On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
if it's not the majority that rule, what's the alternative?
I'm not aware of any good alternatives to majority rule in competitive
two-candidate elections (with some extra assumptions that rule out
On 9.2.2012, at 18.07, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
if it's not the majority that rule, what's the alternative?
I'm not aware of any good alternatives to majority rule in competitive
On 2/9/12 5:19 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
Condorcet is a natural extension to the multi-candidate case (still
assuming competitive elections). Maybe not the only one though. In
another mail I just addressed the possbility of having single-winner
elections that aim at electing the winner from one of
On 10.2.2012, at 0.59, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/9/12 5:19 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
Condorcet is a natural extension to the multi-candidate case (still assuming
competitive elections). Maybe not the only one though. In another mail I
just addressed the possbility of having
Hi Robert,
De : robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote
On Feb 9, 2012, at 9:02 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Robert,
De : robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote
On 2/9/12 10:55 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Feb 9, 2012, at 9:02 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
(Your idea of all the utilities being 0 or 1 can't even be made to
work as a model, I don't think, unless voters really only have two
stances toward candidates. Because what happens when you introduce a
Hi Robert,
I would +1 to Bryan Mills' post.
in the two-candidate case, you would have to assume unequal treatment for
voters
Yes, utility inherently does this. It's trying to maximize happiness which is
a different ideal from giving
everyone equal weight (e.g. even people who don't have a
On 2/8/12 5:53 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I would +1 to Bryan Mills' post.
i still have trouble with all of the contrived assumptions that are made
just to avoid coming to a conclusion of simple majority vote and one
person, one vote for a simple 2-candidate or 2-choice election.
i was
On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical
fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the
2012/2/6 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
How did we get here? What I see called Condorcet is not really that.
On Feb 6, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
Say people vote rated ballots with 6 levels, and after the election you
see a histogram of candidate X and Y that
2012 21h31
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
one thing i forgot to mention...
On 2/5/12 5:07 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:14 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
that is not well defined. given Abd's example:
2: Pepperoni (0.61), Cheese (0.5
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical
fact that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the
electorate prefers? if he is making a utilitarian argument, he needs to
define how the
On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 7.2.2012, at 5.31, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
how can Clay build a proof where he claims that it's a proven mathematical fact
that the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the electorate
prefers? if he is making a utilitarian
On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 12:52 AM,
election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote:
Subject: Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
Message-ID: 4f320919.8090...@audioimagination.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
On 2/7/12 6:30 PM, Juho Laatu wrote
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:01 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
i really don't want this question distracted too much with the guys and i
are going out for pizza. a little bit of distraction was okay, but the
give-and-take relationship with my pizza-and-beer buds is
responding to both Andy and Kristofer...
On 2/6/12 2:31 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:01 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com mailto:r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
i really don't want this question distracted too much with the
guys and i are
2012/2/6 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
responding to both Andy and Kristofer...
On 2/6/12 2:31 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:01 PM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com
mailto:rbj@audioimagination.**comr...@audioimagination.com
wrote:
How did we get here? What I see called Condorcet is not really that.
On Feb 6, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
Say people vote rated ballots with 6 levels, and after the election
you see a histogram of candidate X and Y that looks like this:
(better)
6:Y X
5: Y X
4: YX
2012/2/5 Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
--
*De :* Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
*À :* electionscie...@googlegroups.com
*Cc :* EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
*Envoyé le :* Vendredi 3 février 2012 22h06
*Objet :* Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
making, because most people who don't already agree will
On 4.2.2012, at 11.12, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
On 2/4/12 4:12 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
making,
On Sat, Feb 4, 2012 at 10:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson
r...@audioimagination.com wrote:
On 2/4/12 4:12 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/04/2012 06:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's franchise is equal, should we expect any voter
that has an opinion regarding the
On 2/4/12 4:01 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's franchise is equal, should we expect any voter
that
With information like this it should be (in principle) a quite
mechanical process to check all relevant available methods against the
targets and environment description, and then pick the best method (and
ballot format) (and guidance to the voters on how to vote).
really? okay so,
On 2/4/12 10:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
With information like this it should be (in principle) a
quite mechanical process to check all relevant available
methods against the targets and environment description, and
then pick the best method (and ballot format)
On 5.2.2012, at 5.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 2/4/12 4:01 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 4.2.2012, at 19.14, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
so, i have a few questions for everyone here:
1. do we all agree that every voter's franchise is precisely equal?
2. if each voter's
On 5.2.2012, at 5.39, Jameson Quinn wrote:
With information like this it should be (in principle) a quite mechanical
process to check all relevant available methods against the targets and
environment description, and then pick the best method (and ballot format)
(and guidance to the
De : Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com
À : electionscie...@googlegroups.com
Cc : EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Vendredi 3 février 2012 22h06
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
Condorcet systems fundamentally
Clay Shentrup wrote:
Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing.
no. excluding the cases where there are cycles (which is another
topic), there is no quantitative metric to be the wrong thing.
Condorcet only imposes a logical consistency that, from a popular
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