On Sun, 2014-06-08 at 17:21 -0400, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On your most recent message my Mac client says “Unable to verify
message signature”. Clicking on “Show details” it says that the
certificate is not valid, email address mismatch.
Thanks for that information. That's a
On your most recent message my Mac client says �Unable to verify message
signature�. Clicking on
�Show details� it says that the certificate is not valid, email address
mismatch.
Alpine said it was signed, with a note at the bottom about the signing
address. Thunderbird said it had no
On Sat, Jun 7, 2014 at 10:22 PM, David Woodhouse via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
DMARC really sounded good when it was first defined and spec’d. And it
DOES prevent spoofing a Yahoo or AOL address, but does nothing to
prevent spoofing a Yahoo or AOL user, (or Chase,
On Jun 9, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy superu...@gmail.com wrote:
For the banks, there's a much simpler solution anyway. Banks should be
S/MIME-signing all their customer-facing outbound mail, and a customer
should know with 100% certainty that if they get a mail which isn't
S/MIME
On Monday, June 09, 2014 10:35 PM [GMT+1=CET], David Woodhouse wrote:
On Mon, 2014-06-09 at 21:39 +0200, J. Gomez via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sunday, June 08, 2014 7:22 AM [GMT+1=CET], David Woodhouse via
dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sat, 2014-06-07 at 16:42 -0400, Larry Finch via
On Mon, 2014-06-09 at 13:49 -0400, Larry Finch wrote:
On Jun 9, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy superu...@gmail.com wrote:
My understanding is that (a) it's too hard for users to understand
how to set it up and how to respond when problems occur,
What is there to set up?
If your MUA
On Mon, 2014-06-09 at 21:39 +0200, J. Gomez via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sunday, June 08, 2014 7:22 AM [GMT+1=CET], David Woodhouse via
dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sat, 2014-06-07 at 16:42 -0400, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss
wrote:
DMARC really sounded good when it was first defined
On Sun, Jun 8, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Woodhouse via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
Any bank *not* signing its direct-to-customer email should be prosecuted
as an accessory to fraud which it is enabling by actively training its
customers to succumb to phishing :)
Since none of
On Sun, Jun 8, 2014 at 12:13 AM, Dave Crocker d...@dcrocker.net wrote:
On 6/8/2014 1:26 AM, Al Iverson via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sat, Jun 7, 2014 at 12:44 PM, Dave Crocker via dmarc-discuss
Keeping in mind that the mailing list scenario has always been
legitimate use,
SMTP relay was a
On Sun, 2014-06-08 at 10:52 -0500, Al Iverson via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sun, Jun 8, 2014 at 12:22 AM, David Woodhouse via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
Any bank *not* signing its direct-to-customer email should be prosecuted
as an accessory to fraud which it is enabling by
David,
On your most recent message my Mac client says “Unable to verify message
signature”. Clicking on “Show details” it says that the certificate is not
valid, email address mismatch.
Were you out to prove something?
best regards,
Larry
On Jun 8, 2014, at 1:36 PM, David Woodhouse via
On Jun 8, 2014, at 2:21 PM, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
David,
On your most recent message my Mac client says “Unable to verify message
signature”. Clicking on “Show details” it says that the certificate is not
valid, email address mismatch.
Were you
On Jun 7, 2014, at 3:50 AM, J. Gomez via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
The argument is that DMARC is a paradigm shift in email usage akin to the
paradigm shift of no-open-relays.
DMARC makes email so much more secure, as no-open-relays did.
Except, as I and others
On 6/7/2014 3:24 PM, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss wrote:
Except, as I and others have discovered in the past few days, DMARC does
NOT make email so much more secure,” as phishers and spammers have
already found workarounds to continue their assault. So all DMARC has
accomplished is to
On Jun 7, 2014, at 9:35 AM, Dave Crocker d...@dcrocker.net wrote:
On 6/7/2014 3:24 PM, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss wrote:
Except, as I and others have discovered in the past few days, DMARC does
NOT make email so much more secure,” as phishers and spammers have
already found workarounds
On Saturday, June 07, 2014 16:33:14 Dave Crocker via dmarc-discuss wrote:
...
