n. AIM
seemed to cause major corruption when posting from Linux and also when doing
copy/paste.
Raphfrk
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
really large number will just be ignored and your
ballot rescaled.
This does break the optimal utility effect though.
Raphfrk
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
offer
to replace one of the current members at a lower 'price'.
Also, if the legislature doesn't also decide the government, then there might
not even be a fixed majority coalition.
PS
Anyone know a better free mail system that doesn't cause lots of ??? when
I post to this gr
r the election bind the representatives to their announced policy).?
Right, there can come a point where voter overload is a problem.? However, I
think listing
local candidates with the option for write ins should keep the burden low
enough.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
creased for candidates
who were already elected or managed to reach a threshold in a previous election.
In effect, each candidate would create his own district., so gerrymandering
becomes
less relevant.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify th
candidate.? Each round would just consist of surplus
transferring and would likely
require a few counts.
A candidate who is the 2nd choice of many voters would pick up a large number
of transfers which
would help protect from elimination.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"wh
work together
and find a compromise.
Also, budgets could be an issue.? One option would be to share tax income out
proportionally.
Each member of the legislature could decide what ministries their share is
allocated to.
Tax cuts/raises are an even bigger issue.?
Raphfrk
Int
nd the
>elimination proceeds in a chain.
I assume you mean that the first candidate eliminates a voter and then the
eliminated voter eliminates the next one ?
In a polarised 2-party setting, this would cause alternating eliminations ...
which is probably a good thing.
Raphfr
ke
R: 10
S: 15
B: 30
The elimination order is N->R->S
In both cases, N, R and S are eliminated before Banotti.
Thus it might look like contingent vote but is actually PR-STV (single seat).
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if
is system is that it reverts to random ballot for the 2
candidate case.?
This may result in candidates who would be discouraged from running due to
spoiler
effects in plurality being encouraged to run due to 'civic duty'.
Raphfrk
Interesting s
From: Kathy Dopp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
Comments below
> -- Forwarded message --
> From:? <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Sat, May 10, 2008 at 7:22 AM
>
> Pathological scenarios
> can be constructed for all voting systems, including whatever ones Kathy
> may prefer to IRV.
Diagrams
ved in the 'deal'.
> Why not? just take suggestions from the candidates, parties, voters, etc.?
> Then keep using the ones that work out best until none of them give any
> additional improvement at the required consensus level.
I am not sure if that would work.? The
voting in their best interests.
In Germany, motions of no confidence in the Chancellor (head of
government) are handled by a secret ballot that requires an absolute
majority of their legislature to pass. This is used to change the
head of government, so I guess not all legislatures have public
votes f
aybe a reduced term.
Optimal utility via trade requires that voters have something to trade, and
fractions of a win probability seems to be quite a reasonable solution.
Ofc, another problem is how to handle X:100, all the rest 0 voters.?
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"w
nable strategy to rate
party candidates at 100% and the rest at zero in order to get your favourite
party as many seats as possible.
It would effectively become a PR system.
Raphfrk
AOL's new homepage has launched.
ain winner that they like better.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
AOL's new homepage has launched. Take a tour at http://info.
of candidate control.
However, if you give the candidate control to the voters, then the majority can
put up a majority of the candidates.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws&q
Jobst wrote:
> Dear Raphfrk,?
> it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me:?
> > Also, it is majority compliant. If a majority support a candidate first
> choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose.?
> If that is true, your
f your preference giving a
rank of 1 to your least favourite, 2 to your next least favourite and so on
You do not have to rank all the candidates and any you do not rank will be
considered preferred to any ranked candidate
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone co
uota of supporters and 1 candidate left will be guaranteed to have that
candidate above a quota as he will be the first choice of all those voters.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
sue if
loops couldn't happen.
Anyway, this post is to long (didn't intend the summary of the problem to be so
long), will post another later dealing with the issue.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
n the single winner case, PR-STV is showing all the issues highlighted by Yee.
However, it also shows up in the multi-winner case for certain inputs.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
ww
strategy
"approve your favourite of the top 2 and everyone you prefer to the expected
winner"
or
"approve everyone who you rate higher than the expected utility of the election"
In the above example, it is a perfect tie, but there might be a way to get it
to converge.
Also, i
heir vote totals change
100 = 10*10
110 = 10*11
120 = 10*12
130 = 10*13
140 = 10*14
150 = 10*15
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wikocracy.com
More new f
his may have
applications
here.? A betting market also achieves the above more directly.? Even without
using the market
itself to select the winner, trading on the market should make every voter
indifferent to the
outcome.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"w
Forest W Simmons wrote:
> Below where I said "unlike Borda" I should have said "unlike D2MAC."
> Neither the Borda solution nor the reverse plurality solution requires
> anything other than the ordinal preferences.
>
> So the deterministic solutions that do not depend on some form of vote
>
From: Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> If I understand the meaning of the original example correctly, the answer is
> Asset voting.
> Give every voter 100 points. By the conditions given, both the A and B
> voters think C is 80% as good as their true favorite, so give 5/9 of their
> points t
Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail.
From: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove
> > strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary
> > accomodations.
>
> In my opinion
gt; share of the probability to C, both factions will gain.
However, in practice, they won't.? Most candidates would prefer a 45% chance
that
they will win over a 100% chance that they won't.? Their own personal utlities
will swamp any difference in fact
(Sorry if this double sends)
> From: AllAbout Voting <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> >[Jan Kok] Let's try a DP poll!
> >...
> >This is the proposed poll topic and title:
> >*** What is the best place to host the US-Iraq Conflict forum?
> Jan,
>
> Can you give us more information about wha
Was there any particular reason for this change ?? Perhaps a change of policy
with respect to the discussions.
Also, the link from electrorama wiki is now a broken link.
Raphfrk
Interesting site
"what if anyone could modify the laws"
www.wik
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