On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 09:45:12AM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
> Dear Andrew and Stephane!
>
> Andrew wrote:
> > Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
> > following election with 100 voters:
> >
> > 23 A>B>C
> > 25 A>C>B
> > 3 B>A>C
> > 26 B>C>A
> > 3 C>
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 04:47:19PM -0400, Andrew Myers wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> > Actually as many people will tell you,
> > this claim is wrong.
> >
> > I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
> >
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> Actually as many people will tell you,
> this claim is wrong.
>
> I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
>
> Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
> criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of m
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:51:40 -0400
From: Andrew Myers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Stephane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> Actually as many people will t
On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Andrew Myers wrote:
> > Is there any stronger statement that can be made for strategic
> > immunity of specific completion methods, ideally ones that
> > satisfy the summability criterion?
>
> Maybe your bes
On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 12:58:05PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
> claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
> no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
>
> BR, Juho
Thanks
I thought the folks on this list would find it interesting to see
some actual empirical data on how often cycles happen. I have data on
99 CIVS elections that have been run in which more than 10 voters
participated (max was 1749) and in which there were at least three candidates
(max was 72). These
Hi all,
I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet voting.
I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic
voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve
the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is there
The problem with range voting and other methods that attempt to capture voter
utility is that voters have no incentive not to lie by amplifying their claimed
utility to the maximum extent allowed, causing the method to become approval in
most cases.
If you want voters who understand the system to
On Wed, Jul 27, 2005 at 09:31:33PM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Can anybody cite a study showing cycles would be rare in "real"
> elections with many candidates and truely ranked ballots (not 90% bullet
> votes because of lazy voters)? This claim comes up again and again and
> it seems to me that
On Mon, Jul 18, 2005 at 09:52:50PM +0200, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Andrew Myers,
>
> you wrote (18 July 2005):
>
> > I've noticed that in practice MAM -- and the deterministic variant
> > I developed for CIVS -- both seem to be much more stable than
> >
On Mon, Jul 18, 2005 at 04:00:46PM +0200, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Stephen Turner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > (2) Among the criteria we usually discuss on this
> > list, we do not have one on "stability", which should
> > mean something like: "a small change in the ballots
> > should change
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 05:25:09PM -0400, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> In a context where the norm is simple plurality, with overvotes resulting
> in the ballot being discarded (for the race with extra votes), the simplest
> reform is repealing the rule that discards such ballots. This simple chan
> From: Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] MAM algorithm?
> To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> While finding a way to group candidates together in order to find a
> multi-winner pairwise method, I came up with a technique/algorith
Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Having been the moderator of a highly contentious newsgroup, where
> arguments were rooted in differences which have stood for centuries and
> where, offline, they can and do lead to serious and major violence, I have
> a suggestion. ...
Larry Le
On Wed, Mar 23, 2005 at 06:50:26PM +0100, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Andrew and Juho!
>
> You seem to agree that...
> > ...if votes are sincere, the best voting method would
> > not be Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a
> > number of points to each candidate representing the
> From: Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Hello All,
>
> In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
> Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury
> of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this.
> Any opinions?
...
I would think
Eric Gorr wrote:
> Andrew Myers wrote:
> > A lot of Condorcet election methods use randomness to elect
> > a winner, but in a way that I think voters will find unsatisfactory.
> > They simply produce a winner as part of a complex algorithm that
> > uses randomness a
A lot of Condorcet election methods use randomness to elect
a winner, but in a way that I think voters will find unsatisfactory.
They simply produce a winner as part of a complex algorithm that
uses randomness at various points. MAM is an example of such
an algorithm. A voter might reasonably wonde
Ralph Suter writes:
>I'll cite just two examples of actual decisions I was involved with. One
>was at the 1996 founding convention of an organization tentatively named
>"The Alliance." There were over 300 people at the convention, and one
>decision they needed to make was to choose
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2005 18:22:26 -0800 (PST)
> Subject: Re: [EM] redistricting
> To: "election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com"
>
> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
>
> On Fri, 7 Jan 2005, Forest Simm
On Fri, Nov 05, 2004 at 06:05:05PM -0800, Dr.Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
> On Nov 1, 2004, at 1:27 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
> >I thought people might be interested to know about some
> >recent improvements to the Condorcet Internet Voting Service at
> >http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~an
Hi all,
I thought people might be interested to know about some
recent improvements to the Condorcet Internet Voting Service at
http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~andru/civs.
