On Wed, Jul 27, 2011 at 4:32 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Forest,
>
> --- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a
> écrit :
> > Andy's chiastic method is a way of
> > utilizing range ballots that has a much more mild incentive
> > than
> > Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the
>
Er...
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> So the first one asks:
> 50% rated 3? 33.3% rated a 2+? 16.7% rated a 1+?
> four-slot ballot to mean 133.3%. So then I get:
> 66.7% rated 3? 50% rated 2? 33.3% rated 1+?
>
> I must not have this correct, because isn't the first test
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mer 27.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> Andy's chiastic method is a way of
> utilizing range ballots that has a much more mild incentive
> than
> Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the
> method in a class of methods each of which is based on a
> different
Andy's chiastic method is a way of utilizing range ballots that has a much more
mild incentive than
Range itself to inflate ratings. He locates the method in a class of methods
each of which is based on a
different increasing function f from the interval [0,1 ] into the same interval:
Elect t
Jameson Quinn wrote:
> The ranked majority criterion is: if one candidate is top-ranked by a
> majority of voters, that candidate must win.
>
> To me, the natural extension of that to rated systems is: if only one
> candidate is top-rated by any majority of voters, that candidate must win.
>
That
The ranked majority criterion is: if one candidate is top-ranked by a
majority of voters, that candidate must win.
To me, the natural extension of that to rated systems is: if only one
candidate is top-rated by any majority of voters, that candidate must win.
You are suggesting that we use the ra
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 11:28 AM, wrote:
> If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
> criterion, then you can skip step
> one, and the method becomes smoother.
>
> Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
> criterion: DSC, Bucklin, a
Hi Forest,
Well, the interesting thing about my own Single Contest method is not
that it's an instant runoff between two finalists (i.e. a pairwise
comparison). I can't claim to have invented that. The interesting thing
is how resistant to ranking strategies it is.
The compromise incentive is not
From: Jameson Quinn
> To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff?
That's right. I hope that isn't be too anticlimatic!
>
> 2011/7/23
>
> > If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies
> the majority
> > criterion, then you can skip step
> > one, and
To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff?
2011/7/23
> If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
> criterion, then you can skip step
> one, and the method becomes smoother.
>
> Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the
If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
criterion, then you can skip step
one, and the method becomes smoother.
Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
criterion: DSC, Bucklin, and the
following range ballot based method:
Elect
Hi Forest,
We can't call SC "Maori" because the acronym isn't descriptive of the
method.
--- En date de : Jeu 21.7.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> Too bad we cannot discard even more information, like the
> fact of a majority winner that isn't one of the
> contestants in the contest picked by
Kevin
Too bad we cannot discard even more information, like the fact of a majority
winner that isn't one of the
contestants in the contest picked by the approval votes.
If it weren't impractical, the ideal mode for this election would be an
approval vote for the explicit purpose
of determinin
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