> I'd recommend making a requirement that it be "protected" by at least as
many
> bits of strength as the key it protects. Not doing so could cause
compliance
> issues: things like PCI [1] and the NIST [2] recommendations require this
type of
> protection.
You don't have compliance problems becau
On Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 6:40:53 PM UTC-5, Wayne Thayer wrote:
> Ryan - thanks for raising these issues again. I still have concerns about
> getting this specific in the policy, but since we're now headed down that
> road...
>
> On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 7:13 PM, Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy
Ryan - thanks for raising these issues again. I still have concerns about
getting this specific in the policy, but since we're now headed down that
road...
On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 7:13 PM, Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> A few problems I see wit
On Tuesday, May 1, 2018 at 1:00:20 PM UTC-7, Tim Hollebeek wrote:
> I get that, but any CA that can securely erase and forget the user’s
> contribution to the password and certainly do the same thing to the entire
> password, so I’m not seeing the value of the extra complexity and interaction.
I
: Tuesday, May 1, 2018 3:49 PM
To: Tim Hollebeek
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to policy
> I'm not sure I agree with this as a recommendation; if you want both parties
> to provide inputs to the genera
> I'm not sure I agree with this as a recommendation; if you want both
parties
> to provide inputs to the generation of the password, use a
well-established
> and vetted key agreement scheme instead of ad hoc mixing.
> Of course, at that point you have a shared transport key, and you should
> prob
A few problems I see with the proposed text:
- What is sufficient? I would go with a definition tied to the effective
strength of the keys it protects; in other words, you should protect a 2048bit
RSA key with something that offers similar properties or that 2048bit key does
not live up to its
Thayer
Cc: Doug Beattie ; Buschart, Rufus
; mozilla-dev-security-policy
; Wichmann, Markus Peter
; Enrico Entschew ; Grotz,
Florian ; Heusler, Juergen
Subject: RE: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to policy
OOB passwords are generally tough to integrate into
, Markus Peter
; Enrico Entschew ; Grotz,
Florian ; Heusler, Juergen
Subject: Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to policy
The current policy seems inconsistent on the trust placed in passwords to
protect PKCS#12 files. On one hand, it forbids transmission via insecure
eattie via dev-security-policy
> > Sent: Monday, April 30, 2018 1:06 PM
> > To: Buschart, Rufus ; mozilla-dev-security-
> > policy
> > Cc: Wichmann, Markus Peter ; Enrico
> > Entschew ; Grotz, Florian
> > ; Heusler, Juergen
> > ; Wayne Thayer
> > Subject:
ug
> Beattie via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Monday, April 30, 2018 1:06 PM
> To: Buschart, Rufus ; mozilla-dev-security-
> policy
> Cc: Wichmann, Markus Peter ; Enrico
> Entschew ; Grotz, Florian
> ; Heusler, Juergen
> ; Wayne Thayer
> Subject: RE: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add
6684;
> WEEE-Reg.-No. DE 23691322
>
> > -Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
> > Von: dev-security-policy
> > [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+rufus.buschart=siemens.com@lists.m
> > ozilla.org] Im Auftrag von Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
> > Gesendet: Freit
he Nachricht-
> > Von: dev-security-policy
> > [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+rufus.buschart=siemens.com@lists.m
> > ozilla.org] Im Auftrag von Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
> > Gesendet: Freitag, 27. April 2018 19:30
> > An: Enrico Entschew
> > Cc
Am Montag, 30. April 2018 08:25:39 UTC+2 schrieb Buschart, Rufus:
> ---=== Intern ===---
> Hello!
>
> I would like to suggest to rephrase the central sentence a little bit:
>
> Original:
>
> CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer certificates in PKCS#12 form through
> insecure electronic channels.
On Fri, Apr 27, 2018 at 6:40 AM, Enrico Entschew via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I suggest to make the requirement „* The PKCS#12 file must have a
> sufficiently secure password, and the password must be transferred via a
> separate channel than the PKCS#1
I suggest to make the requirement „* The PKCS#12 file must have a sufficiently
secure password, and the password must be transferred via a separate channel
than the PKCS#12 file.” binding for both transfer methods and not be limited to
physical data storage.
