On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:11 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 10:46 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The same is true of, for instance, LNHarm. If X is the CW, then if
a subset of the voters add Y to the end of their ballots, that
won't make X a n
P.S. One way to use the concept of IAC would be to e.g. set a strict
requirement of LNH-IAC to a method but only wish for reasonably good
performance with full LNH.
Juho
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:31 AM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 19, 2010, at 11:11 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote
/Parliament_of_Norway#Party_groups
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Sweden#Politics
Juho
On Apr 19, 2010, at 2:28 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
robert bristow-johnson > Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 4:03 AM
I dunno about France, but is that the case in Italy? or Israel? I
thought th
uot;Condorcet method" might refer to
the behaviour when there is no top cycle or alternatively e.g. to the
behaviour of the typical (fully specified) Condorcet methods.
Juho
On Apr 21, 2010, at 10:05 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote 17 April 2010:
"First, quoting Wik
o make the
voters feel comfortable with the idea that with the used (Condorcet)
method it is wise to just sincerely rank numerous candidates and not
truncate (and not try any stupid strategies that might hurt more than
help).
Juho
On Apr 22, 2010, at 12:36 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I do
f any such system, please let me know.
Paper ballots are safer if you fear that many might not trust a fully
electronic system (that doesn't leave any verifiable paper trail
behind).
BR, Juho Laatu
OK, that's the first scenario.
Any help answering some of the questions above is
needs of the Czech Green party?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
One more thing. If needed, the method could allow nominating only some
subset of all the candidates as candidates for the P and VP positions.
Juho
On Apr 27, 2010, at 2:45 AM, Juho wrote:
I think there are good and well tested single-winner and
proportional multi-winner methods that the
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a
compromise candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
- use STV (using the same ballots
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
Draft of a method:
- collect ranked votes
- use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a
e:
I would prefer to have the P. elected by the same people electing
the board. The P. is indeed the person most often representing the
party on the outside.
Ok, to be included in the requirements.
On Apr 27, 2010, at 2:55 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Apr 27, 2010 at 1:54 AM, Juho wro
On Apr 28, 2010, at 5:34 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:47 AM, Juho wrote:
You assume that there is only one VP.
Well, if more than 1 VP is possible, then the election could be
- Elect council with PR-STV
- The condorcet winner (only including the councillors) is President
On Apr 28, 2010, at 6:37 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/4/28 Raph Frank
On Wed, Apr 28, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Juho wrote:
> Do you mean that voters would concentrate on the first rankings and
> strongest candidates? The used method should be such that this
kind of
> behaviour wi
hods, some (more) distortion in the P+VPs set proportionality,
or maybe some other new (slightly problematic) solution. This might
already get too complex, so maybe your proposal to propose some
complete solutions to the problem (and list their benefits and
problems) after this discussion
e of
the first vice president position and the fact that use of one ballot
is possible influenced my text above. Now I'm wondering how to balance
the requirements of simplicity and ease of understanding of the method
vs. use of conservative methods.
Juho
2010/4/29, Peter Zborn
On May 3, 2010, at 2:07 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
2010/5/3 Juho :
(What I mean by "distorting effect" is that if you have left,
centre and
right, and centre has less first place support than the other two,
then a
good approach may be to elect C if one elects only one
representati
osed to study also this "one method
only" approach (as an alternative to best possible optimization of the
proportionality of the council) since the resulting method would be
simple and the distortion that it causes could be smaller than its
benefits.
Juho
Election-Met
On May 4, 2010, at 3:19 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear Juho,
just some words to avoid misunderstandings.
I still would like to be able to propose an alternative method,
which elects the council first and then the P and VPs, even though
the condorcet winner is not in there (marked as the
nts of this one should/could be discussed and proposed as
alternative approaches.
Juho
On May 4, 2010, at 3:42 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Peter Zbornik,
this is my proposal:
--Use the Schulze proportional ranking method.
--The top-ranked candidate becomes the president.
