. The most important thing
to have is intelligence from humans. From insiders. This is partly the problem with
the intelligence agencies today. They think
There's a good possibility that Saddam was traced by Tempest
sensing, airborne or mundane. The technology is far more sensitive
than a decade ago. And with a lot of snooping technology kept obscure
by tales of HUMINT, finks, lost laptops and black bag jobs.
For less sensitive compromising emanati
On Dec 14, 2003, at 8:33 PM, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
TEMPEST shielding is fairly esoteric (at least for non-EM-specialists)
field. But potentially could be made easier by simplifying the problem.
If we won't want to shield the user interface (eg. we want just a
cryptographic processor), we may put
ofing), and replacement of all potentially
radiating external data connections with fiber optic.
I should disclaim I have nothing that could vaguely resemble any deeper
knowledge of high frequencies; therefore I lay out the idea here and
wonder if anyone can see holes in it (and where they are).
> Thomas Shadduck writes:
- cute :) Though I am more often called Shaddup.
> > The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of
> > the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything
> > they signed gets compromised too.
>
> Technically th
Thomas Shadduck writes:
> The problem that makes me feel uneasy about SSL is the vulnerability of
> the certification authorities when they get compromised, everything
> they signed gets compromised too.
Technically this is true, but the only thing that the CA signs is
other keys. So it merely me
ver's authentication information, and
report any changes, like SSH does.
The location of the signature may vary; it can be stored in a default
place on the server (https://secure.server.com/cert-gpgsignature.asc), or
the location can be specified in a X509 field.
Is it a good idea? Could it f
dynamically generated pages, and to have many different signed parts on
one page. It should also allow manual checking of the signature, eg. by
curl http://url | gpg --verify
Feel free to use the idea if it is good.
Opinions, comments?
Moin,
Am Sat, 22 Nov 2003 14:54:39 +0100 (CET) schrieb Thomas Shaddack:
> A trick with HTML (or SGML in general) tag and a comment, a browser
> plugin(or manual operation over saved source), and a GPG signature
> over part of the HTML file should do the job, with maintaining full
> backward compa
There is a problem with images and other inline objects. There is a
solution, too.
The objects included into the document can get their hash calculated and
included in their tag; eg,
The tag has to be in the signed part of the document, so the hash can't be
tampered with.
Full digital signatures
. RFID-DETECTOR WINS GERMAN IDEA-CONTEST
==
The German civil rights and privacy-organisation FoeBuD is the winner of
an idea-contest for a national awareness campaign about the infringement
of civil liberties through new technologies. With the
I mentioned here the AT24RF08 chip here for couple times already. I got an
idea about another application for this nice toy.
For an encrypted data storage, the storage of the key is crucial. If the
key is recovered, everything is lost. Remembering 256 (or even 128) bits
is a hassle, a storage
And what is the purpose of connecting the key and data storage in the first
place ?
Data storage is data storage, concealed or not. You feed encrypted data to/from
it.
Key is required at human interface and has absolutely nothing to do with the
storage.
If you want better security than passphras
At 10:11 AM 8/17/03 -0700, Tim May wrote:
>Many evolved diseases _DO_ kill their hosts. Look around.
>
>It is true that there are tradeoffs in lethality, time to death, and
>virulence, and that a disease which kills too quickly and too many
>won't spread adequately, but quite clearly all of the dis
On Sunday, August 17, 2003, at 08:19 AM, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Evolved diseases don't kill their hosts. Google is too useful
to redirect. On the other hand, you can redirect an entire
TLD (eg .mil), albeit on one machine at a time. Try doing that
to one of The DNS Roots (pbut).
Many evolved
ort for everything you
do in an IP stack, buttloads of memory controllers, I/O up the kazoo,
and a dozen hardware-supported
thread contexts (hyperthreading) on each of a dozen high-clockrate RISC
engines.
But they all defer exception packet processing to the onboard ARM, which
might
alert the hos
At 01:19 PM 08/15/2003 -0700, Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
>Suppose malware appends a bogus entry to an infected machine's
>/etc/hosts (or more likely, MSwindows' \windows\blahblah\hosts file).
>(This constitutes a DNS attack on the appended domain name, exploiting
>the local hosts' name-resolution
Suppose malware appends a bogus entry to an infected machine's
/etc/hosts (or more likely, MSwindows' \windows\blahblah\hosts file).
(This constitutes a DNS attack on the appended domain name, exploiting
the local hosts' name-resolution prioritization.)
If the appended IP address points to the
sam
At 05:04 PM 8/11/03 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> This unit has to be cheap and expendable - it's easy to
>locate and to destroy by a HARM missile. As a bonus, forcing the
adversary
>to waste a $250,000+ AGM-88 missile on a sub-$100 transmitter may be
quite
>demoralizing.
Microwave ovens were us
The current developments in international politics, mainly the advent of
rogue states attacking sovereign countries from air, causes a necessity of
proliferation of cheap air defense solutions. Key part of air defense is
the awareness, usually maintained by a network of ground radar stations.
