On 12/24/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rob Brown wrote: I'm a
little curious, since you seem to talk about multiple voters switching their
vote togethermaybe this really represents a situation where there are
multiple equilibriums, as opposed to no
equilibriums
I updated my little article at http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.htmlIt's a good bit longer now, but still aims for relatively short and sweet. The idea is to show people exactly what bad things plurality does (force people into opposing factions) and how it can be fixed. I use approval voting
Lincolnhmmm.He was an incredibly polarizing figure at the time he was elected. The southern states were so angry he got elected that they seceded from the union as a direct result. Over the next 4 years half a million people died.
There was obviously a lot more to the civil war than that one
I'm not going to try to address each and every point in your long message (or Yves's) because we are still on completely different wavelengths and I suspect it would be an exercise in frustration.Still, I think there is hope. You seem to understand why median
works in the case of voting for a
I mentioned I'd dig up the way I have done a median with interpolated values to smooth out the quantized values.Since I'm of the picture paints a thousand words persuasion, I think you can figure out what I'm getting at from this image as opposed to a long description:
On 12/17/05, Simmons, Forest [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Rob, in my experience typically when there is a Condorcet Cycle there is no Approval Strategy A style equilibrium of the kind you posit in your second message on this topic.It had been under the understanding that there will always be at least
At first, one might argue that Approval is not subject to cycles as other methods, such as Condorcet methods are. From a vote counting perspective, it is not. You add up all the votes, and unless there is a true tie, it is completely unambiguous who wins. Very nice and clean.
After my little
On 12/8/05, Scott Ritchie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 18:40 -0800, rob brown wrote: Well, your example is not only a Condorcet cycle, but a pure 3-way tie in condorcet terms. It is effectively: ABC BCA
CABThen make it 5 ABC, 4 BCA, and 3 CAB, and watch the same
On 12/8/05, Scott Ritchie [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then make it 5 ABC, 4 BCA, and 3 CAB, and watch the same thinghappen.I looked into this a bit, and see what's going on and think it is easily fixable.My approach would be to stick with the conceptual point of view that each voter has one software
I'm gonna take another stab at a method that uses the UI of Range Voting, but tabulates it in a way that makes more sense. I'll admit, I actually like the fact that Range Voting collects very rich information about voter preferences, moreso than ranked ballots. (Of course this is no good if people
you are less likely to get ties, and more likely for it to stabilize. (I suppose I should follow that with I think)
-robOn 12/8/05, Scott Ritchie
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 17:10 -0800, rob brown wrote: I am going to guess a few things: 1) that it will be extremely rare
On 12/7/05, Warren Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Rob Brown:How much do you want your vote to count (check one):( ) As much as possible( ) 90% of as much as possible( ) 80% of as much as possible( ) 70% of as much as possible( ) 60% of as much as possible
( ) 50% of as much as possible( ) 40% of
On 12/6/05, James Gilmour [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This is the issue to which there has been no answer from those who suggested it.There is no problem with fixed scale range voting (because the fixed scale 'normalises' the contribution of every voter), but that is not what was proposed to maximise
When putting ballots into a pairwise matrix, we take a ballot like this:CA=DFand add one to C in C vs. A, add one to C in C vs. D, etc. But when we see an equal such as A vs. D (as well as implied equals like B vs. E, etc), we just do nothing.
Has anyone ever considered also adding one-half a
On 12/5/05, Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Has anyone ever considered also adding one-half a point to each of the equals?Yes. It's equivalent to using margins.Hi Kevin,Not sure I understand what you mean. Using margins in what sense?
