Re: WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Zack Weinberg
On 2012-04-13 6:37 PM, Adrienne Porter Felt wrote: I do agree that the proposal is mostly the same: I think that the permission should be granted at run-time, and there should be a notification. However, the way that the actual permission prompt is shown to the user is very important, and a run

Re: WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Adrienne Porter Felt
On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Lucas Adamski wrote: > Even from my casual poking around in app stores its clear many mobile > camera apps are applying realtime custom filters in preview, so we'd need a > pretty compelling case to discourage that entire class of functionality. > Yes. I had not

Re: WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Lucas Adamski
On Apr 10, 2012, at 5:59 PM, Adrienne Porter Felt wrote: > I'd like to propose the following based on discussions at Berkeley & with > others about camera access: > > -- The OS provides two trusted UI buttons. One has a photo icon, and the > other has a recording icon. Applications can embed th

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Johnathan Nightingale
On Apr 13, 2012, at 10:22 AM, Joe Walker wrote: > We can't and shouldn't, attempt to provide 100% protection for all forms of > stupidity here. This is a response to a specific class of problems, involving > some sort of viral propagation. > Therefore the long tail of sites doesn't need protectio

Re: WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Franzi Roesner
If you can have a way of accurately capturing a user's intent to use the camera/location in an application, you don't need a prompt. The buttons that Adrienne suggested in her original email (or at least the first email I saw) let you do this, or get closer to it. One of the reasons that existing

Re: Updated Re: Opt-in activation for plugins (aka click to play)

2012-04-13 Thread Jan Schejbal
Hi, please make sure that the UI shows which plugin (Java, Flash, ...) the user is about to enable. Use case: When I visit a page that is supposed to show a physics demonstration (one of the things where sometimes Java is still used), I need to know if it is Java or Flash before I enable it - Java

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Devdatta Akhawe
> I don't think that's a deal-breaker, it's a one-time mild annoyance at worst. > Make it a flag (pref) handled by Sync, and when you use > Sync to pull in your existing stuff it's a non-issue. Do you have a number on how many Sync users Mozilla has (vs. total users)? It is not a one-time mild an

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread joseph . walker
On Friday, April 13, 2012 9:16:11 PM UTC+1, Justin Dolske wrote: > On 4/13/12 10:49 AM, Tanvi Vyas wrote: > > > One thought I had was requiring that the very first time a user uses a > > developer tool, the user needs to go to Tools->WebDeveloper->Selected > > Devtool. After that, keyboard shortcu

Re: [b2g] WebAPI Security Discussion: Web Telephony

2012-04-13 Thread Mike Hanson
Some followup issues that came up in conversation: 1. There is a regulatory frame around E-911 that we need to understand. Do we need to indicate, through the API, that a device can be used for 911 calls but not other calls? 2. There are two distinct scenarios hidden in the use cases - one is

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Justin Dolske
On 4/13/12 10:49 AM, Tanvi Vyas wrote: One thought I had was requiring that the very first time a user uses a developer tool, the user needs to go to Tools->WebDeveloper->Selected Devtool. After that, keyboard shortcuts would work for all devtools. The developer wouldn't have to do anything else

Re: stealing saved passwords

2012-04-13 Thread Lucas Adamski
On Apr 13, 2012, at 6:25 AM, Henri Sivonen wrote: > On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 10:54 AM, Jesse Ruderman wrote: >> A wifi MITM attacker can steal all the passwords you have saved on >> http sites, by sending you to fake versions of each site and watching >> what the browser fills into the form. > >

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Tanvi Vyas
On 4/13/12 6:37 AM, Henri Sivonen wrote: The proposed scheme would fail to protect the long retail of sites while it would be annoying for debugging sites that use the directive. If a developer can override the directive via a preference, social engineering attack could tell excessively gullibl

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Joe Walker
On 13/04/2012 14:37, Henri Sivonen wrote: On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 12:42 AM, Tanvi Vyas wrote: Given recent social-engineering attacks, firefox no longer allows javascript in the address bar (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=656433). The same issue could exist with the Web Console.

Re: [b2g] WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Serge Egelman
Regardless, this is not incompatible with what we are proposing. Serge Sent from my iPhone, hence the typos. On Apr 13, 2012, at 8:27, Jim Straus wrote: > Actually, a lot of apps need access to the preview before starting to capture > (an image or video). Any app that wants to do realtime tr

Re: OpenWebApps/B2G Security model

2012-04-13 Thread Kevin Chadwick
This came across an android dev list. I hope mozilla can avoid anything similar. I knew android permissions could be bypassed by pre-installed apps, app communication etc., but I didn't realise how bad the situation was. Your probably already aware but just in case. "https://viaforensics.com/secu

Re: stealing saved passwords

2012-04-13 Thread Kevin Chadwick
On Fri, 13 Apr 2012 16:25:26 +0300 Henri Sivonen wrote: > (Dunno how important this > concern is. That is, I don't know how realistic it is for a MITM to > gain the capability to fake non-EV certificates but not to gain the > capability to fake EV certificates.) EV certs are pointless except for

Re: [b2g] WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Jim Straus
Actually, a lot of apps need access to the preview before starting to capture (an image or video). Any app that wants to do realtime transformations or effects will need the preview stream and then display it themselves. Also, there are a class of apps that do "pre-cording" so that you can cap

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Henri Sivonen
On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 12:42 AM, Tanvi Vyas wrote: > Given recent social-engineering attacks, firefox no longer allows javascript > in the address bar (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=656433). >  The same issue could exist with the Web Console.  An attacker could ask a > user to use

Re: stealing saved passwords

2012-04-13 Thread Henri Sivonen
On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 10:54 AM, Jesse Ruderman wrote: > A wifi MITM attacker can steal all the passwords you have saved on > http sites, by sending you to fake versions of each site and watching > what the browser fills into the form. Last I had the misfortune to be able to check, Firefox was h

Re: [b2g] WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Serge Egelman
Again, this is a complete misunderstanding. We are not requiring a button to start preview. We are requiring a button to start *capture*. No current camera app, of which I am aware, gets access to the preview data before the user actually starts recording or snaps a photo. This would completely

Re: [b2g] WebAPI Security Discussion: Camera API

2012-04-13 Thread Ben Francis
CC jcarpenter No mobile camera app I know of requires the user to press a button to start an image preview prior to capturing an image, the "viewfinder" starts as soon as you open the app. This requirement would really break the UX of the current B2G camera app. Preventing UI elements being overla

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Joe Walker
The argument is that the opt-in semantics of script-src (i.e. it's a whitelist) are spoiled by the opt-out nature of this protection (i.e it's a blacklist), so a new directive is better. Joe. On 13/04/2012 02:57, Devdatta Akhawe wrote: How about "no-user" as a source expression in script-sr

Re: no-user-js - New CSP directive to mitigate Self-XSS

2012-04-13 Thread Joe Walker
This would include Scratchpad. The Firebug console is disabled by default, and that seems (so far) like good enough protection. [1] The Error Console is preffed-off by default (would need to check but I think that's right), so by analogy with Firebug, I'm not too worried about that either. (