Re: [EM] percentage support

Curt Siffert wrote: I know many of us are here to work on the best method for various social choice purposes. But many of us are specifically interested in political elections. And there's a problem with this. Plurality actually serves two purposes. It is a bad way to select a winner, but it is

Re: [EM] a majority rule definition based on the Smith set

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hi James, --- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : Another accepted use is "more than half of the voters who express a preference between two options/candidates". That's the definition I choose. I realize that you don't agree with it, but at least my reasoning

Re: [EM] median rating / lower quartile

Fan de Condorcet wrote: James, You wrote: Given sincere votes, this may be interesting, but if votes are not necessarily sincere, it would be quite possible for all candidates to receive a social utility of 0. That is, the lower quartile feature makes the method into a kind of 3/4 supermajority met

Re: [EM] San Francisco IRV Raw Ballot Data

Eric Gorr wrote: Daniel Bishop wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: Raw votes were kept around - I cannot promise they are still there - need a spreadsheet program to summarize. To learn more, goto: http://web.sfgov.org/site/election_index.asp?id=28171 I just finished counting the votes. In all seven

Re: [EM] San Francisco IRV Raw Ballot Data

Dave Ketchum wrote: Raw votes were kept around - I cannot promise they are still there - need a spreadsheet program to summarize. To learn more, goto: http://web.sfgov.org/site/election_index.asp?id=28171 I just finished counting the votes. In all seven districts, IRV, Condorcet, and Plurali

Re: [EM] IRV Failures

Eric Gorr wrote: In a recent conversation with an IRV supporter I asked the question: What cases would you accept as failure of IRV? They answered: Where the general public (or a significant fraction of it) failed to accept the results as legitimate, or at least beyond question. The 2000 and 2

Re: [EM] Condorcet-Approval hybrid method

Russ Paielli wrote: Daniel Bishop dbishop-at-neo.tamu.edu |EMlist| wrote: ... There's a potentially important practical advantage, in that it allows voters to cast a Cardinal Rankings-style ballot. For example, you could let: Rank 1 = ideal candidate Rank 2 = candidate I have

Re: [EM] Condorcet-Approval hybrid method

Russ Paielli wrote: Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote: Russ asked about what we used to call "Approval Completed Condorcet." The legendary Demorep was an avid proponent of several variations of this idea, one of which he christened ACMA for Approval, Condorcet, Maximum Approval, a

Re: [EM] SFC and "margins vs. winning votes"

Kevin Venzke wrote: As Blake pointed out, we can think of truncated votes as more or less equivalent to the same votes completed with random rankings. In that case, any margin of victory translates to a majority victory. So, what do you make of my favorite scenario?: 49 A 24 B 27 C>B Conside

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet package-wvx

Dave Ketchum wrote: On Fri, 25 Feb 2005 00:01:11 -0800 Russ Paielli wrote: ... On the theoretical side, what exactly would an equal-ranking capability accomplish? Does it give the voter some significant strategic mechanism, or is it simply way for the voter to express indecision? If it's the lat

[EM] Re: Condorcet package-wvx

Ted Stern wrote: On 24 Feb 2005 at 18:45 PST, Daniel Bishop wrote: (quoting Ted): Counting X1=X2=X3=...=X1000 as a fractional 0.001 vote for each candidate over every other is both impractical and nearly pointless. Don't you mean half a vote for each candidate over every other

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet package-wvx

Ted Stern wrote: On 24 Feb 2005 at 14:17 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote: I am adding "-wvx" to the subject to debate a=b - time enough to think about labels if my idea, once understood, survives debate. My thought is that a=b expresses interest in this pair, just as aa do for wv, but ranks them equ

Re: [EM] primary elections

Alex Small wrote: Bart- Good points. Advancing the top N would be a bad idea if the top N were determined by Approval totals. OTOH, if the top N were determined by first-choice vote totals then parties (especially small parties or compromise parties) that split their vote would be excluded

Re: [EM] primary election thoughts

Ted Stern wrote: What do group members think of the following primary election proposal: - Ballots allow a voter to rank 1st, 2nd or 3rd choice candidates. - Unlike IRV, more than one candidate can be chosen for any rank. If you aren't using IRV, then there's not a huge implementation advantage

Re: [EM] "summability"

Russ Paielli wrote: Daniel Bishop dbishop-at-neo.tamu.edu |EMlist| wrote: Russ Paielli wrote: Folks, On the old "Technical Evaluation" page of ElectionMethods.org, I had a criterion that I called "summability," which I defined as follows: "Each vote should map onto a

Re: [EM] "summability"

Russ Paielli wrote: Folks, On the old "Technical Evaluation" page of ElectionMethods.org, I had a criterion that I called "summability," which I defined as follows: "Each vote should map onto a summable array, where the summation operation is associative and commutative, and the winner should be

[EM] Condorcet failure of Approval Voting (was Re: Dave reply)

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote: ... [Dave] continued: BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM members to design strategies that sound nice in EM debates, while not practical for public election voters to either get

[EM] Explicit Voter Median Elections

This method gives official standing to the idea of a linear political spectrum. That's probably a Bad Thing, but I'll describe the method anyway. On the ballot, there are 3 boxes next to each candidate's name: Mark one: [ ] This candidate is acceptable to me. [ ] This candidate is too libera

Re: [EM] Another method idea

Forest Simmons wrote: Ballots are ordinal rankings or cardinal ratings. Any candidate with more than average first place rankings or ratings gets a point. Any candidate with fewer than average last place (or truncated) rankings or ratings gets a point or an additional point. The candidate with

Re: [EM] monotonicity and summability criteria

Russ Paielli wrote: Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote: It occurred to me a while back that the two criteria may be equivalent. That is, if a method passes monotonicity, perhaps it must also pass summability, and vice versa. That's just a hunch. Can anyone prove (or disprove

Re: [EM] monotonicity and summability criteria

Russ Paielli wrote: I have an "off the wall" question that some of the math geniuses on this list might find interesting. Before its recent modification, the ElectionMethods.org website had a page called "Technical Evaluation of Election Methods." Two of the criteria listed on that page were mo

Re: [EM] Logic/Jargon question

Paul Kislanko wrote: From Wikipedia: In voting systems , the Smith set is the smallest set of candidates in a particular election who, when paired off in pairwise elections, can beat all other candidates outside the set. Ideally, t

[EM] Multi-seat Condorcet method

Here is a method I developed to elect the Condorcet winner in single-seat elections, provide proportional representation in multi-seat elections, and to be fairly computationally simple. I would like to know if there are any serious flaws, and if so, how the method can be improved. AN EXAMPLE

Re: [EM] Spoiler Effect on Wikipedia

Eric Gorr wrote: At 6:04 PM + 11/11/04, Paul Crowley wrote: On Thu, 11 Nov 2004 12:08:31 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: hummmthere appears to be two opposing points of view here. Chris B. claims that IIA satisfaction does imply ICC satisfaction. Markus S. claims that it does no