Now I have a reasonable definition of Mike Ossipoff's strategy that is supposed
to be valid for all Condorcet methods (and even for all FBC failing methods).
The strategy is if there are winnable unacceptable candidates and winnable
acceptable candidates, find that winnable acceptable candidate
This mail was just a draft that I sent by mistake. It contains still errors and
is badly formulated, so you an ignore it. I'll send a new one in a day or two.
Sorry about the confusion,
Juho
On 29.5.2012, at 11.30, Juho Laatu wrote:
Now I have a reasonable definition of Mike Ossipoff's
On 29.5.2012, at 4.48, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho says:
Voters are also optimists in the sense that they estimate the winning chances
of their favourites to be higher than they actually are.
[endquote]
Where does Juho get that?
I have not often seen situations where people first
On 29.5.2012, at 5.27, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 28, 2012, at 9:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
As usual, I don't know what Dave Ketchum means.
Guessing as to what Mike O is assuming, our topic is whether Approval's
inability to indicate such as ABC matters. I read the words below
Here is one possible strategy for Approval that may be useful especially after
a reform from Plurality to Approval. The idea is simply that current large
party supporters should avoid accepting any of the candidates of their new
rising competitors. With this strategy it is possible to at least
On 29.5.2012, at 21.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Subject: [EM] Approval strategy: never approve challengers
Juho:
You said:
Here is one possible strategy for Approval that may be useful especially
after a
reform from Plurality to Approval. The idea is simply that current large
party
On 29.5.2012, at 22.48, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On 29.5.2012, at 3.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive
problem.
All Condorcet methods fail the FBC criterion. But in practice situations
where the
related burial strategy would be
[I rewrote the message whose draft version I sent out earlier by mistake.]
Now I have a reasonable definition of Mike Ossipoff's strategy that is supposed
to be valid for all Condorcet methods (and even for all FBC failing methods).
The strategy is if there are winnable unacceptable candidates
On 1.6.2012, at 6.38, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
As I was saying in a recent previous post about this, Approval's count
results will tell Green-preferrers whether or not they need Dem to protect
against Repub.
Is that a general claim that after seeing Approval polls, it is always easy for
On 2.6.2012, at 15.32, Jameson Quinn wrote:
There's been a lot of back-and-forth over which is better. As an Approval
supporter myself, but one who doesn't agree with a lot of the pro-approval
arguments that have been made, I'd like to state my own position – once. I
won't respond in this
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My
understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are
only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three or more, the
method pretty much fails
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My
understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are
only one
the candidates
should vote. The decision may thus not be that much based on wild guesses on
what the best strategy might be, but more on agreeing what a good result would
be and then voting in line with that decision.
Juho
On 4.6.2012, at 0.08, Juho Laatu wrote:
...
Election-Methods mailing
On 4.6.2012, at 13.49, James Gilmour wrote:
I think Plurality can be claimed to be the ideal method for the
single-member districts of a two-party system, but then one should
maybe also think that third parties should not be allowed to run, and
we should stick to the same two parties
On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote:
A system that counts the proportions at national level
(typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also
gerrymandering can be avoided this way.
Yes, the votes could be summed at national level and the seats allocated at
national
On 5.6.2012, at 1.52, James Gilmour wrote:
On 4.6.2012, at 19.18, James Gilmour wrote:
A system that counts the proportions at national level
(typically a multi-party system) would be more accurate. Also
gerrymandering can be avoided this way.
Yes, the votes could be summed at national
On 7.6.2012, at 5.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Sainte-Lague isn't the only PR formula that is unbiased with respect to
party-size, but it's the only unbiased formula that doesn't share the
avoidable errors of STV and Largest Remainder.
Largest Reminder has some paradoxes but I wouldn't call
On 8.6.2012, at 12.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/7 Michael Ossipoff email9648...@gmail.com
Juho Jameson:
Jameson:
You describe a complicated new PR system. But why, when there are already
good PR systems?
All PR systems have complicated rules. But PAL representation is actually
On 8.6.2012, at 2.07, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But what I don't understand, Juho, is why you say that Largest-Remainder's
paradoxes are desirable. Saying that the paradoxes are acceptable,
forgivable, for STV, or even for Largest Remainder (when one is advocating
it for alleged simplicity) is
On 8.6.2012, at 20.44, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
As I was saying, I can understand the justification for using d'Hondt to
allocate seats to parties. And I know why you don't use d'Hondt to allocate
seats to districts: Proportionality is much more important when you're
allocating seats to
On 9.6.2012, at 1.46, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I don't know what you mean by minimize violation of opinions.
