Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-03 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Dear Juho, this sounds nice -- the crucial point is that we'll have to analyse what strategic voters will vote under that method! Obviously, it makes no sense to the A voters to reverse their C>B preference since that would eliminate C instead of B and will result in B winning instead of C...

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge+new method AMP

2008-05-04 Thread Jobst Heitzig
Dear Raphfrk, it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me: Also, it is majority compliant. If a majority support a candidate first choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose. If that is true, your method cannot be a solution to the given proble

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge+new method AMP

2008-05-04 Thread raphfrk
Jobst wrote: > Dear Raphfrk,? > it did not think through all you wrote yet, but one point troubles me:? > > Also, it is majority compliant. If a majority support a candidate first > choice (i.e. first choice and nominate him), then he cannot lose.? > If that is true, your method cannot be a s

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-05 Thread Juho
On May 3, 2008, at 11:22 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Juho, this sounds nice -- the crucial point is that we'll have to analyse what strategic voters will vote under that method! Obviously, it makes no sense to the A voters to reverse their C>B preference since that would eliminate C inst

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-08 Thread Juho Laatu
One observation on clone independence and electing a centrist candidate using rankings only and when one of the "extremists" has majority. Votes: 51: A>C>B 49: B>C>A C is the winner. A will be cloned. The votes could be: 51: A1>A2>C>B 49: B>C>A2>A1 C should still be the winner. B will be cl

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-08 Thread raphfrk
Juho wrote: > The problem is that these two sets of votes are identical:? > 51: X1>X2>X3>X4? > 49: X4>X3>X2>X1 Ahh, good point. There needs to be some system for providing an incentive for people to give their honest ratings.? A random system with trading seems like a reasonable solution

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-08 Thread Juho
On May 9, 2008, at 0:29 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: There needs to be some system for providing an incentive for people to give their honest ratings. A random system with trading seems like a reasonable solution. I see elections that elect different candidates with different probabilities

Re: [Election-Methods] [english 95%] Re: [english 94%] Re: method design challenge +new method AMP

2008-05-09 Thread Juho
On May 9, 2008, at 13:39 , Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Juho, you wrote: (Roughly the question is if one wants to give Stalin and other unwanted fellows a small probability to become elected or a zero probability.) I don't think this is the point. To the contrary, bringing up such examples i