Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi,
>
> (Responses to Juho and Dan)
>
> --- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>
>> Kevin, you maybe already know/guess my answer. B is only 2 votes
>> short of being a Condorcet winner. C would need 3 and A 5 votes.
>>
>> In your comments I note that you may think that l
Hi,
(Responses to Juho and Dan)
--- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Kevin, you maybe already know/guess my answer. B is only 2 votes
> short of being a Condorcet winner. C would need 3 and A 5 votes.
>
> In your comments I note that you may think that listing a candidate
> (higher than
Regarding
"Regarding voting power given to the voting junkies...
I tried to alleviate that a bit, by saying it would end at a random time.
So as long as everyone has a chance to come back and tweak their vote 3 or 4
timeswould that be enough? I'm guessing...but can't be sure...that it
would r
This is a rather slow-to-compute method, so I won't be doing millions of
simulations. In fact, I'll only be using one ballot set (with 100
candidates):
1 seat: Winner is at position 0.49847145579341479 (~1/2)
2 seats: Winners are at positions 0.3215501867015067 (~1/3),
0.66554092474796411 (~2/
Paul, thanks for the reply, and with your permission I posted your entire
reply to the list
On Dec 30, 2007 8:51 PM, Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Funny, I was imagining the same sort of real-time results and
> changeable-vote-based-upon real-time-results in conjunction with a C
In the spirit of keeping things stirred up here, I have a question for those
who advocate Approval. Well, I guess if you don't advocate it, you are
welcome to answer it as well. But I think this would explain a lot to me
about the benefits and drawbacks of Approval, if I understood how others
res
We say "rcv", claiming that the IRV backers have done well in promoting
"almost" what we want to sell - we are basically agreed on ballots, but go
our own ways on counting votes.
We can brag that in most races simply counting the votes gives us a clear
winner.
Then we get to cycles, and have n
First, a more efficient implementation of the method for simulation
purposes:
def sntv_winners(num_candidates, num_winners):
"""Simulate an SNTV election under a uniform linear political
spectrum."""
candidates = [random.uniform(0, 1) for dummy in xrange(num_candidates)]
candidates.s
Juho wrote:
> Kevin Venzke replied to Rob Brown:
>
>
>> You say you don't see much point in discussing various Condorcet
>> methods.
>> The ones that I don't like have the quality that sometimes when the
>> quantity of voters who rank candidate A, and don't rank candidate B
>> at all,
>> is
Jonathan Lundell >Sent: 30 December 2007 21:15
> > Jonathan Lundell > Sent: 30 December 2007 19:22
> >> I've posted the tally sheet (I don't know whether it's official; I got
> >> it informally from one of the candidates), temporarily, for anyone
> >> who might be interested:
> >>
> >> http://h
On Dec 30, 2007 3:57 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Rob,
>
> Thanks for answering my questions here. Comments below.
>
> Unfortunately your method didn't do what I was hoping here, which was to
> elect B. Suppose we try this one instead:
>
> 46 A
> 24 B
> 30 C>B
> Would I be corre
Kevin Venzke replied to Rob Brown:
> You say you don't see much point in discussing various Condorcet
> methods.
> The ones that I don't like have the quality that sometimes when the
> quantity of voters who rank candidate A, and don't rank candidate B
> at all,
> is larger than the quantity o
Rob,
Thanks for answering my questions here. Comments below.
--- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Not sure what you are referring to as "my method". I use DSV as an
> explanatory device (i.e. "a software agent which takes your preferences
> as
> input and produces the most strategic app
On Dec 30, 2007 7:05 AM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > that is a bad recommendation, since it implies condorcet voting (the
> > > > only method where every voter has the same strength), which is
> > nowhere
> > > > near as utilitarian as range voting.
> > >
> > > Debatable.
> >
>
On Dec 30, 2007 2:53 PM, rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> In the past, I tossed out a proposal (intended more as a thought
> experiment than a practical suggestion) for a DSV method that voters entered
> cardinal ratings:
>
> http://listas.apesol.org/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.c
On Dec 30, 2007 6:51 AM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Rob,
>
> --- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit:
> > Anyway, as I'm sure you know, that system (rank/rate your candidates
> > honestly, let the system generate the most strategic approval ballot) is
> > simply DSV, and it works
On Dec 30, 2007, at 1:28 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Jonathan,
>
> --- Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>>> I didn't quite understand your post... In the first part of your
>>> post you
>>> seemed to be discussing the strategy of selecting the candidate you
>>> want to
>>> win. It didn
On Sat, 29 Dec 2007 20:31:13 -0800 CLAY SHENTRUP wrote:
> On Dec 29, 2007 7:03 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>Somehow we are not talking the same language.
