On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Rob LeGrand wrote: > Andrew Myers wrote: > > Is there any stronger statement that can be made for strategic > > immunity of specific completion methods, ideally ones that > > satisfy the summability criterion? > > Maybe your best bet would be to show that the general problem of > manipulating a given election method by voting insincerely is NP- > hard. See > > Bartholdi III, John J., Craig A. Tovey and Michael A. Trick. The > computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social > Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227-241, 1989.
Thanks for the reference, but unfortunately NP-hardness is the wrong criterion here. Just because there are SOME elections that are hard to manipulate (which is what NP-hard means) doesn't mean that TYPICAL elections can't be easily manipulated by burying. -- Andrew ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
