s identity associated.
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
Election-Methods ma
t, of a suspicious nature, may have
been done to the system.
That's a good idea, but it should probably be network based instead of
disk based so that the virus (if one is introduced) can't just wipe its
tracks afterwards. Or use some non-erasable medium like aforementioned
PROMs (
On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
So you're saying that computers are better than specialized machines?
I'm not sure that's what you say (rather than that machines are
better than paper ballots), but I'll assume that.
On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 16:37:32 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
4. Re: Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines (Dave Ketchum)
On Sun, 17 Aug 2008 11:14:34 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I DO NOT like printout-based machines. To start some thinking, how about:
auling.
I said nothing of such as central tabulators. Certainly quality needs
attending to here, but voter anonymity should not be a problem here.
On Thu, 21 Aug 2008 22:22:41 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 10:00 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Fi
On Sat, 23 Aug 2008 19:27:07 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote:
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2008 01:02:44 -0400
From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
Federal certification? The many horror stories tell us either:
Equipment is faili
ty of Nash
applying as a reason for voting for Hitler - in fact it becomes more
reason for voting for Gandhi.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
rope went.
I do not see social above - people are affected by, and care about,
how well the village board attends to their needs.
When I read of "rational irrationality" below, I wonder if the real
topic may be deciding how to measure and add up conflicting needs and
desires.
nimum pain? Voters can
rank them together (with equal or adjacent ranks).
Does not Condorcet properly attend to "symmetric" with a voted cycle?
Dave Ketchum
On Apr 17, 2010, at 7:07 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
This post is going to ramble a bit but I thought I'd get something
the same result if there are fewer than 4
candidates in the circularly-ambiguous Smith set and voters
separately rank all of them.
I have heard this complaint before, so am listening for help.
WHAT should I say when I want EXACTLY what is described as "Condorcet"
above?
Dave K
On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:08 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, Dave Ketchum
a écrit :
Why IRV? Have we not buried
that deep enough? Why not Condorcet which does better
with about the same voting?
In the context that I said I wanted to use IRV, I wanted to
Cycles likely are not frequent, but elections with such combinations
of candidates desperately need attention that such as Plurality do not
offer - even if not truly cycle material.
On Apr 18, 2010, at 11:21 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi,
--- En date de : Sam 17.4.10, robert bristow-johnson >
n all, voters wish to do ranking. It is the
ability to do ranking when voters want this that makes it better than
FPP.
Also Condorcet can survive having many candidates, while a voter truly
desiring to vote more than 3 ranks should be rare enough that
supporting such is debatable.
Dave Ke
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:55 PM 4/18/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
There are many elections with only one reasonable choice - such as a
good qualified worker trying for re-election. Here even FPP would be
fine, and we hope for nothing that makes voting
40 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 20, 2010, at 10:21 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Apr 20, 2010, at 1:30 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I would go to Condorcet:
Forget primaries - Condorcet can tolerate clones and voters
should be able to learn related voting.
I would do less runoffs - voter
On Apr 21, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 01:30 AM 4/20/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:48 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Or other advanced method. What is often overlooked in the discussion
of voting methods, due to the emphasis on deterministic methods that
On Apr 28, 2010, at 5:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Peter Zbornik
OK, thanks.
Please go on to propose the condorcet, if you think it is the best.
Approval voting was used in the French presidential election, first
round, where far-right nationalist Le Pen got to the second round.
Le
ers.
IRV, looking only at first preferences while deciding which to
discard, will discard such a CW. It is IRV's discarding without
looking at all that the voters vote that makes many of us desire to
discard IRV.
Dave Ketchum
On May 5, 2010, at 8:09 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Peter Z
On May 5, 2010, at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Terry, i didn't originally intend to just pile on ...
On May 5, 2010, at 9:48 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
"a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences."
True in Condorcet, though not exp
should not be
counted as if it was. Think of a voter "approving" all candidates in
Approval - that voter has done nothing to favor any one of the
candidates.
"Majority" needs careful thought as to its purpose and meaning. If
truly the largest group of voters is onl
On May 9, 2010, at 2:24 PM, Juho wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
an alternative way to count wins against equally ranked candidates,
would be to give both 0.5 wins per vote and not 0 as I did in my
previous mail.
Thus the current state: A>B gives 1:0. A=B gives ?:? (A
simplest cycles each loses to one other).