In t
> As an active twist, we can also use a separate unit, Illuminating
> Transceiver (IT), periodically broadcasting a pulse of known
> characteristics, easy to recognize by the LPs when it bounces from an
> aerial target. This unit has to be cheap and expendable - it's easy to
> locate and to destroy
Messing around TSCM.com, musing over detection of bugs. Getting an
immediate idea I'd like to get peer-reviewed.
There is a problem with bug sweeps in some countries. The legal TCSM
providers can be legally required to not inform the client about a
police-authorized bug, and/or legally forb
shoot the problem more, now that we've narrowed it
down a bit. I certainly was to a point where I was going to give up,
because I had no idea (get it? No "IDEA") whether the problem was in
OpenSSL or MixMaster. It seems people are sure this is the MixMaster
Install script. Maybe I'll grab the absolute latest Install script,
and compare it.
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Eric Murray wrote:
> >Looking for libcrypto.a...
> >Found at /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a.
> >./Install: [: 90701f: integer expression expected
>
> I think that line means that mixmaster's install script isn't
> properly identifying the version of Openssl. If it
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> IDEA is listed on the fourth line, so it seems IDEA was installed with
> OpenSSL, but MixMaster's install may be improperly detecting that IDEA
> is absent. It's when I run the Mixmaster install that I get the
> error:
>
On Sat, 22 Mar 2003, Eric Murray wrote:
> I think that line means that mixmaster's install script isn't
> properly identifying the version of Openssl. If it were
> me, I'd fix the Mixmaster install script.
The install script needs to die. I think nobody argues that point.
> BTW, if you will be
On Sat, Mar 22, 2003 at 09:40:50AM +, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> IDEA is listed on the fourth line, so it seems IDEA was installed with
> OpenSSL, but MixMaster's install may be improperly detecting that IDEA
> is absent. It's when I run the Mixmaster install
* Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2003-03-22 09:13]:
>
> Do a Google search for IDEA and the name of your OS or distribution to
> find out how to recompile with IDEA support enabled.
I might need my hand held on this one. I did an exhausting search
before posting. Part if the
Mindfuq wrote:
> I compiling the Mixmaster remailer, I get an error the
> OpenSSL was not compiled with IDEA support. However, OpenSSL
> was supposed to have compiled with IDEA out of the box, with
> only an option to disable it. What am I missing?
You in all likelihood fell vi
I compiling the Mixmaster remailer, I get an error the OpenSSL was not
compiled with IDEA support. However, OpenSSL was supposed to have
compiled with IDEA out of the box, with only an option to disable it.
What am I missing?
At 10:05 AM 3/18/2003 -0500, you wrote:
I think you're on to something here.
One quick thought that occurs to me is that for some of the gain, I see no
reason forward error correction couldn't be used within the IP payload, at
least for a few dB of gain (has this been tried?)
Both coding (e.g.,
the FEC, but it might be possible for that to look just
like good old Ethernet shared-bandwidth-based conjestion (but I'm no IP guy
so I could be talkin' out my arse here).
-TD
From: Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: [E
On Mon, Mar 17, 2003 at 03:13:46PM +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
> Using a powerful high-frequency modulated infrared source (eg, a bank of
> LEDs) located on a highly visible place, it couldbe possible to facilitate
> local community broadcasts, effectively sidestepping all FCC regulations.
Hi,
Another possibility occurred to me. It might be possible to use the
802.11-like devices for this purpose. The problem for this application
with Wi-Fi is its focus on high data rate and therefore low process
gain. But there is no inherent reason why almost the same circuits
(perhaps even the
At 03:13 PM 3/17/2003 +0100, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Using a powerful high-frequency modulated infrared source (eg, a bank of
LEDs) located on a highly visible place, it couldbe possible to facilitate
local community broadcasts, effectively sidestepping all FCC regulations.
Better to ignore low powe
snow are
apparently fine).
-TD
From: Steve Schear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Thomas Shaddack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, cypherpunks
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Idea: Sidestepping low-power broadcast regulations with
infrared
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 08:40:05 -0800
At 03:1
Steve Schear wrote...
I haven't checked but assume they should be relatively cheap. For example,
I'm assuming this device isn't too expensive and the sensor itself should
be available for a few $10s. http://www.ame-corp.com/UVB.htm
Perhaps I misunderstand what you would want to use this device
At 12:08 PM 3/17/2003 -0500, you wrote:
Steve Schear wrote...
"A detector that is only sensitive to this spectral region has the
capability to operate in the daylight, even while pointing at the sun, and
pick up little background radiation"
How much are UV receivers (note, not the same thing as
the broadcasting LED banks. The advantage is that we don't
have nearby sensitive receiver circuits that would be jammed.)
Maybe it's unusable. Maybe it isn't, and somebody will find some use for
this idea.
eping Internet
>monitoring. Most of them are doable as a technical matter, and all of them
>would be unnoticeable to us as we surf. Forbes columnist Peter Huber's
>idea is perhaps the most distilled version. Call it the return of the lock
>box. He asks for massive government dat
hi,
With reference to the following url
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750.txt
As in idea 1 what about choosing 2 independent bit
file streams.
Then as in RFC 1750 6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function
(page 14),
make a 3rd bit file stream such that We xor
For i=0 to n
bit(i)file3=bit(i)file1 (xor
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