We need to find a way to get objective and comparable information about
this.
...
If only DMARC had a mechanism for providing feedback so that people could
measure this and provide data. ;-)
Scott K
On 6/7/2014 4:56 PM, Scott Kitterman via dmarc-discuss wrote:
If only DMARC had a mechanism for providing feedback so that people
could measure this and provide data. ;-)
I'm pretty sure it isn't my jet lag that's causing me to miss the rest
of the details. For the question just posed --
On Saturday, June 07, 2014 17:00:25 Dave Crocker wrote:
On 6/7/2014 4:56 PM, Scott Kitterman via dmarc-discuss wrote:
If only DMARC had a mechanism for providing feedback so that people
could measure this and provide data. ;-)
I'm pretty sure it isn't my jet lag that's causing me to miss
Dave,
It would be worth documenting both the nature of how they are harder to
use and the extent of the effect.
There is a widely held view that the only effect is a bit of visual
ugliness, rather than of any serious user detriment.
The nature of the detriments experienced by Yahoo Groups
On 6/7/2014 7:31 PM, Franck Martin wrote:
But the claim is that these workarounds will mainly happen after you do DMARC
p=reject. This data is coming in a not too distant future now.
Keeping in mind that the mailing list scenario has always been
legitimate use, the concern is that we may be
On Jun 7, 2014, at 7:44 PM, Dave Crocker d...@dcrocker.net wrote:
On 6/7/2014 7:31 PM, Franck Martin wrote:
But the claim is that these workarounds will mainly happen after you do
DMARC p=reject. This data is coming in a not too distant future now.
Keeping in mind that the mailing list
Larry,
Except, as I and others have discovered in the past few days, DMARC does
NOT make email so much more secure, as phishers and spammers have
already found workarounds to continue their assault.
It can't by itself, no. It needs to be used together with some means to knock
out the
On Jun 7, 2014, at 4:14 PM, Shal Farley s...@roadrunner.com wrote:
Larry,
Except, as I and others have discovered in the past few days, DMARC does
NOT make email so much more secure,” as phishers and spammers have
already found workarounds to continue their assault.
It can't by
Dave,
That does get at attempts via the protected path, namely rfc5322.from
field domain.
However it doesn't permit measuring other aveneues of attack spoofing
the dmarc-using organization.
Hm... I guess there could be privacy problems with allowing a DMARC author
domain to request
On Jun 7, 2014, at 10:42 PM, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
On Jun 7, 2014, at 4:14 PM, Shal Farley s...@roadrunner.com wrote:
Larry,
Except, as I and others have discovered in the past few days, DMARC does
NOT make email so much more secure,” as
On Sat, Jun 7, 2014 at 12:44 PM, Dave Crocker via dmarc-discuss
dmarc-discuss@dmarc.org wrote:
On 6/7/2014 7:31 PM, Franck Martin wrote:
But the claim is that these workarounds will mainly happen after you do
DMARC p=reject. This data is coming in a not too distant future now.
Keeping in
On 6/8/2014 1:26 AM, Al Iverson via dmarc-discuss wrote:
On Sat, Jun 7, 2014 at 12:44 PM, Dave Crocker via dmarc-discuss
Keeping in mind that the mailing list scenario has always been
legitimate use,
SMTP relay was a legitimate use case (or at least was very loudly
claimed to be by those
On Sat, 2014-06-07 at 16:42 -0400, Larry Finch via dmarc-discuss wrote:
DMARC really sounded good when it was first defined and spec’d. And it
DOES prevent spoofing a Yahoo or AOL address, but does nothing to
prevent spoofing a Yahoo or AOL user, (or Chase, Wells-Fargo, Bank of
America, etc)
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