--The sec
the Condorcet winner but not
necessarily always from the Smith set is that the Condorcet winner is
not defeated by anyone but all the the Smith set members are, and they
may be beaten badly when compared to some candidate outside the Smith
set.
Juho
Election-Methods mai
at is one way of relieving the proportionality related
problems since at least the last choice that often distorts
proportionality the most can be done quite freely. I'm not sure how
big the improvement would be. There may be also other more
sophisticated approaches as noted above.)
J
ng it incompatible to some (good)
criterion that it earlier met. The point is that compatibility with
various criteria should often not be an on/off comparison but a richer
analysis where also partial and almost complete compatibilities are
counted.
Juho
P.S. Note that there are also criteria tha
On May 5, 2010, at 1:36 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Juho,
I wrote (4 May 2010):
This is my proposal:
--Use the Schulze proportional ranking method.
--The top-ranked candidate becomes the president.
--The second-ranked candidate becomes the vice president.
--If the first two candidates
On May 5, 2010, at 10:28 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Let's say that there are three different criteria that an election
method should meet. They are related to three different strategic
voting related problems. As in the world of security also election
methods a
On May 5, 2010, at 8:29 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 5, 2010, at 12:22 PM, Juho wrote:
In the pairwise comparison based methods we must also take into
account the fact that we do not measure the strength of personal
preferences, and therefore the decisions that we make are
e level of
proportionality and viability of the smallest parties across all the
districts).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
results after the elections.)
Juho
The heuristics relate to various criteria, but in another sense they
function as vague criteria themselves.
I'll repeat my conclusion to the long section on strategy here, too.
Strategy's biggest effects are not on outcome social utility, but on
cere votes
(e.g. additional votes vs. clones).
Maybe Markus Schulze and others that have worked with and studied
Ranked Pairs, River etc. can give some more light on the historical
and current motivation.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
he requirements above should pretty much
follow the "proportional ranking style") and in the "rest of the
council" election. The proportional ranking only approach is simpler
but is that a good enough reason to allow the minor distortion in
proportionality?
Juho
On May 7, 2010, at 6:40 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/7 Juho
My intent was to propose a nonbinding poll which would be conducted
on the same ballots as, and thus simultaneously with, the actual
election. Any valid vote would be interpreted as an answer in the
poll, but this answer
On May 7, 2010, at 7:11 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
One could discuss which rule should apply in those special cases
when both criteria can not be met. In order to determine exactly
when we have true clones in our hands we would need to have the
original votes, and also
On May 7, 2010, at 6:13 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 7.5.10, Juho a écrit :
Another characteristic feature of the Schulze method is the
use of winning votes. My understanding is that the history
behind winning votes is mostly based on strategic voting
related
simplification all the individual voter opinions are equal in
strength, worth one vote. As a result voting methods will be fair (all
treated equally) and more strategy free although one fails to measure
the strength of the feelings of different individuals.
Juho
As to whether the majority
ion that
same votes are used in all phases. The PR steps are actually just PE
steps that elect only one additional representative. We can thus in
principle use the same PE method all the time. Relation ">" refers to
a serial process and "[ , ]" refers to electi
On May 8, 2010, at 3:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/7 Juho
On May 7, 2010, at 6:40 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/5/7 Juho
My intent was to propose a nonbinding poll which would be conducted
on the same ballots as, and thus simultaneously with, the actual
election. Any valid vote
On May 8, 2010, at 12:43 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On May 7, 2010, at 7:11 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Schulze's primary argument is that the use of paths let one make a
method that is very close to Minmax, yet is cloneproof and elects
from Smith. Thus, i
On May 8, 2010, at 6:32 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 7.5.10, Juho a écrit :
*Who* must have considered winning votes to not be
optimal with sincere
votes?
I don't really know what others have thought. My first
approach when I first time thought about pai
candidates and vice versa. Otherwise we might easily lose a
sincere Condorcet winner.
Juho
On May 8, 2010, at 9:32 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
I have a proposal that uses the same pairwise win/loss/tie
information that Copeland is based on, along with
the complementary information that Ap
10:0. In winning votes victory 50:40 has
the same strength as victory 50:0.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On May 9, 2010, at 9:51 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
thanks, Juho, for this summary.