There are many methods for resolving cycles. For RP I see
deleting the smallest margins from the list until what remains is not
a cycle, but does identify a winner.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
rules for resolving cycles).
Dave Ketchum
On Wed, 12 May 2010 19:00:14 -0400, Dave Ketchum wrote:
There is considerable agreement that awarding the CW as winner is
desirable - yet also claims that some method deserves use in spite
of
its inability to find the CW.
I back Condorc
I see deciding to use Condorcet as important. To go with that we
would need to decide how to resolve cycles.
On May 13, 2010, at 3:37 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Mer 12.5.10, robert bristow-johnson > a écrit :
On May 12, 2010, at 7:40 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I think
On May 13, 2010, at 10:25 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 13, 2010, at 10:08 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I read of arranging ballot data in a triangle, rather than in a
matrix as usually described. A minor detail, but what would be
easiest for ballot counters is most important while
On May 14, 2010, at 2:44 AM, clay shentrup wrote:
On May 13, 7:08 pm, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I see deciding to use Condorcet as important. To go with that we
would need to decide how to resolve cycles.
Why would you go with Condorcet when Score Voting is better in every
way?
You had quoted
On May 14, 2010, at 7:08 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave, by the way,
--- En date de : Ven 14.5.10, Dave Ketchum
a écrit :
We can dream of value in details as we sit here and
debate. Real-life voters need a way to express their
most serious thoughts with reasonable effort:
To vote for
On May 15, 2010, at 7:17 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Sam 15.5.10, Dave Ketchum
a écrit :
De: Dave Ketchum
Objet: Re: [EM] Why Not Condorcet?
À: "Kevin Venzke"
Cc: election-meth...@electorama.com
Date: Samedi 15 mai 2010, 17h34
On May 14, 2010, at 7:08 PM, Ke
On May 16, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:34 PM 5/15/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some objections to Condorcet could be:
1. It is not expressive enough (compared to ratings)
Truly less expressive in some ways than ratings.
This is balanced by not demanding ratings details
On May 16, 2010, at 6:11 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:16 PM 5/16/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 16, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:34 PM 5/15/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some objections to Condorcet could be:
1. It is not expressive enough (compared to ratings
On May 17, 2010, at 11:28 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:12 PM 5/16/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 16, 2010, at 6:11 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:16 PM 5/16/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 16, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:34 PM 5/15/2010, Dave Ketchum
On May 19, 2010, at 2:32 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:37 PM 5/18/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I had written promoting Condorcet.
Kevin Venzke offered some objections, #1 is above, indicating that
ratings have the value of being more expressive. I responded to his
thoughts, also above
On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
Runoffs need avoiding, due to their expense.
Plurality needs them when lacking a majority, for we know they
could not completely express their wants - and still have trouble.
his one is not very
active.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
Condorcet gets some discussion here.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On May 27, 2010, at 12:12 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:03 PM 5/26/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 26, 2010, at 8:19 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
[about IRV]
Backers make a big deal of "majority" - but it is of the final
stacks, not of all ballots.
what it is, is *a
consider bullet voting, and the one you
are considering as an option, are both on the edge such that you could
regret whatever you do, that it is time to worry. So vote if you
care, for voting can either help or hurt.
The studying here mostly makes headaches.
Dave Ketchum
On Jun 16, 2010, at
On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:57 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Kristofer Munsterhjelm > a écrit :
Even so, the simulation would fail to catch
certain aspects
of the election cycle itself. Consider a two party
state
under FPTP. In a pure opinion-space analysis, t
On Jun 16, 2010, at 11:11 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Dave Ketchum
a écrit :
That is possible. Would primaries encourage that
effect? If
so, would we expect parties in two-party states
without
voter primaries to be closer to each other?
I'm not
pairs of candidates from a ballot, comparing the
rankings within each pair).
Dave Ketchum
The ballots are interpreted as multi-slot ratings ballots thus:
An approved candidate ranked below zero other candidates is
interpreted as Top-Rated.
An approved candidate ranked below one other
ot; to the
simpler (and more traditional) "ranking in any position".
Dave Ketchum
On Jun 19, 2010, at 3:33 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Dave,
If you bullet vote, then the candidate that you vote for is the only
one that you "ranked," so it is
considered ranked above all of t
Real-life voters need a way to express their most serious desires, and
be heard, with reasonable effort and expense:
Condorcet claims to offer such. Better than Plurality, for
which voters can vote for only one. Better than Approval, which
assumes equal desires for all voted for. Bett
Having ideas is great.
