Re: Google Trust Services roots

On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 11:02 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy wrote: > > Of all these, Starfield seems to be the only case where a single CA > name now refers to two different current CA operators (GoDaddy and > Amazon). All the others are cases of

Criticism of GMO GlobalSign Re: Google Trust Services roots

This is my second of three forks of this discussion on the transfer of 2 GlobalSign roots. This thread focuses on GMO GlobalSign because in my estimation they have put themselves in a precarious position that

RE: [FORGED] Criticism of Mozilla Re: Google Trust Services roots

> -Original Message- > From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy- > bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Peter > Gutmann via dev-security-policy > Sent: Friday, March 10, 2017 4:15 AM > To: Gervase Markham ; Peter Kurrasch >

Re: Criticism of Mozilla Re: Google Trust Services roots

On 10/03/17 06:41, Peter Kurrasch wrote: > * Types of transfers: I don't think the situation was envisioned where a > single root would be transferred between entities in such a way that > company names and branding would become intermingled. My own personal > opinion is that such intermingling

Re: [FORGED] Criticism of Mozilla Re: Google Trust Services roots

Kurrasch via dev-security-policy writes: >* Types of transfers: I don't think the situation was envisioned where a >single root would be transferred between entities in such a way that company >names and branding would become intermingled. This has

Re: Criticism of Mozilla Re: Google Trust Services roots

Most are not directed at me so I won’t respond to each item, but for several I think I can provide some additional context, see below: > * Manner of transfer: As we learned from Ryan H., a second HSM was > introduced for the transfer of the private key meaning that for a period of > time 2