>> I don't agree with the characterization of the second group. I would
>> say that we are partitioning messages into these two groups:
>> - Those for which we can confirm that they originated in the domain
>> they say they did.
>> - Those for which we can not confirm that.
>
> When we use P=REJEC
Alessandro Vesely wrote on 2021-07-21 19:41:
Some lists operate the evasion hack, a.k.a. From: munging, only if the
sender has p=quarantine or p=reject, some do it unconditionally, some
only if the mail is outbound, some only if the receiver is mail.ru.
Behavior doesn't seem to be settled yet.
On Wed 21/Jul/2021 19:24:35 +0200 Dave Crocker wrote:
On 7/21/2021 10:19 AM, John Levine wrote:
I suppose we could leave pct=0 as a hint to forwarders to turn on their DMARC
evasion hacks.
Why doesn't seeing DMARC as seeing that it isn't p=none ought to suffice for
that?
Some lists operate
> On 21 Jul 2021, at 18:24, Dave Crocker wrote:
>
> On 7/21/2021 1:28 AM, Laura Atkins wrote:
>> This is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a lot of companies and
>> domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0 detects forwarders and
>> other types systems that modify and b
> On 21 Jul 2021, at 18:19, John Levine wrote:
>
> It appears that Laura Atkins said:
>> -=-=-=-=-=-
>>
>> This is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a lot of companies and
>> domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0 detects forwarders
>> and other types systems that
On Wed 21/Jul/2021 10:28:36 +0200 Laura Atkins wrote:
[deprecate PCT entirely] is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a
lot of companies and domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0
detects forwarders and other types systems that modify and break DMARC
authentication. These
On 7/21/2021 1:28 AM, Laura Atkins wrote:
This is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a lot of
companies and domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0
detects forwarders and other types systems that modify and break DMARC
authentication. These systems are undetectable when
It appears that Laura Atkins said:
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>
>This is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a lot of companies and
>domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0 detects forwarders
>and other types systems that modify and break DMARC authentication. These
>systems are undete
At the University of Minnesota we used p=quarantine,pct=0 as a transition
between p=none and p=quarantine,pct=100 as it causes header "From:" to be
rewritten on DMARC-aware mailing list servers. I agree with Laura Atkins
that removing pct=0 will make DMARC implementation more difficult for some
or
Barry's comment:
I don't agree with the characterization of the second group. I would
say that we are partitioning messages into these two groups:
- Those for which we can confirm that they originated in the domain
they say they did.
- Those for which we can not confirm that.
When we use P=REJE
This is going to cause difficulties in deployment for a lot of companies and
domains. Experience tells us that p=quarantine pct=0 detects forwarders and
other types systems that modify and break DMARC authentication. These systems
are undetectable when p=none is in place.
I understand and supp
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