Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-10-04 Thread Scott Kitterman
It was the second. I personally don't have time to hunt through decade old email archives. That argument was made, but didn't carry the day. Scott K On October 4, 2017 2:15:02 AM EDT, Rick van Rein wrote: >Hello, > >Thanks to Scott for his feedback: > >> Making DKIM signing MIME aware was spe

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-10-03 Thread Rick van Rein
Hello, Thanks to Scott for his feedback: > Making DKIM signing MIME aware was specifically rejected during DKIM > development due to implementation complexity. I'm afraid I wasn't there, but would like to learn from the past. Any references are welcome. But what exactly do you mean by "implem

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-30 Thread John R Levine
I shall remove the reason of "security painting" by MUAs from the text. What remains is automated content processing (spam filtering) which still appears to be a sufficiently good reason on its own. It still appears to me that most of the difficult cases can be remedied in the proposed [but curre

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-30 Thread Rick van Rein
Hi, > http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/ > Thanks for this horror story. Mind-numbing, but useful work. I shall remove the reason of "security painting" by MUAs from the text. What remains is automated content processing (spam filtering) which still appears to be a sufficiently good reason

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-29 Thread Kurt Andersen (b)
On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 10:53 PM, Rick van Rein wrote: > > I also should add that the cryptographic design of ARC isn't clear to > me. I pointed out to the ARC authors that there is a lot of *how* but > little or no *why* to underpin what feels to me like a rather complex > set of computations,

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-29 Thread Elizabeth Zwicky
http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/ Is the most classic paper on the complete uselessness of icons. You’ll note that browsers have changed to putting up intrusive pages with unobtrusive ways to continue, among other options, instead of showing broken lock icons. Elizabeth zwi...@otoh.org

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-29 Thread Scott Kitterman
On Friday, September 29, 2017 07:53:50 AM Rick van Rein wrote: > > Also, there are more ways to change content that anyone can describe. > > Some of the harder to describe are recoding between 7 and 8 bit and > > base64, reducing the size and resolution of images (common on phones) > > and reorderi

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-29 Thread John R Levine
On Fri, 29 Sep 2017, Rick van Rein wrote: Thanks to John for reading the draft proposal. Marking content in an MUA is a WKBI*. There is no reason to believe that users would understand content marking or would make reasonable decisions based on it. Hmm. The idea was founded on the common rel

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-28 Thread Rick van Rein
Hi, > Also, among what you're talking about, I think the 7/8/base64 stuff > would be covered by his MIME canonicalization. Since most MIME content is binary, it would be helpfulto canonicalise individual body parts to their binary/pristine form. My current thinking is that even message/* is bin

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-28 Thread Rick van Rein
Hello, Thanks to John for reading the draft proposal. > Marking content in an MUA is a WKBI*. There is no reason to believe > that users would understand content marking or would make reasonable > decisions based on it. Hmm. The idea was founded on the common reliance of yellow/green bars to in

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-28 Thread Brandon Long
On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 3:58 PM, John Levine wrote: > In article <59c8d406.7000...@openfortress.nl> you write: > >I am looking forward to your responses. Please keep me in Cc: if > possible? > > I hate to be totally negative, but this draft revives a lot of things > that we considered and reject

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-26 Thread John Levine
In article <59c8d406.7000...@openfortress.nl> you write: >I am looking forward to your responses. Please keep me in Cc: if possible? I hate to be totally negative, but this draft revives a lot of things that we considered and rejected when we did DKIM. Marking content in an MUA is a WKBI*. Ther

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-26 Thread Rick van Rein
Hi, Thanks to Brandon for reading, and raking up the past :) It does sound like the rolling checksum is a new idea, so let me explain why I think it is useful, and note that you may know it from RSync. It helps in efficiently detecting the original text within an extended new text. If we have a

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-25 Thread Stan Kalisch
I apologize for this post. I was in a car accident, and it's affecting me more than I thought—you're obviously talking about MIME *bodies*. Again, my apologies to the list. Stan > On Sep 25, 2017, at 2:19 PM, Stan Kalisch wrote: > > >> On Sep 25, 2017, at 12:00 PM, Brandon Long wrote: >>

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-25 Thread Stan Kalisch
> On Sep 25, 2017, at 12:00 PM, Brandon Long wrote: > > > The mime body canonicalization is odd, what percentage of mail isn't > multipart at this point? iOS Mail (before 11, at least) does 7-bit text/plain mail by default. (If memory serves, this has something to do with Japanese SMS provi

Re: [dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-25 Thread Brandon Long
This is an interesting sketch, but it doesn't include the hard parts, so it's hard to know if it can provide what is needed. For example, will the rolling hash allow for exact boundaries of changes to be determined? Subjects are pretty short, how does a rolling hash handle that? I'm not familiar

[dmarc-ietf] Lenient DKIM (new Internet Draft)

2017-09-25 Thread Rick van Rein
Hello DKIM/DMARC list, I would like to propose a method for "fixing" the real-world problems that currently break DKIM. I am aware of the work on ARC, but in comparison this appriach: 1. is much simpler, with a simple cryptographic foundation 2. works without explicit support from message-modi