Jan said:
Mike Ossipoff wrote (many things, including):
True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but at least
it
reliably counts all those that you vote. That can't be said for IRV.
What do we mean by
Jan said:
Mike Ossipoff wrote (many things, including):
True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but at least
it
reliably counts all those that you vote. That can't be said for IRV.
What do we mean by
There is a class of voting methods commonly used by young American
school children, and probably by children all over the world. These
methods (EMMM, 1P2P...) guarantee that every voter's vote counts (as
does my YVC0 method that I proposed in a previous post), but furthermore
gives every voter the
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >40 A>B>C
> >35 B>C>A
> >25 C>A>B
> >
> >A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
>
> Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
> assuming you are referring to '35 B>C>A'
>
>
At 5:01 AM +0100 1/24/04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
40 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
25 C>A>B
A wins. The 35 votes are not counted.
Actually, the 35 votes matter a great deal in an RP election -
assuming you are referring to '35 B>C>A'
These 35 votes are a part of the pairwise defeat of B>C being the
strongest (has
I favor version P.
--- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> The reason that the YVC methods are silly is that you can affect the
> outcome of the election, but (if there are a significant number of
> voters) you have no way of knowing how to vote or not-vote so as to
> achieve your desired o
Mike,
I don't understand what prompted you to write such a puzzlingly irritated
reply. If I said something that offended you, do tell.
If you are angry that I didn't reply to your message showing that MMPO does
have truncation incentive, I'll get that out of the way right now:
Mike seems to b
The voting methods proposed below give very high probabilities to all
voters that "Your vote counts!" - as compared with most other methods
discussed on this list.
This post is really a reductio ad absurdum argument showing that
improving the chances that voters' votes "count" (change the outcome
Eric Gorr wrote:
> With Approval and Condorcet, the entire way you vote will affect the
> outcome of an election.
But Jan's point is that with Approval or Condorcet, most of the time the
way you vote WON'T affect the outcome of the election, because your single
vote gets swamped by the sheer volu
At 5:50 PM -0700 1/23/04, Jan Kok wrote:
My straw proposal for the definition of "counts" is: "changes the
outcome of an election".
So what is Mike really saying here?:
True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but
at least it reliably counts all those that you vote. That can
Eric Gorr wrote:
>At 10:35 AM -0700 1/23/04, Jan Kok wrote:
>>Mike Ossipoff wrote (many things, including):
>> > True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but
>>> at least it reliably counts all those that you vote. That can't
>>> be said for IRV.
>>
>>What do we mean by "counts"
Paul asked:
> But be
> honest and give your best guess as to what percentage of the
> voting population would get beyond 5 while in the voting
> booth.
The examples I described, where I had voted positively and negatively for all 30
candidates in an
STV-PR elections, were annual postal ballot
At 6:56 PM -0500 1/23/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
Yes, I can invent numbers that show just the opposite.
Yes, exactly my point.
In the original examples only rankings, not rankings with utilities
were given. Without information on the actual utilities the
Condorcet winner migh
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>The CW is the social utility maximizer.
Not always. Please justify this statement.
>If the voter-median position is occupied only by that despised corrupt
>candidate, why isn't anyone else contesting that position? That seems
>suspicioiusly odd in a Condorcet election, wh
Eric Gorr wrote:
>Yes, I can invent numbers that show just the opposite.
Yes, exactly my point.
In the original examples only rankings, not rankings with utilities were given. Without information on the actual utilities the Condorcet winner might have the highest utility or might not. You just d
At 4:43 PM -0600 1/23/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
For every example that meets such-and-such criterion there is a fairly easy
way to come up with a counterexample that shows a failure to meet a
different criterion, and what most people on this list do is switch criteria
from a post to a reply to an ob
-Original Message-
From: Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Friday, January 23, 2004 3:44 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] No evidence that IRV doesn't fail. Reasons why it must
>>somebody said something
>Yes, I can in
At 4:22 PM -0500 1/23/04, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
Condorcet did not elect the wrong candidate. The voters were clearly
split, but both of the larger groups preferred the third option over
the primary opposition. As such, the highest utility candidate was
elected by Condorcet.
W
Eric Gorr wrote:
>Condorcet did not elect the wrong candidate. The voters were clearly
>split, but both of the larger groups preferred the third option over
>the primary opposition. As such, the highest utility candidate was
>elected by Condorcet.
>Why do you believe that the first place pref
At 2:43 PM -0600 1/23/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
??? You said the same thing I did, but didn't recognize that's what you did.
