On Tuesday, 11 February 2020 22:21:05 UTC Linda Dunbar wrote:
> ...
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-problem-statement/
>
> During IETF 106, we received comments that the document should cover the
> problems associated with DNS service by different Cloud Operators f
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations WG of the IETF.
Title : DNS Resolver Information Self-publication
Authors : Puneet Sood
Roy A
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations WG of the IETF.
Title : Terminology for DNS Transports and Location
Author : Paul Hoffman
Filename: dr
Many thanks to Paul Ebersman and Suzanne Woolf discussion during NANOG about
the deep intricate issues around DNS and learned that DNSOP is the right group
to solicit feedback about DNS issues for utilizing hybrid Clouds.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-problem-state
Dear DNSOP,
I asked Dmitry to please bring this document to DNSOP for discussion;
DNSOP is where we generally discuss the use of different algorithms in
DNSSEC.
I'd appreciate it if the discussion can be kept to the DNS / DNSSEC
parts of the document (using the algorithms for DNSKEY, RRSIG, and DS
Dear DNSOP mailing list members,
Please see the announcement of the draft describing using the
GOST 2012 hash and digital signature algorithms for DNSSec.
The document pretends to update 2 IANA registries.
The 1st one implies the "RFC required" status:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-al
Hi,
We’re a few weeks away from IETF 107 in Vancouver, BC, so your chairs are
starting to put together the DNSOP meeting.
First, this note is our first call for agenda items. Send your requests to
dnsop-cha...@ietf.org.
The chairs will be reaching out to some draft authors about updates and
Dick Franks wrote:
>
> The troublesome length bytes can be avoided by (ab)using a generic URI
> RR instead:
Indeed :-) The reason I wanted to make the attack work with TXT was the
example scenario targeted ACME dns-01, so it's more pointed if we imagine
the attacker has very limited access to upd
On Mon, 10 Feb 2020 at 16:19, Tony Finch wrote:
>8
> When I was working out how a SHA-1 attack could work with TXT records,
> (https://www.dns.cam.ac.uk/news/2020-01-09-sha-mbles.html)
> one of the problems was that the collision blocks in the best attack so
> far are 588 bytes, which is too big
