From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: RE: [EM] Query for one and all JBH asked:My question, for one and all: Is there any desirable quality, that any single-winner method has, that this method does not have?
Two problems.
1. Your second and subsequent preferences count against your first preference.
2. If more than first preferences have to be counted, the value of the votes of different voters may
be different if the voters truncate after different numbers of preferences.
James
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From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [EM] Query for one and all (snip) Condorcet, Condorcet Loser, Consistency, Independence of Clones, Reversal Symmetry, Smith, later-no-harm, Participation.
Markus Schulze --__--__--
(JBH) These are exactly the sort of replies I was hoping to get. But I must ask for further explanation.
James: (1) would seem to be true of all methods that allow voting for more than one candidate. But with MCA, as with IRV/STV, your later-choices do not come into play unless your first-choice has failed to win. So, (1) is much less true of MCA than it is of plain Approval. (2) is true of any method that allows truncation; since it is at the voter's discretion, I see no grounds for complaint.
Markus: Condorcet and Condorcet loser I had already surmised. "Smith" sounds like another Condorcet-type of qualification; always chooses a member of the Smith set, I would guess. Consistency: is there any method that passes this, other than Plurality? Do I remember right, this is the ability to divide the electorate into parts, and if each part elects A, the combined whole elects A? How does MCA NOT pass that? Please remind me what "Reversal Symmetry" and "later-no-harm" mean, why they are desirable, and why MCA does not pass them. Much Thanks-
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John B. Hodges, jbhodges@ @usit.net
Do Justice, Love Mercy, and Be Irreverent.
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