On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Mark Côté wrote:
> I actually like Gijs's proposal, to mirror *from* Phabricator *to* BMO.
> That way, if you're looking at the bug and want to pull someone in, you CC
> them; if you're looking at the fix and want to involve someone, you add
>
I ran some scripts that I had to find out tests that are *fully* disabled
on e10s, and posted the results to
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376934
In summary:
mochitest-plain: 49 tests
browser-chrome: 15 tests
devtools: 86 tests
Note that the script evaluates the skip-if condition
Hello Folks,
Bug 1372656 landed this morning, which means that Nightly now loads the
root certificate authority trust database asynchronously and shouldn't
block the main thread*. This should make startup faster, but it's a bit
experimental and improving PSM/NSS startup time is a work in progress
TL; DR: apply
https://github.com/froydnj/gecko-dev/commit/12a80904837c60e2fc3c68295b79c42eb9be6650.patch
to get faster --enable-optimize local builds if you are working on
Stylo or touching Rust in any way. Please try to not commit it along
with your regular patches. =D
You may have noticed
On 8/9/17 1:43 PM, Daniel Veditz wrote:
What do web pages do if they want to reflect a pretty URL into their page?
Cry, basically.
This is the fundamental reason I was opposed to this behavior change,
but apparently no other browsers care about this issue and we were
getting compat
On 8/9/17 1:55 PM, Henri Sivonen wrote:
I'm thinking of introducing a C++-implemented XPCOM object that the
JS-implemented XPCOM object can hold a reference to and that has a C++
destructor that does what I want.
Does that mean your action doesn't depend on which exact JS object got
For brevity and clarity I'm just replying to Dan here, but I am attempting to
address other points raised so far in this thread.
On Wednesday, 9 August 2017 13:07:08 UTC-4, Daniel Veditz wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 5:30 PM, Mark Côté wrote:
>
> > I am not sure how often
TLDR: Once bug 1387764 merges to mozilla-central, anybody running with
WebRender enabled on Linux will need to force-enable hardware
acceleration (layers.acceleration.force-enabled=true) to keep
WebRender enabled.
Long version:
Previously the check for enabling WebRender ignored the status of
On 9 August 2017 at 19:43, Daniel Veditz wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 9:57 AM, Valentin Gosu
> wrote:
>
>> This is a definite improvement in terms of web-compat. document.origin,
>> location.href, etc will from now on return punycode.
>>
>
>
On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 1:26 PM, Henri Sivonen wrote:
> What's the correct way to take an action right before a JS-implemented
> XPCOM object that acts as the implementation for a WebIDL interface
> gets garbage collected?
Taking action soon after GC would work for me as
On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 9:57 AM, Valentin Gosu
wrote:
> This is a definite improvement in terms of web-compat. document.origin,
> location.href, etc will from now on return punycode.
>
What do web pages do if they want to reflect a pretty URL into their page?
Will
On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 5:30 PM, Mark Côté wrote:
> I am not sure how often CCed users are involved with confidential bugs'
> patches
> [
> ] Anecdotally I have been told that a lot of the time users are CCed
> just to be informed of the problem, e.g. a manager might
TL;DR: we have made some changes to the nsIURI API that affect IDN domain
names
Before:
ASCII - GetAsciiSpec, GetAsciiHost, GetAsciiHostPort
UTF-8 - GetSpec, GetPrePath, GetHost, GetHostPort
Now:
UTF-8 - GetDisplaySpec, GetDisplayPrePath, GetDisplayHost,
GetDisplayHostPort
ASCII
On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 12:20 AM, Axel Hecht wrote:
> I think we should strive to have as few people as possible with general
> access to security bugs.
We do. We've reduced the number of people with access, and split the
"client" security group into ~10 sub groups so that
On Tue, Aug 8, 2017 at 11:38 PM, Nicolas B. Pierron <
nicolas.b.pier...@mozilla.com> wrote:
> However, users outside of the security group(s) can see confidential bugs
>> if they are involved with them in some way. Frequently the CC field is
>> used as a way to include outsiders in a bug.
>
>
>
On 08/08/2017 08:30 PM, Mark Côté wrote:
First I want to double check that this is truly useful. I am not sure how
often CCed users are involved with confidential bugs' patches (I might be able
to ballpark this with some Bugzilla searches, but I don't think it would be
easy to get a straight
What you are looking for sounds pretty much like my Backtrack project
[1]. It's still under development, tho, but I have strong motivations
to move it forward in Q4/17. The goal of Backtrack is exactly what you
are looking for - find the right scheduling prioritization. It's said
we don't
On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 3:36 AM, Boris Zbarsky wrote:
>
> Hmm. Do we load about:blank from the url bar in a content process?
>
>
Yes.
I agree, I find it annoying too that we have to rely on MOZ_DEBUG_CHILD_PROCESS
or MOZ_DEBUG_CHILD_PAUSE and that I have to be clever all the
On 09/08/2017 01:30, Mark Côté wrote:
If you have any thoughts on this, please reply. I'll answer any questions and
summarize the feedback with a decision in a few days. Note that we can, of
course, try a simple approach to start, and add in more complex functionality
after an evaluation
To answer the question not asked ;-)
I think we should strive to have as few people as possible with general
access to security bugs. The concerns the folks have when crossing
borders is awful. And just from a general risk profile. Saying that as
someone that neither has nor wants access to
On 08/09/2017 12:30 AM, Mark Côté wrote:
Hi, I have an update and a request for comments regarding Phabricator and
confidential reviews.
First of all, thanks for considering confidential bugs as part of this
process. This was my main reason for not using moz-review.
We've completed the
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