It is just one natural way to measure delta to full proportionality. I don't
claim that this is the only one or the absolutely correct one, but it is
natural and it respects the
It is easy to fill the ballot in VPR. It is one step more difficult to check
the preferences of the candidates and decide whom to vote. If one goes one step
further in this simplification path, one might end at tree voting. We could
have a candidate that belongs to the free rifle group of the
On 11.6.2012, at 0.46, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/10 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
It is easy to fill the ballot in VPR. It is one step more difficult to check
the preferences of the candidates and decide whom to vote. If one goes one
step further in this simplification path, one
On 13.6.2012, at 11.39, Nicholas Buckner wrote:
Actually, on a weird second thought, wouldn't a method that refused to
identify a winner in a three-way tie (Condorcet paradox) be compatible
with both?
Election methods that are partial in the sense that they don't always find
winners are also
On 14.6.2012, at 8.12, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
One key element in democracy is to structure administration (families,
municipalities counties, states, countries) and representation based on
natural borders.
Well, if you mean rivers and ridges, gullies, etc., if that's what
people want,
On 14.6.2012, at 9.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I also note that of course the differences in regional disproportionality
due to the sizes of multi-member districts are much smaller than regional
disproportionality caused by single-member districts.
Not a valid comparison. Single member
On 14.6.2012, at 23.45, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If the district's population is off by one person,
that's nothing compared to the amount by which even the best PR system
will put it off, when allocating seats to fixed districts.
Could you give me an example (or a formula or some other exact
On 15.6.2012, at 1.41, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 5:37 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 14.6.2012, at 23.45, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If the district's population is off by one person,
that's nothing compared to the amount by which even the best PR system
On 16.6.2012, at 5.33, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
Can you give an example where there is a difference between those
methods?
(Sainte-Lague and Largest-Remainder)
Yes, in the sources that I've already referred you to. Do you really
need me to look it up for you?
No need. I think
On 17.6.2012, at 0.41, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
And I'll repeat what I mean by SL's optimal proportionality:
SL minimizes differences in seats per person (whether seats are being
allocated to districts or to parties).
Ok, the Sainte-Laguë side of the claim seems to be clear now. This is
On 17.6.2012, at 7.59, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juhos:
Ok, you're right in a way: LR _does_ have something right it does: LR puts
the allocation as close as possible to the ideal fractional allocation. It
does that when it preferentially gives seats to parties or districts with
largest
Yes, there can be different criteria and different needs. We could use e.g.
D'Hondt because also it is based on one ideal way to allocate the seats. It
gives the seats to those parties that can offer the highest number of
represented voters per representative. That's fair too, from one point of
Sorry about some delay in answering the mail. I was celebrating the midsommer
out of the reach of proper internet connections. I think we are already on the
second round of this topic (divisor methods and ratios vs. quota based methods
and number of people) but here are some comments from a
Evaluative and Comparative are good descriptive names, especially for
nontechnical use.
There are many different needs for names. For informative nontechnical needs
the names should be stable and understandable. For research needs the names
should be stable and exact. For marketing needs the
On 23.6.2012, at 19.07, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: I think the method in princple encourages people to
participate, e.g. via membership in a party.
On the contrary, Juho. Joining a party is profoundly passive. Instead of
expressing their own view, party members cede
On 23.6.2012, at 19.07, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: I think the method in princple encourages people to
participate, e.g. via membership in a party.
On the contrary, Juho. Joining a party is profoundly passive. Instead of
expressing their own view, party members cede
On 24.6.2012, at 9.36, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But remember that, to get one thing, you give up something else. What
are you giving up to get LR's optimization?
You already know. Some well known paradoxes + non-monotonicity with respect
number of seats. These may be problematic or may be what
On 25.6.2012, at 4.50, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Do you have an exact formulation on what you think is the crucial property
that makes SL optimal or best in equal representation that all should
follow (at least when compared to LR)? You focus very much on optimization of
seats per quota,
On 25.6.2012, at 23.10, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Political parties are quasi-official institutions designed to acquire the
reins of government.