The pairwise matrix is used for lots of things, from an
On 12/2/05, Warren Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So you are deluded in thinking that your kind of voting is more fundamentallydemocratic because it omits strength of preference information.Deluded is certainly a word that comes to mind regarding the suggestion that people will, in significant
On 11/30/05, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 01:51 PM 11/27/2005, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:At 07:11 PM 11/23/2005, Rob Brown wrote:Yes, but all it shows is the winner, and only if that candidate is
the condorcet winner.What if the winner is not a condorcet winner?Then the matrix
On 12/1/05, Steve Eppley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Briefly replying to two people's comments:Rob Brown wrote:-snip- I believe that condorcet elections intentionally ignore strength of opinion information for the exact same practical reason. Since
there is no way to avoid collecting some strength
On 12/1/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ah, but you contradict yourself. See
below.
Sorry if you don't want me mentioning borda, but the only way to get
around what you see as wrong is by doing exactly what borda does. And
that is bad.
Borda isn't the only way topreserve rank
Planning to. I'd like to have it stabilize a bit before I do that
though. There are a couple other issues as well we can talk about
offline...
But glad you like it...
On 11/29/05, Rob Lanphier [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Very cool!I notice that there's no explicit redistribution license listed on
I was thinking about Paul K's statement (in several different threads,
hence my top post) that condorcet elections throw important ballot data
away. I'm not trying to pick on Paul, but it got me
thinking. Trying to come up with a way to wrap my head around the
concept, I came up with a simplified
Does anyone know any good sources for sample ballot/pairwise matrix data?
I'm looking for both degenerate cases/extremes, as well as real/realistic data. The more samples the better.
I have something I wrote that generates random ballots by giving each
candidate a random point in space (an x y
In a couple recent discussions, I've found myself taking almost
contradictory positions on whether the pairwise matrix is raw data or
results.
In one discussion, where I advocated a more grokkable output format,
I argued that the pairwise matrix is effectively raw datathat is,
it is the input
One of the things I am trying to research now -- without much success -- is what are the real
world effects of various election methods, or specifically, of failures
to meet various criteria of election methods. My searches have
not turned much up on the web, other than mentions of Duvergers law
Paul Kislanko kislanko at airmail.net writes:
This is my philosophical objection to vote-counting methods that use the
pairwise-matrix as input. You cannot map the pairwise matrix to the voters'
ballots unambiguously, so any such method is by definition not
transparent.
I believe any valid
Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com writes:
Who is claiming Condorcet does not start with ballots?
Sure seems that Paul is. That seems to be the whole reason he doesn't like it,
because it begins with the pairwise matrix.
(myself, I would consider the pairwise matrix to be a halfway
Why do you need to break ties? Wouldn't it make more sense to consider ties to
be ranked equally?
If you are trying to do it in as few ballots as possible, you might also
consider leaving tied candidates in their previous relative sort position (from
the last time through the loop).
The problem
RLSuter at aol.com writes:
It's a nice article and nicely formatted.
Thanks. And yes, I cleaned up the title. :)
What do you plan to
link to the underlined word in the bottom box for people wanting
to learn more about tabulating ranked ballots?
Hopefully an article I write myself,
Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu writes:
Your little essay about how political parties form aka movie night
started out nice but got lame at the end.
You mean the happily ever after part? (I'll agree that was lame and was kind
of a joke. I would like to find a better ending)
Or is there
Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr writes:
However, I'm still unable to picture the real world consequenses of
minsum/dodgson's problems. Similar candidates would help each other,
But this means that factions can deliberately nominate multiple candidates
solely because it may help, and
I keep making attempts at writing some sort of article to explain what
is wrong with our (well, the US's) voting system. Here's my
latest attempt:
http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
The point is to be as short and sweet as possible but get the idea
across to average people with short
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax abd at lomaxdesign.com writes:
Color (even gray scale) can instantly show the Condorcet winner in a
pairwise matrix. I'll use gray scale. When the candidate naming the
row wins, leave the background color of the cell white. When the
column candidate wins, gray it. The
Oops silly me forgot the link!
http://karmatics.com/voting/bargraphs.html
-rob
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On 11/21/05, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
An aside - Plurality is not broken - it does EXACTLY what it was designedto do.Problem is that those of us who bother to think about it wantsomething else.
