From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Query for one and all
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
Situation 1:
2 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
4 C > A > B
The win
From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: [EM] Query for one and all
JBH asked:
My question, for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that
any single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
Two problems.
1. Your second and subsequent preferences count against your
Gilmour,
Would you be so kind as to answer Lyra's question about the Parliamentary
form of government?
You are most likely the best informed to answer the question.
Thank you, I knew you would, Ha Ha.
Donald,
Forwarded Letter
Date: Sat, 30 Aug 2003 02:27:55 +0100 (
Markus,
--- Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
> > I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
> > but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
I agree that the below shows a failure of Clone Independence in the method
as it was described by Jo
Having inspired Alex Small's response (see end of this post) in thread
Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity
I retrieve what I wrote long ago:
URL: http://people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek/platideas/
Section: PP Notes: III. Of the People, By the People, For the People
Something is nee
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (2 Sep 2003):
> I think MCA meets Clone Independence and Participation,
> but I'd like to hear reasoning to the contrary.
Situation 1:
2 A > B > C
3 B > C > A
4 C > A > B
The winner is candidate C.
Situation 2:
Replacing C by C1, C2, and C3 gives:
I found how MCA fails Participation. It seems pretty mild, though:
5: A>B>C
4: B>C>A
A is a majority favorite and wins.
But add these in:
2: C>A>B
There is no majority favorite and B wins by greatest approval.
The two voters would have done better to not cast these votes. Or, if they
had pol
Dave Ketchum said:
> If I really wanted to broaden the field, I might get into ways for the
> people being represented to control who got to be officials, and
> when officials got replaced, WITHOUT doing elections.
Here's a simple scheme along those lines. Surely it can be improved, and
as set fo
As I said last time, I approve of EM getting into other topics but, for
myself (and I assume many others), public elections are the big deal.
Certainly other topics could include non humans, etc.
If I really wanted to broaden the field, I might get into ways for the
people being represented to
On Sun, 31 Aug 2003 10:19:12 EDT [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote in part:
>In public elections we need to have the voters understanding the method
>well enough to vote intelligently, and to be able to accept declared
>winners as appropriate to the vote count totals (which I claim s
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>> While there is no CW,
>> Eliminate the Approval loser.
> "Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an
> Approval cutoff, default is between 1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each
> candidate is also ok, with def
David,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
> >David's method gives me a similar, simpler idea that would seem to be an
> >improvement over IRV. The method would be:
>
> >1. The voters rank the candidates they would be willing to support, and also
> >place an approval cutoff
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