I agree. But in democracies the voters can (at least in principle) kick the
worst of the partis out of power. I note that a two-party system has some
, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2012, at 4.50, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Do you have an exact formulation on what you think is the crucial
property that makes SL optimal or best in equal representation
that all should follow (at least when compared to LR)? You focus
very much
On 26.6.2012, at 23.12, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Hi, Juho
re: Yes, I agree that parties typically have tendency to drive
the system towards oligarchy and not towards (more voter
controlled) democracy.
Precisely. And that knowledge urges us to 'think outside the box' - to 'go
where
-partisan
electoral method. Let's start.
Juho Laatu said:
Let's generate better methods. Are you sure that you don't want
parties even in the sense that there would be ideological groupings
that people could support? Or in the sense that there would always
be an alternative to the current
On 27.6.2012, at 18.03, Fred Gohlke wrote:
How, exactly, do we make our pseudo-democratic systems better?
I have considered numerous options. At this very moment, maybe the sponsoring
problem could be one easy (in theory) problem to solve. Just cut out party
sponsoring and/or set some limits
On 27.6.2012, at 20.10, Jameson Quinn wrote:
3. As I envision PAL representation, the PR system I designed, parties would
simply be a label that any candidate could self-apply. To keep out wolves in
sheeps clothing, any candidate would have the power to say, among the other
candidates who
On 28.6.2012, at 19.11, Fred Gohlke wrote:
The only way to eliminate party sponsorship is to conceive a candidate
selection process that empowers the people to select their best advocates,
independent of the parties.
You can buy some votes with a large (advertising, campaigning) budget. To
I'd be happy to try that somewhere. Only those votes count that are cast.
This approach could be seen as less fair than the traditional population based
allocation, since those people that didn't vote in some district will not be
represented at all. In allocation between parties also non-voters
On 2.7.2012, at 1.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There's no reason why, STV, voting for and electing candidates, couldn't be
used in each multimember district, with the parties afterwards topped-up
according to a national at-large list-PR allocation.
STV ballots may rank candidates of multiple
On 2.7.2012, at 1.51, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I always advocatred SL (Sainte-Lague) over dH (d'Hondt) for party list PR,
because, if you're using PR it's because you want proportionality, and if
you want proportionality, then you want SL.
Then, more recently, I said that, since I don't
On 2.7.2012, at 8.16, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
That's _big_ bias in favor of large parties, and against small parties.
Maybe so, if you count the s/v values for D'Hondt. If you count the seats, the
bias will be less than one seat per party. That's maybe not a _big_ bias.
(Sainte-Laguë is
On 2.7.2012, at 8.45, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You asked:
, or would the candidate maybe indicate his favourite party separately?
Sorry, I had a typo here. I should have written would the voter maybe
indicate. No need to answer again since I think this was already covered below.
But if
On 2.7.2012, at 16.08, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: At least in theory we could have a political system that
runs on goverment budget money only.
That can't happen because the donation of private money to support political
action has been deemed an expression of free speech.
It is possible
On 2.7.2012, at 13.58, Raph Frank wrote:
Another possibility is alternative-vote based PR.
You rank up to 2 parties. Something like,
Use divisors 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, ...
This is Websters but is d'Hondt-like for the first seat.
The seats would be allocated using that rule, and any party
in a party-based system.
Juho Laatu replied:
As well as in a party-free system.
But imagine for a moment that the following is no longer possible:
(a) a *primary* electoral system
(b) one that sponsors candidates for *public* office
(c) where voting is restricted to *private* members
On 3.7.2012, at 3.39, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Yes, even in that small district, d'Hondt's bias will of course make things
worse for small parties. But d'Hond't effect will be less in the small
district, even as the small district problem makes things worse, in its own
way, for small
On 4.7.2012, at 23.10, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But if your independent that you vote for locally doesn't win a district
seat, s/he might still win an at-large seat in the national list PR
allocation, because, as I said, there's no reason why an independent
shouldn't be able to run as a
://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixed-member_proportional_representation#Decoy_lists)
Juho
End of reply. What follows below is just a quote of some previous discussion,
including your post.
Mike Ossipoff
On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote
On 5.7.2012, at 23.24, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Hi, Juho
You raised a multitude of points.
re: I agree that getting rid of the financial ties and
getting rid of the party internal control on who can
be elected would reduce oligarchy within the parties
and power of money.