I suppose if what you say it was designed to do is select the
plurality winner, well yeah,
Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr writes:
Beatpath(wv) satisfies clone independence, monotonicity,
plurality, minimal defense, Condorcet Loser, Local IIA,
always elects from Schwartz, always elects from the CDTT..
It'll be very hard to meet the same properties if you
design method from
On 11/22/05, Rob Lanphier [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If all you're looking for is something better than IRV that can beboiled down to a single score, you're better off going with Approval orRange.My sense is that by insisting on shoehorning a Condorcet winnermethod into a single score, you're
Rob LeGrand honky1998 at yahoo.com writes:
Rob Brown wrote:
The candidate with the smallest sum of all losing margins is
the winner.
See the description of what I call Dodgson at
http://cec.wustl.edu/~rhl1/rbvote/desc.html
Yes that is exactly what I meant. Thanks!
-rob
Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr writes:
Actually plurality only fails half of it. Plurality isn't sensitive to
cloning losers.
Ok, well what plurality does with cloning winners is so bad that it results in
the partisan stuff that we have today in Washington and elsewhere.
Minmaxseems to
Gervase Lam gervase.lam at group.force9.co.uk writes:
I don't know what you mean by normalisation here, but it usually means
some scaling up or down (i.e. multiplication or division). What I would
do is probably apply the following formula to get each candidate's
score.
Candidate's Score =
Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com writes:
Plurality is simple, people are used to it, and it is, usually, good
enough
Yes, agree with your first two points, STRONGLY disagree that plurality is
usually good enough.
I hear plenty of complaining about how partisan our government is, I
On 11/22/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Defend the statement that Condorcet looks at ALL that the voters say. Nomethod that begins counting from a pairwise matrix can do that. Furthermore,there are numerous Condorcet methods because there are numerous ways to
distinguish between the
Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr writes:
I'd just use the beatpath ordering (that is, candidate A has a
stronger beatpath to every other candidate than vice versa and so
wins; candidate B has a stronger beatpath to everyone but A, etc.).
But you seem to not want this because it doesn't
Gervase Lam gervase.lam at group.force9.co.uk writes:
If I remember rightly, Forest and then I came up with MinMax(wv) or
other MinMax Condorcet method. This is probably the easiest way to get
scores from a Condorcet method.
...
Is MinMax good enough?
Yeah, I just realized (see my reply
Wow no one?
I'll try to reword since my first explanation was rather rambly and not all that
clear.
The candidate with the smallest sum of all losing margins is the winner.
I've done my best to see if someone has proposed it and can't find it anywhere.
I see minisum mentioned here and there,
Hi, I haven't been around for a good while but some of you may remember me.
I have recently been playing around with some stuff for scoring
condorcet elections, and ran into a question that seemed obvious but
maybe not:
Is it possible, in any of the Condorcet election methods (beatpath,
ranked
Ok, I see what you are saying. If there is a condorcet winner,
that candidate will have more pairwise wins than any other
candidate. But just because someone has more pairwise wins does
not make that candidate the condorcet winner. Fair enough.
Thanks.On 11/16/05, Scott Ritchie [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 11/16/05, Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But the original condition was that there was NO condorcet winner, so theremust be more than nine candidates.
Yes, Scott was replying to my simplified variant of the question.
I was confusing a Condorcet tie with a tie for the number of
James Green-Armytage jarmyta at antioch-college.edu writes:
Actually getting rid
of the EC via a federal amendment would be extremely difficult, but
gradually undermining it on a state-by-state basis is quite feasible.
Not sure why Colorado is doing this, but I doubt many other states will
Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu writes:
Hi,
James G-A replied to Rob B:
Suppose instead it were winner-takes-all except when
the vote is really close:
I've exaggerated because of the limitations of the
text font. When I say really close I'm thinking
about within 1%,
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004 06:27:50 -0400, James Green-Armytage
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If I lived in a swing state, I would be all for a proportional
allocation. It's just more fair, less unstable. Who really wants to be in
the middle of the kind of craziness that they have in Florida these
Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu writes:
Rob B asked:
Steve Eppley writes:
But recounts could still be important, you've just
moved the linewhat if it was a difference
0.4% and the election hung on whether it
was possibly really 0.5%?