What we do should be based on whether we see them as worth the effort.
My proposal for adding an array to the N*N matrix was based on both
reducing effort and expecting less errors in recording desires.
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 7, 2010, at 11:33 AM, robert bristow-johnson
On Jul 6, 2010, at 11:31 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jul 6, 2010, at 9:31 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ballots: Must support write-ins and, perhaps, 3 ranks (do not need
to rank rejects and can do equal ranking).
i think that the number of ranking levels should be as large as the
respond to:
On Jul 7, 2010, at 9:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jul 6, 2010, at 11:31 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jul 6, 2010, at 9:31 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ballots: Must support write-ins and, perhaps, 3 ranks (do not
need to rank rejects and can do equal ranking).
i think that the
Thanking Jameson for serious thinking.
The possibility of cycles should not scare us on election day - we
should be prepared for reasonable response for whenever they happen.
Such as:
A or B or C should rate as CW vs D thru Z (a 3-member cycle - 4 or
more are possible, but not considered
seen different descriptions of what this is
but if it involves Plurality, TTR, or IRV, I have written against such
above.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
e.
If simplicity matters, Ranked Pair's relative simplicity may be more
important than Schulze's track record, for instance. Asking in that
manner could also help letting it know which arguments work - e.g.
if the canceling-out phrasing of the singlepeakedness theorem gives
a sense of fairness.
Simplicity DOES matter. Also need to agree on, and promote, a
particular method.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
advantage of
this method is that is really is no more complicated to explain than
IRV, and it *does* resolve directly to a winner whether a CW exists
or not. i am curious in how, say with a Smith Set of 3, this method
would differ from RP or Schulze.
For Condorcet you have the N*N matrix and precinct summability but,
unlike IRV, you better do nothing that involves going back to look at
any ballots.
Dave Ketchum
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
s of races, but I
do not really like that particular word here.
Why not Condorcet? We can brag about having enough sense to use
something good invented so long ago.
Dave Ketchum
JQ
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
thus find at
least a cycle member.
For N-1 races, see if this cycle member is loser to another. If
so we have two members of a cycle and can proceed to complete it; if
not we have the CW.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 14, 2010, at 9:41 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Re: [EM] it's be
ete better.
Further, counting all should encourage more to vote and thus get
visibly counted.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 21, 2010, at 2:58 PM, leeswalker wrote to:
http://sfbay.craigslist.org/forums/?forumID=4123
Re: [InstantRunoffNYS] Greatest Majority Voting -the purpose of IRV
For over a decade
If someone can do better, fine.
I DO argue that such as Burlington demonstrate TRC doing better than
IRV at truly seeing voter desires.
On Aug 23, 2010, at 2:38 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 23, 2010, at 1:53 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I see below that leeswalker is doing his best
the results to be our found median?
When we are plotting how to do general elections the major parties
plot for advantages - here there could be more readiness to try for
best.
Dave Ketchum
.
On Aug 25, 2010, at 4:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
we have a l
I read below is at times into trying to do good outside of party
primaries needs.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 26, 2010, at 7:39 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Aug 25, 2010 at 9:41 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
wrote:
Third, the primary is not open and so
even if a good
On Aug 26, 2010, at 11:23 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 26, 2010, at 11:03 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This started with a description of a primary problem - 5 strong Dem
candidates for gov. in VT.
5 candidates, but only 4 were "strong". one was always an underdog
and
On Aug 27, 2010, at 2:41 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
This thread has touched several points.
Branding
I'm not particularly fond of "TRC" as a name for Condorcet. Ideally,
a name should give some idea of how the system actually works. That
was where my "VOTE" branding idea came from (Virtual O
On Aug 27, 2010, at 11:47 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 27, 2010, at 12:09 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Aug 26, 2010, at 11:23 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
...
still agree that Condorcet is better than IRV, but IRV is better
than FPTP. within the Racine camp (which is where i
We know that Plurality has problems - and go to great effort to find
something better.
If IRV functioned like Plurality, that would tell us IRV is not the
magic improvement desired.
IRV is different - which could give us hope for being better. There
are demonstrations showing success - a
Discussing IRV is mostly a waste since, in the Rank Choice world,
Condorcet is much better.