On May 9, 2010, at 2:24 PM, Juho wrote:
All classical Condorcet methods can handle equal rankings and their
impact has been analyzed quite well.
Usually the discussion focuses on how to measure the
r than truncation).
Truncation due to not knowing enough or due to considering all the
remaining candidates to be more or less equal are quite good and
sincere reasons to truncate. Truncation due to laziness may lead to
distorted results (since all opinions are not measured). Truncation
On May 9, 2010, at 11:22 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 2:24 PM, Juho wrote:
On May 9, 2010, at 6:49 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
an alternative way to count wins against equally ranked candidates,
would be to give both 0.5 wins per vote and not 0 as I did in my
previous mail
n the other
hand I'm sure that we can not fully get rid of it. (I was planning to
reply something to Forrest Simmons on this topic. Maybe soon. One key
point is that if people don't rank the moderate candidates (plausible
winners) of the competing sections then the more radical o
in itself, truncating the worse of two
frontrunners doesn't hurt anything.
One counterexample. Left wing has one moderate candidate and one
extreme candidate. The extreme candidate has more first place support.
If right wing voters truncate the moderate candidate (frontru
On May 9, 2010, at 2:34 AM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Here are some more late comments (I was busy with some other
activities for a while).
Juho,
Thanks for your interest and input.
Having an approval cutoff to rank just like the candidates is a good
idea. On ballots where the cutoff is
inary situation first and not directly on how the new method
would change the current leadership to something better :-).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
consider "do as well" and "do better" to be well defined (and they are
pretty much so).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ns)).
The method counts how many additional supporters each candidate would
need (or have extra) to beat all other candidates in pairwise
comparisons.
From one single ballot point of view, if one ranks X above Y in the
ballot then X will need one vote less to beat Y and Y will need one
vo
laim above.
Any Condorcet method that encourages truncation of any of the
potential winners carries a risk of making the sincere Condorcet
winner lose.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
nding strong opinion in the reverse
direction. (Such weak opinions could be used also to defend clones (or
a grouping or a wing). There was some discussion on this on the EM
list long time ago.)
Juho
It turns out that it is impossible to do this in such a way that
everybody is
perfectly s
then uses e.g. STV to distribute the allocated seats independently
within each party.
Juho
P.S. Also a tree based structure (maybe to group the parties) could be
used instead of a flat list based structure, although this approach
can also be used instead of a (party internal) tree structure
approach is also
already close to a tree structure based inheritance (more limiting but
easy to understand at one sight). (The "ugly trick" that I mentioned
above would in a way allow the voters determine the "candidate-
list" (or inheritance tree) of each candidate.)
On May 22, 2010, at 3:18 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Simple question, simple answer. Use lists between parties (or other
groupings) and candidate ranking within them. Open lists try to
implement proportionality within the lists in one quite primitive
way. Use of
inked
somehow to maintain proportionality (since the president os also part
of the council).)
In summary I think there are many opportunities in this kind of
extensions of the basic proportional methods. The biggest challenges
are in complex calculation rules and complex ballots (or complex and
tedious filling of the ballots even if the ballots themselves are not
that complex).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ged their vote to "C>A". B does not beat A. A
wins. The "C" voters were harmed when they included their later
preferences.
Juho
Proof of LNHarm satisfaction: Let's say you were voting B>Y (retaining
the meaning of the alphabetical ordering) and you conside
True, I missed the "majority" part.
Juho
On May 24, 2010, at 10:38 AM, C.Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (23 May 2010):
> 1. Rank the candidates. Truncation is allowed. Equal ranking is not
> planned for (but we could come up with something).
> 2. Label the candidate
e not been able to follow properly all the developments and I
can't remember all the proposals that have been made. Also here a wiki
style approach with good descriptions and classification of the
methods could be helpful.
Juho
On May 26, 2010, at 9:08 PM, Alex Rollin wrote:
Everyone on
s
(or Condorcet or ranked methods)?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On May 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
The following criterion is similar to
Plurality. Does
it have a name?
