Markus--
You said:
Well, you wrote that a candidate B is "majority rejected"
when there is another candidate A such that a majority of
the voters strictly prefers candidate A to candidate B.
I reply:
No, that wasn't how I defined "majority-rejected". I spoke of voting, not
preference.
You continu
Dear Markus--
You quoted me:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-February/001295.html
GMC: Never elect a majority-rejected candidate (a candidate
over whom someone else is ranked by a majority) unless
every candidate in the set from the method is to choose
is
Ted Stern tedstern-at-mailinator.com |EMlist| wrote:
On 15 Mar 2005 at 08:34 PST, Ted Stern wrote:
On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:02 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names
in the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and co
Hi Forest,
Apparently I missed your interactions with Bart on this list, but I'll take
your word for it. ;-)
On 15 Mar 2005 at 14:12 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
> But now let me continue on to a sales pitch for a related method:
>
> We got the set P by eliminating all of the candidates that both A
Hello,
I compiled my triangle-plotting program to a DOS .EXE (which runs
probably in full-screen, 320x200x256 mode) which I can send to anyone
who wants to play with it. It opens with a page of instructions.
The program assigns ballot types to dimensions (up to four, meaning
this is a pyramid, an
On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest Simmons, about fundamental Condorcet vs.
approval issues
James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set
because
otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary.
However, it seems to me that maj
A variation on least additional votes:
Let f(A) be the fewest number of additional ballots (by friends of A) that
can turn A into the CW.
Let g(A) be the fewest number of additional ballots (by opponents of A)
that can turn A into the Condorcet Loser.
In other words g(A) is the same as the reve
On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, Ted Stern wrote:
I don't think
anybody could argue with that.
Bart inoculated me against ever using that sentence :')
Here's my sales pitch (to EM members) for RAV/ARC:
When candidate X beats Y in both approval and by head-to-head choice,
let's say that X strongly beats Y.
I
Greg Dennis wrote:
just FYI on the San Francisco data . . .
a vote for candidate (number-of-candidates + 1) indicates an "overvote,"
which is a vote for more than one candidate at the same rank. in
District 9 there were only 7 candidates, so a vote for candidate "08"
indicates an overvote. SF co
just FYI on the San Francisco data . . .
a vote for candidate (number-of-candidates + 1) indicates an "overvote,"
which is a vote for more than one candidate at the same rank. in
District 9 there were only 7 candidates, so a vote for candidate "08"
indicates an overvote. SF counting rules dictat
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2005 22:03:25 -0800
From: Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] About random election methods
Russ wrote to Andrew:
Andrew,
I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic. Barring
actual numerical ties, why should the selection of the winner depend in
Ted Stern tedstern-at-mailinator.com |EMlist| wrote:
On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:02 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names
in the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to
study its properties, especially it
I found the reason why my counts were different from the official tally
for District 9, but this leads to more confusion on how the ballots were
counted...is anyone more familiar with the IRV counting rules used in SF
then myself?
First, there were only 7 candidates in the race...6 named and 1
On 15 Mar 2005 at 08:34 PST, Ted Stern wrote:
>On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:02 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>> Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
>>
>> I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names
>> in the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to
>> study its properties, espec
On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:40 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
>
> Note, however, that as you proceed up toward the Approval winner, the number
> of blacked-out elements needed to win decreases. The AW himself needs
> none. In other words, the Approval winner needs no pairwise wins to win the
> election. That's
I am doing my own count of the votes and I seem to be having trouble
getting the same tally for district 9 that match the official results.
The data I am using comes from:
http://web.sfgov.org/site/election_index.asp?id=28171
The results can be found at:
http://www.sfgov.org/site/election_index.a
On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:02 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted!
>
> I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names
> in the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to
> study its properties, especially its anti-strategy properties.
>
> I agree wit
Hello,
As I wrote recently, I want to elect from the CDTT set by Random
Ballot. (The CDTT set, again, contains every candidate who has a
majority-strength beatpath to everyone who has such a beatpath back
to them.)
I think the randomness can be justified here by noting that the CDTT
effectively d
Russ Paielli wrote:
I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic.
They don't currently do so, so why would they do so in the future?
It is not completely unexpected for a tie to occur and, when that
happens under Plurality (First-Past-The-Post), the winner has generally
been det
Dear Russ!
ARC (aka RAV) cannot elect the Approval winner when s/he beats
no other candidate since the method is Smith-consistent!
Yours, Jobst
__
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Dear Russ!
You wrote:
> I think voters will reject any method that isn't deterministic. Barring
> actual numerical ties, why should the selection of the winner depend in
> any way on some random event?
Well, in my opinion election methods should be democratic, and that is not
the same as "maj
Dear James Green-Armytage,
> > > Am I correct in thinking that minimax chooses E in this
> > > example, ranked pairs chooses D, and river chooses F?
> >
> > > Oops. Minimax chooses D, not E... is that right?
> >
> > MinMax chooses A.
>
> Yes, indeed it does. I'm quite embarrassed. Did I get the
>
Hi Juho,
About your "least additional votes" method: Correct me if I'm wrong, but
I think that your method is equivalent to minimax (margins). Adding an
additional "vote" will decrease the margin of each of a candidates defeats
by one. So, the candidate whose widest-margin defeat is less w
James G-A replying to Forest Simmons, about fundamental Condorcet vs.
approval issues
>James opined that the winner should always come from the Smith set
>because
>otherwise majority rule is violated more than necessary.
>However, it seems to me that majority is just one form of consensus.
>Max a
On Tue, 15 Mar 2005 06:53:52 +0100 Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Dave!
You wrote:
Agreed you do not need (n-1)*n/2 pairwise comparisons BUT, seems to me
ROWS went too far:
It will happily and efficiently return the CW if there is one.
It does not know if there is a cycle, though the winner of t
Hello James,
Here is some feedback on point 1. I didn't find yet time to write a proper answer also to point 3 but I'm planning to comment also that.
1. Majority and Smith set
Yes, one should respect the majority opinion. My thinking however goes so that in some situations some majority opinio
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