> Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2005 17:06:44 -0800 (PST)
> From: Forest Simmons
> Subject: [EM] Approval/Condorcet Compromise
> Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
> until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
>
> Pick
Forest Simmons wrote:
I agree with Russ that Kevin's Approval Runoff method (eliminate lowest
approval candidates until there is a CW) is a decent public proposal.
I'm glad to hear that.
Let me suggest a nifty way to think about this method. It may be obvious
to some, but so be it.
Let the appro
Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
Pick the lowest approval score candidate that beats all of the candidates
with greater approval scores.
Proof of equivalence:
Kevin's winner KW has to bea
I agree with Russ that Kevin's Approval Runoff method (eliminate lowest
approval candidates until there is a CW) is a decent public proposal.
It would be interesting to compare that method with what I call TACF,
Total Approval Chain Filling:
Proceeding from the highest approval candidate to the
Most of the proposed Approval/Condorcet Compromises assume that the CW is
more desirable than the Approval Winner when they are not the same
candidate, i.e. the Approval Winner is only to be considered when there is
no CW available.
That seems to me like a kind of one sided approach to "comprom
Jobst's recent postings about complaints and their rebuttals, and "short
ranked pairs" has led me to the following Approval Condorcet hybrid:
Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoff, equal rankings allowed.
Let U(A) be the set of uncovered candidates that cover the approval winner
A. The membe