Eric wrote:
Consider the case of a polarizing issue, such as Abortion. To
those on either side, their last place vote will matter just as
much as their first place vote. Eve
??? You said the same thing I did, but didn't recognize that's what you did.
>>Eric wrote:
>>
>>>Consider the case of a polarizing issue, such as Abortion. To
>>>those on either side, their last place vote will matter just as
>>>much as their first place vote. Even their middle preferences
>> >wi
James wrote in response to
>Paul wrote:
>> That would only be the case when every voter ranks all
>> candidates, and every voter has been told that who they rank
>> last matters. No voter I know wants to go to that much
>> trouble.
>
>Meet one.
>When voting in STV-PR elections I have frequently ma
>Paul said:
>> Where I disagree a bit with James is that I think it is too
>> much to ask the voters to quantify their subjective rankings
>> by coming up with their own weights.
>
>I never suggested we should ask the voters what their weightings were.
What I did say was that our
>knowledge that,
At 1:28 PM -0600 1/23/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Eric wrote:
Consider the case of a polarizing issue, such as Abortion. To
those on either side, their last place vote will matter just as
much as their first place vote. Even their middle preferences
>will matter greatly as it puts a buffer between t
Paul wrote:
> That would only be the case when every voter ranks all
> candidates, and every voter has been told that who they rank
> last matters. No voter I know wants to go to that much
> trouble.
Meet one.
When voting in STV-PR elections I have frequently marked preferences against all 30
Eric wrote:
>Consider the case of a polarizing issue, such as Abortion. To
>those on either side, their last place vote will matter just as
>much as their first place vote. Even their middle preferences
>will matter greatly as it puts a buffer between the viewpoint
>they agree with and the viewpoi
Paul said:
> Where I disagree a bit with James is that I think it is too
> much to ask the voters to quantify their subjective rankings
> by coming up with their own weights.
I never suggested we should ask the voters what their weightings were. What I did say
was that our
knowledge that, for
At 5:34 PM + 1/23/04, James Gilmour wrote:
Eric asked:
> Why do you believe that the first place preferences matter more
then the middle or final preferences? What is the basis for
this assumption?
Unless you ask the voters specifically you cannot know,
Quite true. I would liken it to the He
>Eric asked:
>> Why do you believe that the first place preferences matter more then
>> the middle or final preferences? What is the basis for this
>> assumption?
James answered:
>Unless you ask the voters specifically you cannot know, but I think there
is an intuitive answer.
>Consider a Borda e
At 10:35 AM -0700 1/23/04, Jan Kok wrote:
Mike Ossipoff wrote (many things, including):
> True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but
at least it reliably counts all those that you vote. That can't
be said for IRV.
What do we mean by "counts"?
The election system would take it
Mike Ossipoff wrote (many things, including):
>True, Approval doesn't let you vote all your preferences, but at least
it
>reliably counts all those that you vote. That can't be said for IRV.
What do we mean by "counts"?
One meaning is used in arguments about why people should vote. "Your
vote c
Eric asked:
> Why do you believe that the first place preferences matter more then
> the middle or final preferences? What is the basis for this
> assumption?
Unless you ask the voters specifically you cannot know, but I think there is an
intuitive answer.
Consider a Borda election in which a
I mistakenly said that defensive burying is needed in Approval and Margins.
I meant that defensive burial is needed in IRV & Margins (also in
Plurality).
Defensive burying of a favorite is never needed in Approval.
Order-revesal can only be needed in Approval under conditions that are said
to
David Gamble said:
This first example is countered with a second example which is usually
something like:
47 A>B>C
4 B>A>C
2 B>C>A
47 C>B>A
in which B is the Condorcet winner with a very low percentage of the first
preference vote.
In the first example IRV will probably elect the wrong candidate
Chris said:
Here is an example that Mike Ossipoff posted (Tues.Jan.20)
Presumed sincere preferences:
40:A>B>C
25:B>A>C
35:C>B>A
100 ballots. B is the Condorcet Winner (and the IRVE winner).
A voters Bury (offensively order-reverse against)B, while all other voters
vote sincerely:
I reply:
Let m
Kevin said:
Mike:
Say a voter refuses to express a preference between X and Y. Anyone who
says that that voter is saying that s/he prefers X to Y, and that s/he also
prefers Y to X, must have their head all the way up their ass.
It's not necessarily saying that.
I reply:
So you agree that you'
Kevin--
You said:
I think you may be confused about the process of Symmetric Completion
as different from the criterion.
I reply:
I'm not interested in what you think. It would be more worthwhile if you
could tell us why you think what you think.
Did I say something that suggested that I belie
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