* It now implements three different completion rules, including
MAM, Beatpath Winner, and a deterministic variant of MAM. If
I added a version of ranked pairs/winning votes (as I understand it) to the
CIVS voting system, though it's a little harder to get to than the beatpath
winner result. This is partly because RP seems to be much more expensive to
compute, even with some rather effective optimizations I added to incre
On Wed, Apr 28, 2004 at 07:59:05AM -0400, Eric Gorr wrote:
> At 12:26 AM -0400 4/28/04, Andrew Myers wrote:
> >You can check the results out for yourself at
> >http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.
>
> This link appears to be invalid.
Sorry, I dropped a tilde. It's
didate #3,
but an unambiguous winner and runner-up exist.
You can check the results out for yourself at http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.
Is there literature suggesting that cycles are going to be a problem even
when voters are mostly sincere?
-- Andrew Myers
Election-methods mailing list
David Gamble writes:
> Andrew, could you provide a worked example of your method with say 4
> candidates for 2 seats.
>
> Secondly are there any circumstances electing two candidates from four with
> the vote set:
>
> 34 A>B>C>D
> 23 B>C>D>A
> 22 C>D>B>A
> 21 D>B>C>A
>
> in which A is not one
I implemented the PR-enforcing Condorcet algorithm I described in my recent
mail to this list, as part of the CIVS voting web service. If you would like
to try it out (and give me some testing!), visit the following URL and vote on
the "ice cream assortment" election:
http://www5.cs.cornell.edu/~
their maximum valid preference is a 3-preference
(60% = 3/5). The 40%, on the other hand, have a valid 2-preference for the second
result, so ABCXY is the winning committee, as desired.
-- Andrew Myers
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
> From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] I Propose an EM Poll on Presidential Candidates
>
> It's been suggested that we do some polls on EM, to demonstrate the voting
> systems.
...
> So I propose that we now hold a poll on the U.S. presidential candidates.
I'm already runnin
> From: Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Just an idea...
>
> Now that the Oscar nominations are out, if possible, run your own
> Oscar vote among a large group of people. Personally, I belong to a
> rather large movie group in the DC area and am doing just this. Not
> sure how much participat
Condorcet methods like beatpath winner can be used to obtain a ranking
of the candidates but they don't seem to be good for elections in which
the goal is proportional representation. I'm curious whether people
know about generalizations of beatpath winner that make sense for this
purpose.
There
Because there has been continuing concern about the algorithm, I looked
up more information in the standard textbook I referred to in an earlier
email (Cormen, Leiserson, and Rivest).
The Floyd-Warshall algorithm (so named because the algorithm was
proposed by Floyd but based on a theorem by Wars
doesn't matter
much which algorithm is used.
-- Andrew Myers
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
finds the highest-weight path.
This is the particular choice of operators that results in selecting
the beatpath winner.
Many other choices for 'min' and '+' are possible, of course.
When implemented correctly it has O(V^3) running time where V is the number of
vertices (nodes) in the graph.
-- Andrew Myers
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Wed, Oct 15, 2003 at 03:51:37PM -0400, Eric Gorr wrote:
> At 3:16 PM -0400 10/15/03, Andrew Myers wrote:
> >In Condorcet elections with the beatpath winner criterion, the
> >computation of the beatpath winner involves finding the strongest
> >beatpath connecting two candid
appen if you compute
beatpaths adding the links that go in the "losing" direction, with their
appropriate vote count. Clearly you get different answers for some
elections, but is there a good example that shows that the answers you
get are inferior?
-- Andrew Myers
Election-m
ornell.edu/~andru/icvs
Cheers,
-- Andrew Myers
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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