At 12:58 AM 08/11/2002 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
>BTW, does anybody here know if there is still an email time stamping
>server in operation? The references that I found to such servers appear
>to be dead.
The canonical timestamping system was Haber & Stornetta's work at
Bellcore, commercialized
On Tue, 13 Aug 2002, James A. Donald wrote:
> To me DRM seems possible to the extent that computers themselves
> are rendered tamper resistant -- that is to say rendered set top
> boxes not computers, to the extent that unauthorized personnel are
> prohibited from accessing general purpose comput
--
On 12 Aug 2002 at 20:38, Mike Rosing wrote:
> I'm actually really confused about the whole DRM business
> anyway. It seems to me that any data available to human
> perceptions can be duplicated. Period. The idea of DRM (as I
> understand it) is that you can hand out data to people you
In discussing how TCPA would help enforce a document revocation list
(DRL) Joseph Ashwood contrasted the situation with and without TCPA
style hardware, below. I just want to point out that his analysis of
the hardware vs software situation says nothing about DRL's specifically;
in fact it doesn'
On Mon, 12 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> It is clear that software hacking is far from "almost trivial" and you
> can't assume that every software-security feature can and will be broken.
Anyone doing "security" had better assume software can and will be
broken. That's where you *start*.
On Mon, 12 Aug 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> His analysis actually applies to a wide range of security features,
> such as the examples given earlier: secure games, improved P2P,
> distributed computing as Adam Back suggested, DRM of course, etc..
> TCPA is a potentially very powerful security e
> It reminds me of an even better way for a word processor company to make
> money: just scramble all your documents, then demand ONE MILLION DOLLARS
> for the keys to decrypt them. The money must be sent to a numbered
> Swiss account, and the software checks with a server to find out when
> the
Seth Schoen of the EFF has a good blog entry about Palladium and TCPA
at http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-08-09.html. He attended Lucky's
presentation at DEF CON and also sat on the TCPA/Palladium panel at
the USENIX Security Symposium.
Seth has a very balanced perspective on these issues compa
David wrote:
> AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> >His description of how the Document Revocation List could work is
> >interesting as well. Basically you would have to connect to
> a server
> >every time you wanted to read a document, in order to
> download a key to
> >unlock it. Then if "someone"
- Original Message -
From: "AARG! Anonymous" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[brief description of Document Revocation List]
>Seth's scheme doesn't rely on TCPA/Palladium.
Actually it does, in order to make it valuable. Without a hardware assist,
the attack works like this:
Hack your software (which
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
>His description of how the Document Revocation List could work is
>interesting as well. Basically you would have to connect to a server
>every time you wanted to read a document, in order to download a key
>to unlock it. Then if "someone" decided that the document needed
11 matches
Mail list logo
