Chris--
I mentioned two separate reasons why Plurality meets Non-Drastic Defense.
Let me quote what I got from a website:
Non-Drastic Defense:
"Each voter must be allowed to vote as many alternatives as s/he wishes tied
for top, and if more than half the voters vote some alternative y (tied for)
Chris--
Plurality passes Non-Drastic Defense. Suppose that
"to rank" means " to rank in a rank-balloting system".
In that case, no one can write a Plurality example
that complies with the premise of Non-Drastic Defense.
That means that no one can write a Plurality NDD
failure example, and that Plur
Andrew--
You said:
I would think that if votes are sincere, the best voting method would not be
Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a number of points to
each candidate representing the utility they ascribe to that candidate. The
candidate with the largest total utility would win
James--
You wrote:
My two cents on the rampaging "plain Condorcet" vs. "Simpson-Kramer" vs.
"minimax" debate:
The main thing I don't like don't like about the term "plain Condorcet"
is that it sounds too much like "plain yoghurt". It sounds as if the
voters are getting a half-rate cup of Co
Dear Markus--
You say:
however, at least when each voter casts a complete ranking
of all candidates then the Simpson-Kramer method is identical
to what you call "Plain Condorcet".
I reply:
Not good enough. The fact that Simpson-Kramer can sometimes give the same
result as PC doesn't mean that Simp
Though I've told why, for the purpose of my criteria (and Steve's criteria)
it doesn't matter what "prefer" means, and, in fact, though I've told why it
doesn't matter if "prefer" doesn't mean anything, some may be uncomfortable
about the fact that I haven't posted a precise definition of "prefe
On Fri, 25 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Forest, you wrote:
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 18:50:26 +0100
From: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
There is no sincere way to specify utilities.
Prove me wrong and tell me what a sincere utility could possibly be!
How about the probability that the candidate in question would represent
me accurately in his vote on a r
From: "James Green-Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] I forgot something important...
James wrote...
I forgot to mention something important before I sent my last post, "CWO
may be worth fighting for". I wrote:
Here is one possible progression for single winner elections (t
Forest, you wrote:
> Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
> ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
> In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
> B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They have no incentive whatsoever t
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
On Wed, 23 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
strategies, there is never as group strategy equ
Dear Chris!
First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM can be thought of as
being essentially the same method with only different definition of
defeat strength, so it seems quite natural to compare them in detail as
you started.
Recall that the DMC winner is the unique immune candidate w
Hi Chris,
Nice example. But there is still a counter-strategic incentive under
DMC -- see below.
On 24 Mar 2005 at 08:11 UTC-0800, Chris Benham wrote:
> Suppose there is pre-polling and so the L supporters
> decide to approve C, while the C supporters sincerely
> divide their approvals.
> Furthe
Say in a Raynaud election the ranked ballots are
7:A>B>C
2:B>A>C
5:B>C>A
6:C>A>B
C is eliminated and A wins. But if the B>A>C voters uprank A,
giving
9:A>B>C
5:B>C>A
6:C>A>B
B is eliminated and C wins. So A went from winning to losing with
extra support.
--
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
[EMAIL P
Ted, Russ, Forest, James,Juho and others,
I think that Ted's draft public "Definite Majority
Choice" proposal is excellent, in the sense that
anything that might be slightly better would be more
complicated and/or less intuitive.
Two contending methods that use the same style of
ballot are James
My two cents on the rampaging "plain Condorcet" vs. "Simpson-Kramer" vs.
"minimax" debate:
The main thing I don't like don't like about the term "plain Condorcet"
is that it sounds too much like "plain yoghurt". It sounds as if the
voters are getting a half-rate cup of Condorcet that lack
Dear Mike,
however, at least when each voter casts a complete ranking
of all candidates then the Simpson-Kramer method is identical
to what you call "Plain Condorcet". This cannot be said about
Condorcet's proposals (who, by the way, doesn't discuss partial
individual rankings either). So after al
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