On 14 Mar 2005 at 22:02 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote: > Dear Forest, Russ, and Ted! > > I suggest that we call the method we discussed under various names > in the last days ARC (Approval Runoff Condorcet) and continue to > study its properties, especially its anti-strategy properties. > > I agree with Russ that it is perhaps a very nice first public > proposal, especially because it may be a nice compromise between > IRV- and Condorcet-supporters: Both methods are Runoffs which delete > the single candidate with the least points until there is among the > rest a candidate with a special property! > > Yours, Jobst
I do agree that Approval Runoff Condorcet (ARC) finds the same winner as Approval-seeded Bubble Sort (ABS). But I happen to think eliminating candidates through Runoff is one of IRV's weakest points. Its only appeal is familiarity. It seems to me that the key reason for eliminating primaries is to keep candidates in as long as possible, to enable voters to coalesce around the one whose views are closest to the majority. However, if you think that it can be a useful argument, then go ahead. I just worry that you would be letting the IRV advocates frame the debate in a way they think they can win. I admire of the compact description of ABS. I think it is the fastest possible way to reveal the social ordering of this method. Another point I would like to make is that although successively eliminating lowest approved candidates may be easier to describe -- easy to describe in the same way IRV is easy to describe -- every time you eliminate a candidate, you have to look for undefeated candidates again. I think it is just as much work as the Bubble Sort. Back to elimination again: I was thinking about how elimination of candidates tends to narrow voter choices, and I thought of this analogy. Say Democrats vote along a North-South axis, and Republicans vote along an East-West axis. But most of the voters are sitting somewere in the South-West. In the primary, the core partisans of each camp will choose a candidate somewhere along their axis. Democrats will probably not choose the South-leaning candidate who has drifted slightly to the west, and Republicans will probably not choose the West-leaning candidate who has drifted slightly South. The voters end up with a choice between a too-far-north Democrat with little Western tendencies and a too-far-East Republican with little Southern tendencies, neither of whom is particularly close to what they feel is truly important. When the voters can specify exactly how close they feel to each candidate without having to channel their choices, the winner will more likely be the WSW or the SWS candidate. Or even the true SW candidate who isn't a member of either party. Ted -- Ted Stern Change reply address to tedstern at u dot washington dot edu ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info