>>
>>An example that could be executed, with voters each splitting candidates
>>into two groups (as many as they choose into
Jonathan,
--- Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > I didn't quite understand your post... In the first part of your
> > post you
> > seemed to be discussing the strategy of selecting the candidate you
> > want to
> > win. It didn't seem you were discussing the voting strategy onc
On Dec 30, 2007, at 12:53 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
> Jonathan Lundell > Sent: 30 December 2007 19:22
>> I've posted the tally sheet (I don't know whether it's official; I
>> got
>> it informally from one of the candidates), temporarily, for anyone
>> who
>> might be interested:
>>
>> http://h
Jonathan Lundell > Sent: 30 December 2007 19:22
> KPFK (the LA member of the Pacifica radio network) recently held its
> election for its Listener Station Board. They used STV to elect 9
> board members and 5 alternates. 2246 ballots were counted by hand,
> using a spreadsheet as a tally aid
On Dec 30, 2007, at 12:22 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> I didn't quite understand your post... In the first part of your
> post you
> seemed to be discussing the strategy of selecting the candidate you
> want to
> win. It didn't seem you were discussing the voting strategy once you
> know
> what
Jonathan,
I didn't quite understand your post... In the first part of your post you
seemed to be discussing the strategy of selecting the candidate you want to
win. It didn't seem you were discussing the voting strategy once you know
what you want. So how could this become easier when you're allow
Jonathan Lundell > Sent: 30 December 2007 18:55
> > On Dec 30, 2007, at 2:14 AM, Dan Bishop wrote:
> > In the coming weeks/months/whenever-I-feel-like-it, I will be performing
> > simulations to evaluate the performance of multi-winner methods. In
> > order to do this, I will make the assumptions
On Dec 30, 2007, at 11:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
> There are fractional votes even in the
> first round, for reasons I don't understand.
Dan Bishop suggests that this is because of equal rankings, and it
looks from the tally that this indeed was the case. Mystery solved.
Mystery remaining
KPFK (the LA member of the Pacifica radio network) recently held its
election for its Listener Station Board. They used STV to elect 9
board members and 5 alternates. 2246 ballots were counted by hand,
using a spreadsheet as a tally aid.
There were 27 rounds. Curiously, a write-in candidate
On Dec 30, 2007, at 2:14 AM, Dan Bishop wrote:
> In the coming weeks/months/whenever-I-feel-like-it, I will be
> performing
> simulations to evaluate the performance of multi-winner methods. In
> order to do this, I will make the assumptions that:
>
> * There is a uniform linear political spect
Hi,
Steven J. Brams and M. Remzi Sanver wrote this in a Dec 2005 paper:
"A majority-preferred candidate is likely to have a more coherent point of
view than an AV winner, who may be the most popular candidate because he or
she is bland and inoffensive - a kind of lowest denominator who tries to
a
Yes, I'm to some extent comparing apples to oranges, but I think the
Approval strategies are also not quite "complete" since they rely on
some estimate on how others are going to vote and that estimate is in
real life always unreliable and incomplete. The Approval strategies
that regular vo
Clay,
--- CLAY SHENTRUP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > > that is a bad recommendation, since it implies condorcet voting (the
> > > only method where every voter has the same strength), which is
> nowhere
> > > near as utilitarian as range voting.
> >
> > Debatable.
>
> oh yeah? where's your
Rob,
--- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Anyway, as I'm sure you know, that system (rank/rate your candidates
> honestly, let the system generate the most strategic approval ballot) is
> simply DSV, and it works out to be the same as Condorcet.
How does your method resolve:
49 A
24 B>C
Juho,
--- Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >> Approval is simple only if you find it convenient to ignore such
> >> questions
> >> as "how should a voter vote to best
> >> pursue his interests?" If you happen to include such things in the
> >> equation, Approval mind-blowingly complex.
> >
>
On Dec 30, 2007, at 2:00 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Rob,
>
> --- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> Approval is simple only if you find it convenient to ignore such
>> questions
>> as "how should a voter vote to best
>> pursue his interests?" If you happen to include such things in the
>> eq
On Dec 30, 2007, at 3:23 , CLAY SHENTRUP wrote:
>> This mail stream is about joining forces in defending all the good
>> methods.
>
> well, "good" is relative. combining utility efficiency with
> simplicity/practicality, range and approval are unparalled. so why
> would we want to spend time d
In the coming weeks/months/whenever-I-feel-like-it, I will be performing
simulations to evaluate the performance of multi-winner methods. In
order to do this, I will make the assumptions that:
* There is a uniform linear political spectrum. (Other models of voter
behavior will be considered l
On Dec 29, 2007 6:30 PM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Rob,
>
> --- rob brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit:
> > > I can't think of any (serious) method with more straight-forward
> > strategy
> > > than Approval.
> >
> > Please elaborate. Seems to me that the optimum strategy of Approv
On Dec 29, 2007 7:30 PM, CLAY SHENTRUP <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Dec 29, 2007 5:23 PM, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> good. we want it to be hard for people to vote strategically, and we
> know that it is easy to use strategies like burial with ranked methods
> -- what a great point rob!
>
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