On 6.7.2012, at 0.40, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
- For instance, a system based entirely on random selection would probably
not have very powerful parties, as the parties would have no way of getting
their candidates into the assembly. Of course, such a system would not have
the
On 7.7.2012, at 21.04, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But your concern probably is that a party could deviously ask a candidate
that they like, and who is, for all intents and purposes, a party candidate
of theirs, to run as an independent, with no official party designation, and
no mention of a
On 7.7.2012, at 23.18, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Can you describe a circumstance in which letting the leaders of a subset of
the electorate control of the nomination of candidates for public office will
be in the public interest? In a representative democracy, is it not the
right of the people
On 8.7.2012, at 12.54, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Sat, Jul 7, 2012 at 4:29 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 7.7.2012, at 21.04, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
But your concern probably is that a party could deviously ask a candidate
that they like, and who is, for all intents
On 9.7.2012, at 22.45, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Juho
re: A party represents some set of political ideals and targets.
There may be limitations on how many candidates each party
can nominate. This party might be interested in nominating
candidates that represent those
On 2.7.2012, at 13.58, Raph Frank wrote:
For example, 26 parties at 1.5% and one party at 61% for a 49 seat parliament
would split the seats, 20 for the large party and 29 for split between the
micro parties. The micro parties get 59% of the seats for 39% of the vote.
I only now checked
On 11.7.2012, at 19.18, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: There may be also negative arguments against party control,
but aren't those given reasons rational reasons that aim at
creating the best possible and representative list of
candidates that drive the party values forward?
Ya got
On 12.7.2012, at 7.58, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 3:14 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 2.7.2012, at 13.58, Raph Frank wrote:
For example, 26 parties at 1.5% and one party at 61% for a 49 seat
parliament would split the seats, 20 for the large party
On 13.7.2012, at 2.24, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
You said:
Btw, this strategy is much less risky when we talk about splitting
districts, since the population of districts is very stable when compared to
possible risky changes in party support.
I don't know if U.S. states are
I think you are making the question quite complex and quite detailed. I also
don't know if this is a reply to something specific that I said or just general
observations on what kind of systems I might like.
One basic approach that I find quite decent is the idea that if one wants to
have
On 13.7.2012, at 18.35, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: (Here's btw one possible approach that allows anyone to run.
There will be a primary elecion at every municipality or
other small area (common to all voters of that area). Anyone
can nominate himself as a candiate. The winners will be
Here are some responses to the requests and comments. I'm afraid this mail may
not have much new content to others than Mike Ossipoff and me. This mail is
more about the discussion than the actual content. But if you are interested,
just read forward.
Juho
On 15.7.2012, at 2.21, Michael
Also this mail may not have much new content to others than Mike Ossipoff and
me.
On 15.7.2012, at 2.30, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 3:39 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
I think you are making the question quite complex and quite detailed.
Speaking
On 16.7.2012, at 1.17, Fred Gohlke wrote:
They will not have met them, but each of them are part of a direct line of
individuals that culminates in the people who are make the later selections.
Depending on the way the process is implemented, they can influence those who
make the later
On 16.7.2012, at 1.58, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
Seat% and Vote%:
I don't just mean that it's generally impossible to make all the
parties' seat% equal to their vote%. Of course that's impossible. But
I mean more than that.
I mean that it's also in general, with fixed house-size,
This mail has again very little EM content. Feel free to skip.
Juho
On 16.7.2012, at 21.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
{referring to making seat% as close as possible to vote%]
I note again that I have not set any such target.
[endquote]
Excuse me, I thought you had, because
On 17.7.2012, at 23.05, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: ... being able to influence through the chain of electors
offers a useful communication / influence channel between
the bottom level voters and their representatives.
It also gives the people meaningful participation in the political
On 19.7.2012, at 14.40, Raph Frank wrote:
On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 1:58 PM, Michael Ossipoff
email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes, but if a large party suplus-transfers to another party,and it,
too,as a result, acquires a quota and must transfer,then the
destination for that next transfer can
On 19.7.2012, at 19.43, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
Juho: ... being able to influence through the chain of electors
offers a useful communication / influence channel between
the bottom level voters and their representatives.
Fred: It also gives the people meaningful
On 23.7.2012, at 0.22, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: If we start from low/local level and parties set the
candidates, I might try giving the decision power on who
will go to the next levels to the regular voters, and not to
the candidates that may already be professional politicians.
On 25.7.2012, at 19.35, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: In the quoted text I assumed that your question What would
you think of letting interest groups (or parties) select
their most effective advocates to compete with other
candidates for public office? referred to
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still working on
the best graphics to visualize Condorcet results.
