Re: Compromised certificate that the owner didn't wish to revoke (signed by GeoTrust)

2016-09-07 Thread Jakob Bohm
Given the specific name in those certificates, and the place where the private key was seen, I would guess the actual use case is this: Each router (presumably a SOHO router) contains a DNS server that responds with its own internal RFC1918 IP address for the name securelogin.arubanetworks.com an

Re: Reuse of serial numbers

2016-09-07 Thread Rob Stradling
See also: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=435013 On 06/09/16 18:55, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Tue, 6 Sep 2016, Kyle Hamilton wrote: > >>> That seems unlikely to me (in that browsers don't really keep a server >>> cert database). >> >> Has that changed? I talked with Dan Veditz (at Mo

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Rob Stradling
On 06/09/16 11:11, Rob Stradling wrote: > "UTN - DATACorp SGC" was also cross-certified by the "AddTrust External > CA Root" root [3], but we revoked the cross-certificates in December > 2015, invited Mozilla to add them to OneCRL [4] and disclosed them as > revoked to Salesforce [5]. (I don't kn

RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Richard Wang
Hi Gerv, Kathleen and Richard, This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end it, it doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s precious time. I make my confession that our system and management do have some problems which lead to the misissuance of some certificates. And I am very s

Re: Compromised certificate that the owner didn't wish to revoke (signed by GeoTrust)

2016-09-07 Thread Nick Lamb
Responding to the scenario Jakob described which I agree is likely in outline Let's Encrypt has seen a number of enquiries about relaxing their rate limits or granting some sort of exception so that firmware OEMs can use Let's Encrypt to have their devices self-issue using ACME from a name pool

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Gervase Markham
Hi Richard, On 07/09/16 11:06, Richard Wang wrote: > This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end > it, it doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s precious time. Unfortunately, I think we may be only beginning. I have prepared a list of the issues we are tracking with WoSign's c

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Richard Wang
Got it, thanks. We will reply to you soon. By the way, the link you used in the page to our report is not correct. Regards, Richard > On 7 Sep 2016, at 18:58, Gervase Markham wrote: > > Hi Richard, > >> On 07/09/16 11:06, Richard Wang wrote: >> This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Gervase Markham
On 07/09/16 12:14, Richard Wang wrote: > By the way, the link you used in the page to our report is not correct. Fixed; thank you. Gerv ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-s

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On 2016-09-07 13:00, Gervase Markham wrote: Hi Richard, On 07/09/16 11:06, Richard Wang wrote: This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end it, it doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s precious time. Unfortunately, I think we may be only beginning. I have prepared a list o

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Richard Wang
We posted all 2015 certificates, total 109,405 We almost finished 2016 certificates, till now, 129,426, not finished. All 392 cert is not from one serial number, it is from several serial numbers. Regards, Richard > On 7 Sep 2016, at 20:07, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > >> On 2016-09-07 13:00, Gerva

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Rob Stradling
On 06/09/16 19:12, Thijs Alkemade wrote: > Hello, > > We obtained 2 certificates from the StartEncrypt API which had SHA-1 > signatures and which were backdated to December 20, 2015. > > After WoSign announced that all certificates issued in 2015 were logged to > their Certificate Transparency

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Thijs Alkemade
On 07 Sep 2016, at 14:52, Rob Stradling wrote: > > On 06/09/16 19:12, Thijs Alkemade wrote: > >> Hello, >> >> We obtained 2 certificates from the StartEncrypt API which had SHA-1 >> signatures and which were backdated to December 20, 2015. >> >> After WoSign announced that all certificates is

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Rob Stradling
On 07/09/16 15:01, Thijs Alkemade wrote: > What is suspicious is: > > - Twice as many SHA-1 certificates being issued on a specific Sunday in > December than the daily average that month. (Which also happens to be the > date on the certificates which I personally got from the StartEncrypt API.)

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Gervase Markham
On 07/09/16 13:52, Rob Stradling wrote: > Hi Thijs. I agree that this pattern is interesting (and it'd be nice to > see an explanation), but I'm not convinced that it proves everything you > think it proves. Hi Rob, My digest of Thijs's work (and that of others investigating the same issues) is

RE: Compromised certificate that the owner didn't wish to revoke (signed by GeoTrust)

2016-09-07 Thread Steve Medin
This certificate was just revoked. Kyle, thanks for bringing this to our attention - we were able to start work once you posted here at m.d.s.policy. Kind regards, Steven Medin PKI Policy Manager, Symantec Corporation -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-poli

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread dymutaos
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 10:10:44 PM UTC-4, Richard Wang wrote: > ... we can't find the info what port is used, our CMS system just record this > order is validated by website control validation method, not record the used > port at that time. > > Why we can find out other 72 certificate

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Jozef Izso
Richard, why the report does not mention that the list of certs issued using high port validation is not complete and that you cannot properly find all the relevant information in your system? > On 7. 9. 2016, at 4:08, Richard Wang wrote: > > We checked our system that this order is finished t

Security concern on various domain validating methods

2016-09-07 Thread Han Yuwei
I raise this question because of the Wosign's incident about high port validating. Many CA use email validating such as send a email to webmas...@foo.bar, or put a specific file into the root of website. What I think is that this cannot validate *domain* is yours. It just verified you have the

Re: (Optional) list of participants

2016-09-07 Thread Kirk Hall
On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 8:28:53 AM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote: > While we try and evaluate contributions to this forum based on their > content rather than on who posted them, the issue has been raised that > it is sometimes useful to know where someone is coming from, who they > represe

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Wed, Sep 07, 2016 at 02:08:24PM +0200, Kurt Roeckx wrote: > On 2016-09-07 13:00, Gervase Markham wrote: > > Hi Richard, > > > > On 07/09/16 11:06, Richard Wang wrote: > > > This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end > > > it, it doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s preciou

Re: Security concern on various domain validating methods

2016-09-07 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 10:43:34 AM UTC-7, Han Yuwei wrote: > I raise this question because of the Wosign's incident about high port > validating. Many CA use email validating such as send a email to > webmas...@foo.bar, or put a specific file into the root of website. > What I think i

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-09-07 Thread Percy
On Wednesday, September 7, 2016 at 3:08:33 AM UTC-7, Richard Wang wrote: > Hi Gerv, Kathleen and Richard, > > This discuss has been lasting two weeks, I think it is time to end it, it > doesn’t worth to waste everybody’s precious time. > I make my confession that our system and management do have