If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is
greater than
the number of
ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y
On May 27, 2010, at 4:07 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho a écrit :
The following criterion is similar to
Plurality. Does
it have a name?
If the number of ballots on which X beats
Y is
greater than
the number of
ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y
ld peace and clean environment) ... or
money". "And" corresponds to "min", and "or" to "max".
Juho
P.S. Use Mac and Grapher and set parameters to:
View / Frame Limits...=>x: 0...1y: 0...1z: 0...1
c = 0.2
a = 0.9
z = c*max(x,y) + (1-c
study what
would happen if there would be some stable segments of voters falling
into the different strategic categories. But I will not jump into that
for now.
Juho
On Jun 13, 2010, at 6:50 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 11:53 AM 6/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Abd,
The best way
courage them of put pressure on them since it is better to let the
voters decide).
BR, Juho
Thanks for your advice.
Best regards
Peter Zborník
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
list info
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
candidates, and that may lead to some distortion in the
results.
Juho
On Jun 16, 2010, at 5:51 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik a
écrit :
thanks for your view on the topic.
In election-theoretic language, what criterion is used to describe
use those exceptional cases
in Condorcet elections. For a regular voter in large public elections
sincerity is clearly the best strategy to follow.
Juho
On Jun 16, 2010, at 8:30 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Dear all, dear Markus Schulze,
I got a second question from one of our members (actuall
t;B
If the three C voters will truncate then they will win instead of B in
winning votes based Condorcet methods.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
The described algorithm seemed to make the completion in a "non-
symmetric" way, leading to comparing the proportions of the A>B and
B>A votes.
Juho advocates MinMax(margins) which is why he posted this example
Not really because of the minmax part but to cover also margin
rts though :-). I will expand and improve (and otherwise
modify, maybe even destroy) the calculator when time allows and I have
the energy and ideas.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
The ordering need not be random. One can use also a tree structure as
given by the candidates. Clones and near clones will form branches.
The simplest approach is to consider defeats within a branch to be
weaker than defeats between branches.
Juho
On Jun 26, 2010, at 4:01 AM, Jameson
not the only reasonable scenario. It is also possible that A voters do
not like C although C voters do like A. This is not the most common
scenario but sometimes opinions may go also this way.
Juho
On Jul 5, 2010, at 9:11 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
What if you could have a monotone, clone
lead to bad results / bad performance with sincere votes / worse than
best winners. Truncation of possible winners is always a risk (=best
candidate maybe not elected).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ibility to the voters? I think in most cases burying is
harmful to the method and voters should be discouraged to vote that
way (i.e. rank some strong candidates insincerely lower than their
sincere ranking is).
Juho
similarly to voter registration and ballot access to voters bein
ion of term "not worth ranking" would thus be
"candidates that have no chance of being elected" and not "candidates
that the voter does not like". In the first case the method would
always pick a good winner, "only" some weak candidate related
preference
ot have sufficient support
to justify changing the leader (or other state of affairs) => new
elections, or the old leader / state of affairs can be kept for the
time being).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
oters that
would work also in real life, not just on paper. I.e. guidance like
"if opinion polls show that ... then vote so that ..." or "since
opinion polls show that ... you should vote so that ...". Are there
such cases? Are they common? Is it rational to say to the vo
On Jul 22, 2010, at 1:42 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2010/7/17 Juho
On Jul 17, 2010, at 7:40 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
To clarify my position:
I think that, because of social dynamics which push voter groups
towards symmetry (ie, B voters like A as much/little as A voters
like B), honest
will have
a long-term competitive advantage and come to be most common.
If there are rational implementable strategies.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
hen one sums up all the (smallest) violations
in all votes (for all possible divisions). The division with lowest
score is the best division.
Category 2 methods are not be fully strategy free but maybe the
strategies are at least more difficult to apply due to the increased
complexity :-)
that would offer best sum of utility to
the voters (=> sum of ratings like philosophy) or if one wants to find
a winner that can rule the society thanks to having majority support.