One solution is to support minmax(margins). With that method you can simply
draw a histogram that indicates how many new
On 15.9.2012, at 13.02, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/15/2012 09:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still
working on the best graphics to visualize Condorcet results.
One solution
On 17.9.2012, at 21.08, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 9/15/2012 3:02 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/15/2012 09:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still
working on the best graphics to visualize
On 18.9.2012, at 18.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/16/2012 02:35 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 16.9.2012, at 9.57, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(More precisely, the relative scores (number of plumpers required)
become terms of type score_x - score_(x+1), which, along with SUM
x=1
On 19.9.2012, at 20.26, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho--
This thread is demonstrating something that I spoke of earlier: There
are an unlimited number of things that different people can ask for
from voting systems, just as there are infinitely-many ways to count
rank ballots.
It couldn't
On 20.9.2012, at 8.20, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
The idea that there are third candidates but that are never elected,
and that can act as spoilers does not fly very well.
[endquote]
In what sense doesn't it fly well? What does that mean?
I just meant that it is a waste of
On 21.9.2012, at 4.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When you say can't be elected, you need to examine what you mean by
that. Do you mean can't be elected under combination of a selective
media blackout, and Plurality voting? Or do you mean can't be
elected because the public prefer the policies
On 21.9.2012, at 22.52, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Just in practice. Some more weight on Duverger's law, some less on media
(would happen also without media).
So you keep repeating. But, in this country, the 1-party monopoly
_wouldn't_ happen without the media fraud that I've discussed.
On 22.9.2012, at 1.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Do you claim that unimproved Condorcet can be
defended in a comparison with Symmetrical ICT, or ordinary ICT?
I don't know if I have anything important to say. You are probably a better
expert on the properties of those methods. Also definitions
We are about to dive into the details of some methods. I'm not sure if there
are still some unanswered questions that I should cover, or my own claims that
I did not clarify yet. I'll comment some random points below.
On 22.9.2012, at 1.48, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Maybe you meant to compare
be a problem in Approval, and, posted specifically,
about SFR, that I don't think that I should repeat it again this soon.
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 7:43 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
We are about to dive into the details of some methods. I'm not sure if there
are still some unanswered
On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as
well as [...what?] when
people rank sincerely. That statement requires specification of what
method(s) choose(s) better than SITC under sincere voting, and why
that is so.
On 23.9.2012, at 8.01, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 6:11 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as
well as [...what?] when
people rank sincerely
I will not comment the Dodgson and changing vs. adding votes related
misunderstandings. I hope that misunderstanding is now solved. My example best
sincere winner criterion was meant to refer to the Minmax(margins) philosophy.
On 24.9.2012, at 16.33, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If you think that
On 25.9.2012, at 7.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
Minmax(margins) can elect outside the top cycle if such a candidate is
closest to being a CW (measured in number of required additional
votes)
[endquote]
Now, you see, that's exactly what I was talking about. Now you're
back
On 25.9.2012, at 9.31, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
Here's the MinMax(margins) chicken dilemma example that I promised, in
which defection by B voters is successful and rewarded::
Sincere preferences:
75: ABC
51: BAC
100: C(A=B)
Voted rankings:
75: AB
51: B
100: C
Try
On 27.9.2012, at 9.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
...about some things.
But first, regarding some of the other things:
1. You seem to imply that you think that there is a single, objective,
right ideal sincere winner. Of course you'll deny that, but you've
repeatedly fallaciously based on
Ok, thanks for the effort, trying to convince me.
Juho
On 28.9.2012, at 4.47, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
It's time to agree to disagree.
But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
to the
Since Wikipedia says in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:VOTE that
voting is used maily to help in building consesus. The polls are thus not
expected to be competitive. The final decisions are not made based on the poll
results but in a discussion that the polls should help.
Because of
On 28.9.2012, at 22.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Since Wikipedia says in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:VOTE that
voting is used maily to help in building consesus. The polls are thus not
expected to be competitive. The final decisions
that
Wikipedia aims at making the working practices as discussion and consensus and
agreed policy oriented as possible.
Juho
On 29.9.2012, at 1.16, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 28.9.2012, at 22.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4
What is a strong Condorcet method?
Juho
On 29.9.2012, at 23.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/28/2012 10:11 PM, dn...@aol.com wrote:
A B
Choice C comes along.
C may - head to head ---
1. Beat both
C A
C B
2. Lose to both
A C
B C
3. Beat A BUT lose to B
C A B
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