On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 08:19:52 -0400 Florian Lengyel wrote:
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 03:17:30 -0400, Dave Ketchum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Agreed the hard-sciences often tal
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 03:17:30 -0400, Dave Ketchum
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
>
> Agreed the hard-sciences often talk of randomness - AND - often mea
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 19:32:22 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote:
That's why we want an election method that can find
the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might
otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice.
Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that
James Green-Armytage wrote:
>
>> That's why we want an election method that can find the compromise
choice that serves 60% of the people when we might otherwise get some
faction's 40% or 41% choice.
>
>
>
> Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee
60%, or
> anything ove
>That's why we want an election method that can find
>the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might
>otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice.
Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee 60%, or
anything over 50.1%. But anyway, I agree w
Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> If they get 10% of whatever PR body, that's fine and there's no need
> to augment that with anything else.
>
> For a single seat, I think the vast majority would be poorly served by
> four years of office holding by a tiny majority. I'm even more scared
>
On Oct 18, 2004, at 7:09 AM, Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so
I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that they
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
> don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that they're the
only ones that can be completely imm
On Oct 15, 2004, at 7:24 AM, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole & Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how th
James Cooper wrote:
So I'm down to looking at IRV vs. Approval (Approval being completely
trivial to explain).
The Center for Voting and Democracy (a group I generally agree with)
has stated its preference for IRV over Approval. There are two
relevant links:
http://www.fairvote.org/irv/approval.ht
>could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
>tabulated?
>I searched the list, and found a few posts about ER-IRV from this
>spring/summer (including your humorous June 7 post), but none of them
>describe the method in detail.
I don't know how detailed I can ge
At 11:05 AM -0700 10/15/04, Brian Olson wrote:
The variations I implemented were obviously rational and fair to
me. I may need some convincing of other variations. I think I'm
allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I don't
plan on implementing such an option.
Well, the three meth
On Oct 15, 2004, at 7:24 AM, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole & Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how th
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole & Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how things get tabulated easily enough
by selected
hi James,
thanks for the reply. comments below.
> ER-IRV(whole) is more of an IRV-approval "hybrid", and does a better job
> of reducing the incentive for the compromising-reversal strategy, but
> ER-IRV(fractional) is probably more acceptable to the general public, and
> less likely to
On Oct 12, 2004, at 8:34 PM, James Cooper wrote:
I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
the plurality system here. We have a state-wide inititiative trying
to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/). It proposes
using IRV. In addition, it would eliminate th
> Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 20:34:41 -0700
> From: James Cooper
> Subject: [EM] Approval vs. IRV
> The requirement to rank all the
> candidates also results in some odd side effects (like 'how to vote'
> cards, and the horrific 'donkey vote').
May be it is not
Hi James, and welcome to the list.
>
>I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
>methods.
I agree with you there. But keep in mind that "Condorcet" is not a single
voting method but rather refers to any Condorcet-efficient voting method,
the variety of which is
Hi James,
To me, it comes down to this:
a) In IRV, if everyone acts sincerely, bad things can happen
b) In Approval, if someone acts insincerely and nobody notices, bad
things can happen
Ultimately, I'd rather reward sincerity and encourage people to watch
out for insincerity.
Rather than vice
At 8:34 PM -0700 10/12/04, James Cooper wrote:
I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
methods. However, the lack of any real world implementations to point
to, and the difficulty of explaining the tie-breaker make it very
difficult to explain to voters.
If you would li
hi everyone,
I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
the plurality system here. We have a state-wide inititiative trying
to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/). It proposes
using IRV. In addition, it would eliminate the general primaries in
Washington,
Dear election methods fanatics,
Whenever we list-dwellers debate approval vs. IRV (and I have no
illusions that this will be the last time it happens), I'd like to suggest
that people keep equal rankings IRV (whole votes) in mind as much as
possible.