As to Approval vs Condorcet:
Approval thoughts can be expressed in Condorcet since Approval
uses only a single rank and Condorcet extends this to multiple ranks.
This extra capability costs,
On Aug 30, 2010, at 4:56 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
One of the things that the Burr dilemma assumes is that the voters are
split into 2 groups and each group rates their candidates as vastly
superior to any candidate from the other side.
When I see clones I think of them as such, and treat them ali
r A - which being low count gets discarded immediately.
So Tom wins with 66T>33D, though a closer look at the beginning would
have seen 68A>32H, 67A>33D, 66A>34T, 65H>34T, 66T>33D, 67D>32H.
I offer Condorcet, for which voters can vote exactly as for IRV but
have more complete analysi
won in Plurality BECAUSE voters cannot
express their desires as completely there.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 13, 2010, at 11:09 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Sand W wrote:
Here are the results on an actual election: http://www.demochoice.org/dcresults.php?poll=OakMayor&type=table
en in Plurality.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 13, 2010, at 5:43 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Message: 1
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 2010 22:17:49 +0200
From: Juho
To: Election Methods
Subject: Re: [EM] breakdown of Oakland mayor ballots
Message-ID: <8c9f038f-e57b-4589-a102-41b7a91bf...@yahoo.co.uk>
Content-Type
On Nov 13, 2010, at 10:07 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 9:46 PM, Dave Ketchum > wrote:
Actually, "differs from plurality" is not a sure indication of
failure for
ranked voting - either IRV or Condorcet.
For Plurality, voter can name only ONE candidate.
David,
HOORAY for thinking! Too rare around here!
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 21, 2011, at 4:27 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I can't help wondering why anyone would think it beneficial to have
either later-no-harm or burial prevention in a voting method. Here is
why:
1. later-no-harm prevents finding compr
deserves
mentioning.
Perhaps worth mentioning Plurality's weakness here - could have had a
different method that did not drop Jospin.
Dave Ketchum
On Apr 3, 2011, at 7:50 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
http://rangevoting.org/ElMargins.html
--
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org <--
Agreed that the warning about "fraudprone" is valid. Rather than the
labor-intensive change I see below, I would simply require the voter
to indicate quantity of approvals.
Dave Ketchum
On May 4, 2011, at 3:14 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
2011-05-04T05:48:15Z, “Matt Welland” :
On May 3, 2011, at 7:55 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On May 2, commenting on the criterion of Independence from
Irrelevant Alternatives, Forest
Simmons wrote, "IIAC is a totally unreasonable requirement." On May
3, Kevin Venzke added,
"IIA isn't compatible with Condorcet. It's not compatible with
Jameson offers a couple very good points:
There are MANY ways to commit fraud.
MANY methods are susceptible, including Plurality.
Dave Ketchum
On May 4, 2011, at 12:39 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
Unfortunately, there is no task that you can manually ask the voters
to do, which won&#
He offers good thoughts - I will try to add a bit.
On May 4, 2011, at 4:26 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 4, 2011, at 1:48 AM, matt welland wrote:
On Tue, 2011-05-03 at 21:38 -0400, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
after IRV has been beaten up so badly because of its perceived
complexit
On May 6, 2011, at 3:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
likewise, when the IRV method chooses the same candidate as
Condorcet would (which is what would happen if the Condorcet winner
makes it into the IRV final round), we can say "Hey, IRV did pretty
good
One of his thoughts caught my eye.
On May 8, 2011, at 1:32 AM, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
With Condorcet, one must rate many candidates and then one must
resolve cycles. I prefer scorevoting.
We do not usually say "rate" with Condorcet but, thinking: Two
thoughts fit together for Score.
We optimi
ith either method this desperate voter could do the new ballot
effort.
Dave Ketchum
With Scorevoting, the ballotvalidator (optical scanner would catch
the omission. The voter would then rate the candidate. A candidate
on a scorevoting ballot, would look like thus:
Kristofer Mu
and do not believe in the two-party religion), these people
had no idea that there was another way to look at those very same
ballots. Fairvote essentially sold ranked-choice voting with IRV as
if they were the same thing. as if there *is* no ranked-choice
voting without IRV.
And we need to
ressed.
DYN is a simple addition for those who see value in that
method. Unranked serves as no; top rank serves as yes; third (middle)
rank gets passed to the candidate this voter wants to leave choice to.