I'm afraid I don't yet
This is really sweet.
The only minor quibbles are
1) when you sort it, the default is to put highest scoring candidate at the
bottom rather than the top, so you have to click again (or scroll down the
page) to see what you did.
2) Since you can easily specify ties, the sorting can be a bit
Rob Lanphier robla at robla.net writes:
Thanks for the feedback. Before replying, I'm going to point out a
new, alternate version of the script:
http://electorama.com/2004/condorcetballot/?rate=scale
I don't like it as much as the original, at least not in its current form.
Interesting
Any slashdotters here?
There is a discussion now which can draw some exposure to election issues,
http://politics.slashdot.org/politics/04/09/13/1249231.shtml?tid=4tid=219
I posted the following, which if it gets any more mod points it might be
selected as one of the 10 questions for
Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de writes:
Dear Rob!
you wrote:
In a ranking, I cannot tie A=C, B=C, A=D, and B=D
and simultaneously express AB and CD.
True, and you shouldn't be able to, because that is (in my opinion) illogical
and contradictory.
But some ranking systems DO allow you
Paul Kislanko kislanko at airmail.net writes:
I find it amazing that the list thinks we should ignore voters' preferences
when defining an election method.
Well, if you are going to respect all their preferences, even if those
preferences are contradictory, why not also have ballots that
Paul Kislanko kislanko at airmail.net writes:
To which I reply you are entitled to your opinion, but if you cannot prove
that all orderings of n-1 candidates by a single voter will be consistent
with the orderings of n candidates by THE SAME voter for ALL voters, then
your opinion doesn't
To me it makes no sense to have a cyclic individual preference. I at least
can take comfort in knowing that Condorcet considered it non-rational (because
he considered the fact that collective preferences can have this quality to be
a paradox)
From a pragmatic point of view, I think it is
David GLAUDE dglaude at gmx.net writes:
Releasing into public domain is not really the best choice if at all
possible...
Why not?
Who are we to judge on somebody else democracy?
Let's try to fix our problem first...
I didn't suggest we TRY to fix anyone else's problems, I just said, if
first choice and Bush my second), I better go ahead
and check some 2nd and 3rd choices and such.
-rob
Rob Brown
http://www.karmatics.com/voting/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
This is a very good idea, and I will help if I can.
Some time ago, I had the idea to start a site with the goal of convincing
Nader fans that voting for him was a bad idea, but unlike other such sites,
mine would have a technical emphasis and explain why our plurality system is
so broken (and
Paul Kislanko kislanko at airmail.net writes:
Yep. You got it. Kerry's hold on his votes is very tenuous. If he even looks
like he's asking Nader for help, he's toast.
That's crazy. I don't doubt that there is *someone* out there that thinks
that illogically, but given that this would
Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com writes:
I propose a ballot looking just like plurality would use to let voters
mark an X for one candidate. Here voters could rank as many of the
candidates as they chose:
Either 0-9 or A-Z would be permitted, but not a mixture unless you
can
Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com writes:
Agreed BUT:
If someone writes usable code, AND makes it public, what stops someone
else copying the code without paying those who did the work?
One thing that would work is that the federal government contracts that the
code be written,
One of the biggest problems with ranked choice voting (whether it be tabulated
by a condorcet method or IRV or whatever) is that ballots can be rather
complex and it would presumably be expensive to implement as well as to
educate people on how to vote (true, interfaces like this one I did
Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net writes:
At 8:50 PM + 8/31/04, Rob Brown wrote:
Has anyone ever proposed such a thing?
Yes.
What do they call it? Is there any site out there which talks about it?