Juho
Random Ballot Smith doesn't discourage burial in this case, in which
C retains only 30% of the
ed in real
life. But certainly this approach makes Approval better.
Juho
On Aug 29, 2010, at 10:58 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Aug 29, 2010 at 5:31 PM, Kevin Venzke
wrote:
Will Approval just turn into Plurality? Not really, because in
Plurality
once you have two frontrunners, this pretty
On Aug 30, 2010, at 3:42 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 29.8.10, Juho a écrit :
De: Juho
Objet: Re: [EM] Approval reducing to Plurality
À: "Election Methods"
Date: Dimanche 29 août 2010, 16h59
Yes, polls that are arranged before
the actual election is an i
just get the same 2-option menu in every district.
What kind of election did you refer to? Did the districts maybe have
separate elections or separate electors to be elected, or just
different set of mind although the votes will be counted for the whole
country?
Juho
Election-Metho
there are
more than two potential winners. As long as T1 and T2 are called
"T" (i.e. "minor") things are fine.
Juho
On Aug 31, 2010, at 10:53 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Aug 30, 2010 at 2:42 PM, Juho wrote:
What is nice about approval is that even if each candidat
been
taken.
i know (and respect) that such is the product you're selling.
similarly to how FairVote sells IRV.
Yes, FairVote and RangeVoting have some similarities :-).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Aug 31, 2010, at 7:39 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 31, 2010, at 6:28 AM, Juho wrote:
On Aug 29, 2010, at 10:13 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Aug 29, 2010, at 12:55 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
... long discussion on Approval and IRV ...
These foundational problems
e result also when one
of the R candidates is much more popular than the other (since all
weaker R candidate supporters will not follow the "approve both"
recommendation anyway).
I agree that some real life Approval elections would tell us better
what will happen.
Juho
On Aug 31
am not sure how well the multiwinner extention CPO-STV handles
large number of votes, seats and candidates although Juho was kind
enough to program a web-app.
CPO-STV and many other ranked proportional methods are a computational
challenge if the number of candidates and votes is large. It
. Condorcet criterion can be seen as a generalization of the
majority principle. On this list you will find many opinions on which
one of the Condorcet methods is best. (You can find also some voices
preferring other single-winner methods to the Condorcet compatible
ones.)
Juho Laatu
On Sep
tronger than random loop (that was
discussed above) in the results.
Juho
P.S. In general I think Condorcet methods will do quite fine in the
elections. If we arrange an election among the EM list members, then
we might see strategy analyses and even attempts to use some strategy.
But in &q
of Condorcet methods one might often
need also the other end, i.e. the one where the voters (or sufficient
majority of them) tend to vote sincerely.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
From: Juho
[snip].
On the other hand we know that all Condorcet methods
are
vulnerable at
least to the burying strategy.
All Condorcet Methods? Or all deterministic Condorcet
Methods?
I would say all... LNHelp is basically a subset of a "burial
resistance"
criterion and you c
st one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one
candidate at different rounds.)
Juho
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending n
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM
> On Mon, Nov 1
ision making and without too accurate knowledge about the behaviour of
other voters the performance of Condorcet methods is very good.
(Just checking how one could eliminate some of the problems of sequential
elimination (e.g. by using approval and avoid losing the "eliminated"
cand
Yes, IRV is a good example. Most Condorcet methods do the
comparisons/evaluation just once (when all the candidates are in the same
situation).
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM]
place support may be elected.)
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tuesday, 11 November
approaches may be ok too. And use of some sequential approach to break a
Condorcet cycle as well.
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To:
although B is the Condorcet winner.
(The rule that I used was something like "those voters whose most approved
candidate among those candidates that they approve is least approved must
approve one more candidate (or multiple if ranked equal) except if that would
mean approving the most appr
nk the (numerous) combinations. (The numeric ratings
>will determine the order.)
Juho
--- On Tue, 11/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] Popular initiatives and dulling the tyranny of the majority
> To: &quo
--- On Wed, 12/11/08, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Wednesday, 12 November, 2008, 3:01 AM
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