Otherwise I agree with this proposal.
On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 8:01 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 20/04/2018 21:59, Wayne Thayer wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 6:10 AM, Buschart, Rufus via dev-security-policy <
>> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>>
>> I be
On 20/04/2018 21:59, Wayne Thayer wrote:
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 6:10 AM, Buschart, Rufus via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
I believe the wording "insecure electronic channels" leaves a lot of space
for interpretation. In corporate PKIs for email encryption
On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 6:10 AM, Buschart, Rufus via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> I believe the wording "insecure electronic channels" leaves a lot of space
> for interpretation. In corporate PKIs for email encryption it is quite
> common to transfer centra
cy
Subject: Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to policy
On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:22 AM, Jürgen Brauckmann via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>
> Am 10.04.2018 um 01:10 schrieb Wayne Thayer via dev-security-polic
On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:22 AM, Jürgen Brauckmann via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
>
> Am 10.04.2018 um 01:10 schrieb Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy:
>
>> Getting back to the earlier question about email certificates, I am now of
>> the opinion that
Am 10.04.2018 um 01:10 schrieb Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy:
Getting back to the earlier question about email certificates, I am now of
the opinion that we should limit the scope of this policy update to TLS
certificates. The current language for email certificates isn't clear and
any a
t; To: mozilla-dev-security-policy
>
> Subject: Re: Policy 2.6 Proposal: Add prohibition on CA key generation to
> policy
>
> Getting back to the earlier question about email certificates, I am now of the
> opinion that we should limit the scope of this policy update to TLS
> c
Getting back to the earlier question about email certificates, I am now of
the opinion that we should limit the scope of this policy update to TLS
certificates. The current language for email certificates isn't clear and
any attempt to fix it requires us to answer the bigger question of "under
what
On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 12:29 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> On 05/04/2018 18:55, Wayne Thayer wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 3:15 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos
>> wrote:
>>
>> My proposal is "CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer private ke
On 05/04/2018 18:55, Wayne Thayer wrote:
On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 3:15 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos
wrote:
My proposal is "CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer private keys and
associated certificates in PKCS#12 form through insecure physical or
electronic channels " and remove the rest.
+1 - I su
On Thursday, April 5, 2018 at 9:55:39 AM UTC-7, Wayne Thayer wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 3:15 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> wrote:
>
> > My proposal is "CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer private keys and
> > associated certificates in PKCS#12 form through insecure physical or
> > electronic
>> I don’t think you should include #2 because it's a common practice to
>> issue one certificate for Secure Mail that is used to both sign and
>> encrypt, and this would preclude CA key generation for those types of
>> certificates.
>>
>> I was attempting to match the existing "forbidden practi
On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 4:58 AM, Doug Beattie
wrote:
>
> I don’t think you should include #2 because it's a common practice to
> issue one certificate for Secure Mail that is used to both sign and
> encrypt, and this would preclude CA key generation for those types of
> certificates.
>
> I was att
On Thu, Apr 5, 2018 at 3:15 AM, Dimitris Zacharopoulos
wrote:
> My proposal is "CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer private keys and
> associated certificates in PKCS#12 form through insecure physical or
> electronic channels " and remove the rest.
>
> +1 - I support this proposal.
__
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Wayne
> Thayer via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, April 4, 2018 5:26 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-policy
>
> Subject: Policy 2.6 P
On 5/4/2018 12:26 πμ, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy wrote:
CAs MUST not distribute or transfer certificates in PKCS#12 form through
insecure electronic channels. If a PKCS#12 file is distributed via a
physical data storage device, then:
* The storage must be packaged in a way that the ope
On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 3:15 PM, Ryan Hurst via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Some thoughts:
>
> 1 - Should additional text be included to mandate strong cipher suites (
> http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=543) be used; it is not uncommon for me to
> find PKCS#12
Some thoughts:
1 - Should additional text be included to mandate strong cipher suites
(http://unmitigatedrisk.com/?p=543) be used; it is not uncommon for me to find
PKCS#12s with very weak cryptographic algorithms in use. Such guidance would be
limited by Windows which does not support modern c
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