Clay Shentrup wrote:
Condorcet systems fundamentally try to maximize the wrong thing.
no. excluding the cases where there are cycles (which is another
topic), there is no quantitative metric to be "the wrong thing".
Condorcet only imposes a logical consistency that, from a popular
perspective and with the additional value that each vote counts equally,
if some candidate is the "best" (from a popular vote POV) candidate for
this single-seat office, then that candidate is better than each and
every other candidate. instead of having the candidates arm-wrestle or
take some written exam or flip a coin, the measure of which candidate is
"better" is simply the popular vote of the electorate. if Candidate A
is "better than" Candidate B, that is decided solely if more voters like
Candidate A than voters who like Candidate B when voters are asked to
compare and choose between the two. that is what Condorcet
fundamentally tries to do. nothing other than that.
They try to maximize the odds of electing the Condorcet
winner, even though it's a proven mathematical fact that the
Condorcet winner is not necessarily the option whom the
electorate prefers.
i am no slouch at mathematics, Clay. you (or Warren) have never proven
that to me. pointing to a page on rangevoting.org does not constitute
proof. and i don't see how you can since the ballots are different. in
the same manner that we compare ranked-choice voting to FPTP, but
*assuming* that the single affirmative vote for FPTP is the same as the
1st-choice vote in the ranked ballot, in that same manner you have to
map the ranked ballot to a score ballot, and that requires some
assumptions. to compare apples to oranges, you must make assumptions.
and good definitions, like who/what is "the option whom the electorate
prefers"? is that the same as the "true, honest utility winner"?
Someone wrote:
Trouble is that the ballots ARE the voters' statements as to which
candidate IS the CW. The above paragraph seems to be based on the
ballots sometimes not truly representing the thoughts of the
voters voting them.
i think the case they continue to make is that, compared to a Score
ballot, there is some intrinsic knowledge that voters won't mark their
ranked ballots as sincerely when they know it's Condorcet. that's not a
fair comparison. how can you be making a fair comparison (apples to
apples) when you assume one method gets sincere and informed voter
participation and the other method does not?
On 2/3/12 11:06 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
No, he's saying that when the CW and the true, honest utility winner
differ, the latter is better. I agree, but it's not an argument worth
making, because most people who don't already agree will think it's a
stupid one.
as do i. it's like saying that the Pope ain't sufficiently Catholic or
something like that. or that someone is better at being Woody Allen
than Woody Allen.
but for the moment, would you (Jameson, Clay, whoever) tell me, in as
clear (without unnecessary nor undefined jargon) and technical language
as possible, what/who the "true, honest utility winner" is? how is this
candidate defined, in terms the preference of the voters?
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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