Dave Ketchum
Charles Dodgson (aka Lewis Carroll) anticipated this
difficulty in 188
On May 25, 2011, at 2:07 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
On 7/22/64 11:59 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 24, 2011, at 6:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this EM list
for a
advice on what election method
to try propose in the Washington State
On May 30, 2011, at 1:21 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
OK, it seems that there are no objections to using this list to
organize a statement. I think this would explain the connection to
this list, but explicitly disclaim being an "official position" of
any persons or organizations besides its si
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without b
On Jun 1, 2011, at 11:38 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.
Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal availabl
On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There
Here we get led down a path of rejecting methods for being worse than
plurality in some way, without considering whether they may be better
in other important ways.
Agreed that Approval is better - and very little different.
Asset deserves a bit of study - the candidate you vote for can be p
up making complications for voters.
Dave Ketchum
On Jun 3, 2011, at 7:01 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I thought of a simpler way to explain my "safety" fix. The full
system description follows, with my new phrasing in bold.
N days before the election, all candidates (including declared
On Jun 4, 2011, at 3:16 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jun 3, 2011, at 10:30 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
...
Ranking:
IRV ranking, learned by many, is a start, with equal ranking a
trivial addition.
Approval voting permissible and usable as valid Condorcet by
using a single
I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson calls SODA.
It gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
compliance. I offer what I claim is a true summary of what I would
call smart Approval. What I see:
. Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters
having full
value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual
ranking.
On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/6
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
> 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
>
> > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
having full
value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual
ranking.
On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/6
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
> 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
>
> > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
to SODA being Approval with a minor complication option:
. Voter votes for those approved of.
. Candidates each provide a list of those they will vote for and
voter votes for candidate whose list attracts.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
in some Condorcet methods. I prefer poll
level preemptive defence to this since that way we can avoid
e.g. Condorcet becoming "more plurality like".
If it works, sure, but if it doesn't, I would guess margins is the
"more plurality like" in the sense that the winner's f
Why are we here?
It certainly made sense to come and explore.
. We find ourselves asking the voters to do some truncating.
. Counters may have to adjust counting ballots.
Among the many variant Condorcet methods there are various ways of
handling cycles that are close to defining CWs -
Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy
weakness.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
I think the following complete description is simpler than anything
possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (
basics of assigning higher numbers to candidates liked best.
Or "ranked pairs" which will matter only when the voter gets a lot of
sophistication.
I do not talk of strategy because it is a big topic and I am covering
only the basics.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 8:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 15, 2011, at 5:12 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Wednesday, June 15, 2011 1:41 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] Best use of two bit ballots?
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
So far SOD
On Jun 15, 2011, at 2:05 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.6.2011, at 14.46, Kevin Venzke wrote:
It's better if explaining the method's
rules is enough (or close) to understand the strategy.
...
No, I am (almost) saying that if you have to explain the strategy
separately then that's bad. I think p
ecial election, so that seems like a good
prospect. Hochul's win makes her deserve a full term, so look
elsewhere.
Dave Ketchum
On Jun 14, 2011, at 10:33 AM, Warren D. Smith (CRV cofounder, http://RangeVoting.org
) wrote:
I think Justin Levitt's view of optimal districting, is
Internet in the flexibility doable that way.
Read more at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html
Seems like CIVS would be good to use as is in many places where voting
via Internet makes sense - and shows using Condorcet - something
adaptable to the way we normally do elections.
Dave
ves such as SF and Berkeley. On the other hand, it just goes to
show that a fundamentally flawed system can be sold in such enclaves.
Above you said selling would be undoable; here you say what should
never get bought has demonstrated possibility of selling such?
Dave Ketchum
Sorry if I&#x
.
Recommend you study this description of CIVS and consider what it
offers: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 7, 2011, at 10:25 AM, Sand W wrote:
I hope everyone is interested in a new online survey site intended
to prove how much better IRV-enabled surveys
bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:26 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ouch!
i missed it.
. As Kristofer just wrote, Condorcet is a much better method
than IRV for what you are promising - Interesting that Condorcet
offers (more than) the same voter ranking capabilities as IRV, but
does
s offering.
Dave Ketchum
--Bob Richard
On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the
argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky
risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that
are m
an turn to Condorcet which:
. Has counting that awards to deserving candidates.
. Can easily handle equal ranking.
. Can learn to award to write-ins (when they are deserving).
Dave Ketchum
I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural
selection, or a like fight of
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