With software, providing such a feature would be trivial. Each
candidate could provide
Eric Gorr eric at ericgorr.net writes:
If you choose to not pick one from this list, you can do the rankings
yourself. I can't imagine this would not be important for general
acceptance. People will want the option even if most do not use it.
Well, one of the main marketing benefits of the
, you say you would
demand it, but on the other hand, you seem to say there is no advantage to it?
At 10:09 PM + 8/31/04, Rob Brown wrote:
I'm not sure how you can say that people will demand such an option.
Because I would demand such flexibility. I do not consider myself to
be eccentric
James Gilmour jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk writes:
If you really believe in democracy as representation of the people I don't
see how you can support
any form of so called proxy voting in which you hand over this critical
decision of choosing YOUR
representative(s) to a candidate or a party.
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com writes:
There's a website that describes an interesting solution to the
lesser-of-2-evils problem, a solution that works even with Plurality:
Say you prefer Nader, but you're going to vote Democrat, in the belief that
that's the only way to keep the
Dr.Ernie writes:
snip
I appreciate your perspective, but I'm not quite sure what exactly we
disagree about. If I remember correctly, we were talking about parties
per so, not the electorate. Thus, there's at least three issues
involved, and I'm not sure which one(s) you're commenting on.
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar drernie at radicalcentrism.org writes:
However, the root of the split is, at the end of the day, the
polarized ideologies of conservatism and liberalism that anchor the
hard-core base of each party, and drives politics at the local level.
As long as both parties
Dr. Ernie Prabhakar drernie at radicalcentrism.org writes:
However, the root of the split is, at the end of the day, the
polarized ideologies of conservatism and liberalism that anchor the
hard-core base of each party, and drives politics at the local level.
As long as both parties
At 04:14 AM 10/30/2003, you wrote:
Sorry if I wasn't clear - I have no objection to using Condorcet to select
the winner - I applaud that and really like the voting interface. I am just
struggling with how to make the scalar values meaningful as intermediate
results.
And I am struggling with the
At 08:48 PM 10/27/2003, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I read these two threads thru 2130 EST on Monday, but choose to respond to
this original.
Looks like a GREAT idea, though a few details disturb me.
You talk of a primary customer, who would give their users some experience
with Condorcet, but as
At 09:00 AM 10/28/2003, Paul Kislanko wrote:
If I were going to display intermediate results in a Condorcet election I
think this is how I would do it. It presents all the information the
voters need to see how their candidate is doing compared to all of the
others. (I usually convert all of
At 01:29 PM 10/29/2003, you wrote:
Agree. They want Borda. You want Condorcet.
Well, maybe. I want to give them something as intuitive as Borda in terms
of showing a nice pretty set of scores that mere mortals can wrap their
heads around, as well as being correct in terms of being non-strategic
At 01:27 PM 10/29/2003, you wrote:
Well, finding a set of scores that reflect the way the election was
decided is
not hard. For example, using beatpath scores of each loser against the
winner
works. The real trick is finding a set of scores that convey information you
actually care about.
At 01:00 PM 10/26/2003, Paul Kislanko wrote:
As I said above, not seeing the others' votes is only important in
elections. In the ezboard-type environment (I am a user of ezboards, and for
sure their polls need some help - as they are today they are pointless and
worse than useles) But these
At 02:56 PM 10/26/2003, Adam Haas Tarr wrote:
Looks like a promising idea, Rob.
Thanks!
Here is a UI I am working on for doing for ranking
candidates:http://weblogz.com/voting/2000pres.html
This demo is of course based on the 2000 presidential election, and allows
you to rank candidates with
At 11:26 AM 10/26/2003, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Not a bad interface, but how do I vote? I got to order my candidates, but
there was no submit button
Thanks. I added a submit button (still at
http://weblogz.com/voting/2000pres.html ), but clicking it doesn't do
anything yet. (sorry, I am doing
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