On Sun, 11 Sep 2005 00:52:49 -0400 Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
At 12:24 AM 9/10/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Approval gets mentioned so often that I comment up front:
Approval as the method. Simple, but a loser because I too
often come up with something like: I WANT Nader, but I cannot
At 01:52 AM 9/12/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
As Abd alluded to in at least one email, it's possible to have a revised
version of Copeland that works differently. For example, it could be
possible to not credit a candidate with a victory if they don't receive
majority support (called Copeland
At 06:44 PM 9/11/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I thought about this a bit. Consider this election:
49 A
24 BE
27 CDBE
C has 3 wins, and is the only Copeland winner.
Let's look at this. C is not just the Copeland winner, C is the
Condorcet winner, because in all the pairwise elections, A has 49
Hello,
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
At 06:44 PM 9/11/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I thought about this a bit. Consider this election:
49 A
24 BE
27 CDBE
C has 3 wins, and is the only Copeland winner.
Let's look at this. C is not just the Copeland winner, C is the
Rob,
--- Rob Lanphier [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
As Abd alluded to in at least one email, it's possible to have a revised
version of Copeland that works differently. For example, it could be
possible to not credit a candidate with a victory if they don't receive
majority support (called
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 04:47:19PM -0400, Andrew Myers wrote:
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using
On 9/12/05, Simmons, Forest [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The
John and Jane dialogue must have given you the wrong impression that my
other discussions of the possibilities were limited to the three
candidate case.Please read them again with the idea in mind
that they apply to any finite number of
Dear Adam (and other
interested parties),
The John and Jane dialogue must have given
you the wrong impression that my other discussions of the possibilities were
limited to the three candidate case. Please read them again with the idea
in mind that they apply to any finite number of
At 03:40 AM 9/12/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Approval has the singular advantage of requiring no ballot changes,
only a tweak of the election rules: simply stop discarding
overvoted ballots.
Not much advantage, for even this requires reprogramming. Better to
go for more good with the
