--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM > On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > One could e.g. force supporters of the > "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one > candidate (at least one of the "remaining" > candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second > preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm > would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval > level. > > > > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. > force the voters to approve at least one on the > "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more > than one candidate at different rounds.) > > That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval > threshold > changing in each round for all voters. > > The process could be > > 1) Each candidate is designated a strong candidate > 2) Each ballot is considered to approve the highest ranked > strong > candidate and all candidates ranked higher. > 3) If the most approved candidate has > 50%, then that > candidate is elected. > 4) Re-designated the least approved strong candidate a weak > candidate > and goto 2).
Yes, could go this way. > > It still suffers from centre squeeze effects, though. > > For example > > 45: A>B>C > 9: B>A>C > 46: C>B>A > > Round 1 > > A: 45 > B: 9 > C: 46 > > no winner, B designated 'weak' > > Round 2 > > A: 54 > B: 9 > C: 41 > > A wins. How about continuing and allowing the C supporters to compromise and approve also B. (Just didn't use the 50% termination rule this time.) After this round B would win and there would be no more interest to compromise (all voters already either approve the to be winner or would approve it as a compromise). > > The method has potential strategic truncation incentives. > > If B voters bullet voted for B, the result would have been > > Round 2 > > A: 46 > B: 9 > C: 41 > > C designated 'weak' > > Round 3 > > A: 46 > B: 55 > C: 41 > > B wins > > Ofc, the other voters can use counter strategies. > > It might be worth adding a rule that if all candidates on > a ballot > are weak, the ballot counts as approving everyone. Yes, short ballots like "B" would be seen as "B>A=C". The unlisted A and C candidates are at shared last position. B supporters are not allowed to refuse to compromise after B is declared "weak", so they have to approve both A and C. Juho ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info