Does ER-IRV(whole) have any ser
Adam Tarr writes:
>You've shown that approval is exactly as bad as plurality, when people
>choose to vote in exactly the same way as plurality. This should come as
>no surprise to anyone. If everyone bullet votes in IRV or Condorcet, it
>would have this same effect as well.
>
>One would imagin
James Green-Armytage wrote:
So, 80% of the voters strictly prefer every other candidate to
candidate
L. And yet L wins using approval, because everyone only approves of their
favorite. Yikes! It's crazy!
You've shown that approval is exactly as bad as plurality, when people
choose to vote
Here is a definition of the majority loser criterion that is designed so
that limited-rank-ballot methods such as plurality and approval can't
weasel their way out of it:
"If a candidate is the sincere last choice of a majority of voters, and
that majority votes sincerely, then that cand
Mike Ossipoff wrote previously:
>Judge them by criteria. Approval meets FBC & WDSC. IRV meets Mutual
>Majority (MMC). But, as I discuss below, every MMC example is an IRV
>failure example in wihch IRV fails FBC & WDSC. One must choose which is
>more important.
Since before the dawn of t
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
>As I was saying before, I often call MMC the "Fortuitous Special Case
>Criterion), because it only applies in what, for a certain set of voters,
>is
>a fortuitous special case. But that case isn't so fortuitous for other
>voters, and every example of that type leads to an
Of course it's true that it's at least a near toss-up between IRV & Runoff.
But that isn't the case with Approval vs IRV.
IRV can claim two criterion compliances over Approval:
1. Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC)
2. Indepence from Clones Criterion (ICC)
I've pointed out here many times why those c
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I still place Plurality third, while conceding that Approval is close
enough that I do not object to your choice. Plurality only requires
picking one candidate to rank first, while Approval always requires
deciding whether to add one more to my approved list
I reply:
You seem t
If you trade Approval for ERIRV with AERLO, you're trading FBC for SDSC. If
the choice were only between Approval and ERIRV with AERLO, I'd probablly
choose ERIRV with AERLO, unless that od's FBC violation turned out to be
frequent and flagrant.
This is in answer to the question about how E
I don't disagree with Mike's post, but would point out that the
differences between Condorcet and Approval with regard to SU are fairly
small.
With results averaged over many runs, Condorcet generally has the edge
over Approval. Although in Merrill's "Making Multicandidate Elections
More Democra
Much of the criticism of Approval is done in a vacuum. I always want to
reply:
"...So then, Approval is worse thanwhat?"
IRV?
James cited Mutual Majority (MMC) as Approval's failing. But the mutual
majority situations where MMC applies are situations where IRV demonstrates
its failure of
On Wed, 28 Jan 2004, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> I think CR deserves a lot more attention than it's received. In many
> ways, it's a generalization of various other systems. By restricting the
> range of values in one way, CR can be made to simulate Approval. By
> restricting them in another
Bill,
--- "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Then I don't see the significance of the strategic equivalence, at all.
> If my strategy is going to be different for the exact same election with
> the exact same voter preferences, with the only difference being whether
> Approval
Richard Moore wrote:
> You may be reading to much into the statement "CR is strategically
> equivalent to Approval". What this statement means is just the
> following: If S is an optimum strategy for an Approval election, and
> S' is the equivalent CR strategy (in which an S' ballot is one that
>
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> In reading through some of the archives, I've come across a point that
> apparently needs some clarification.
>
> (A) The optimal strategy in CR is to always vote the maximum or
minimum.
>
> (B) CR is strategically equivalent to Approval.
>
> Now, the
Note that "optimal" is not the same as "optimum" . The difference is that
"optimal" allows for lack of uniqueness.
For example, in linear programming we have the well known "corner
principle" which says that if we search among all of the corners we will
find an optimal solution.
There may be ano
In reading through some of the archives, I've come across a point that
apparently needs some clarification.
(A) The optimal strategy in CR is to always vote the maximum or minimum.
(B) CR is strategically equivalent to Approval.
Now, the point I would like to make clear is that A and B are not
s
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