I wrote:
> One thing that I did not cover explicitly is how to handle equality. I guess
> it is ok not to require clones to be separated from others but just require
> them to be next to each others. What I mean is that if A and B are the only
> clones and there are three candidates {A, B, C},
2011/8/7
> To sum up my point of view suppose that the candidates publicly announce
> the respective preferences
> (with levels of support shown):
>
> 48 A
> 27 C>B
> 25 B
>
>
I'm going to cut you off right there. Although the rest of what you say
includes interesting points, I'd like to tell you
That "Q" in the previous subject heading was a typo.
Here's an example that illustrates the difference in Woodall's DSC and my
modified version:
25 A1>A2
35 A2>A1
20 B>A1
20 C>A1
Woodall's DSC assigns 60 points to {A1, A2} and then the only other positive
point coalitions that have
non-empty
To sum up my point of view suppose that the candidates publicly announce the
respective preferences
(with levels of support shown):
48 A
27 C>B
25 B
We cannot tell from these ballots alone if B is bluffing or if B really
despises A and C equally.
If the decision is made only on the basis of t
Ok, I agree that you need a concrete enough description to check the properties
of the method.
If the tree is (((A,B),C),D), then all of them are explicit clones at top level
(trivial), A, B and C are explicit clones, and also A and B are explicit clones
within those larger clone groups.
If yo
> I think the "explicit clone preprocessing of the votes + Condorcet"
> description that I gave below is a quite accurate definition of a method
> that both eliminates the clone problems and has rich ballots (rich enough to
> take position also on the order within the competing branch).
>
I still
Sorry if the explanation was not clear enough. A basic tree method with bullet
votes indeed has the limitation that you mentioned below (inability to
influence the preference order in the competing branch).
I think the "explicit clone preprocessing of the votes + Condorcet" description
that I g
Please, finish elaborating and describing a method before you claim benefits
for it. I think that building the trees is not as easy or safe as you think.
I know that I myself have been guilty at times of claiming benefits for
something before I'd sat down and really worked it out on paper, and I'm
I sent also another mail that explained that the basic / simplest tree method
uses bullet votes (and is therefore limited to giving opinions that influence
one branch only), and that trees can be used with richer votes too. In that
case tree methods become hybrids since the tree concept and the
Like IRV, tree approaches would not allow supporters of candidates from
other branches to help decide which of the "clones" on the winning branch
wins. They would also not allow a situation where A likes B but B doesn't
like A. In both cases, this leads to an IRV-like center-squeeze problem,
which,
P.S. One can use trees / exact clones also with the vote set that was discussed.
> 48 A
> 27 C>B
> 25 B>C
The tree structure could be just a forest here. One tree is A alone. The other
tree is (B, C). The idea is that support to B/C means also support to C/B. If I
try to vote B>A>C, that would
On 7.8.2011, at 2.04, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2011/8/6
> Jan,
>
> IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't truncate.
> But IRV elects A when the B
> faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
> likely to truncate, and as you say C
>
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