On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 19:32:22 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote:
That's why we want an election method that can find
the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might
otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice.
Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 03:17:30 -0400, Dave Ketchum
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Agreed the hard-sciences often talk of randomness - AND - often mean a
carefully
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 08:19:52 -0400 Florian Lengyel wrote:
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004 03:17:30 -0400, Dave Ketchum
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004 10:09:31 -0400 Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Agreed the hard-sciences often talk
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that they're the
only ones that can be completely immune
On Oct 18, 2004, at 7:09 AM, Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so
I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random methods is that
Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If they get 10% of whatever PR body, that's fine and there's no need
to augment that with anything else.
For a single seat, I think the vast majority would be poorly served by
four years of office holding by a tiny majority. I'm even more scared
of
That's why we want an election method that can find
the compromise choice that serves 60% of the people when we might
otherwise get some faction's 40% or 41% choice.
Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee 60%, or
anything over 50.1%. But anyway, I agree
James Green-Armytage wrote:
That's why we want an election method that can find the compromise
choice that serves 60% of the people when we might otherwise get some
faction's 40% or 41% choice.
Of course, majoritarian methods like Condorcet can't guarantee
60%, or
anything over
On Oct 15, 2004, at 7:24 AM, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how
James Cooper wrote:
So I'm down to looking at IRV vs. Approval (Approval being completely
trivial to explain).
The Center for Voting and Democracy (a group I generally agree with)
has stated its preference for IRV over Approval. There are two
relevant links:
hi James,
thanks for the reply. comments below.
ER-IRV(whole) is more of an IRV-approval hybrid, and does a better job
of reducing the incentive for the compromising-reversal strategy, but
ER-IRV(fractional) is probably more acceptable to the general public, and
less likely to anger
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how things get tabulated easily enough
by selected
On Oct 15, 2004, at 7:24 AM, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 11:15 PM -0700 10/14/04, James Cooper wrote:
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I have Equal Ranking IRV Whole Fractional implemented within my
voting calculator.
You should be able to discern how
At 11:05 AM -0700 10/15/04, Brian Olson wrote:
The variations I implemented were obviously rational and fair to
me. I may need some convincing of other variations. I think I'm
allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I don't
plan on implementing such an option.
Well, the three
could you explain the details of how ER-IRV (whole and fractional) are
tabulated?
I searched the list, and found a few posts about ER-IRV from this
spring/summer (including your humorous June 7 post), but none of them
describe the method in detail.
I don't know how detailed I can get
Hi James, and welcome to the list.
I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
methods.
I agree with you there. But keep in mind that Condorcet is not a single
voting method but rather refers to any Condorcet-efficient voting method,
the variety of which is
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 20:34:41 -0700
From: James Cooper
Subject: [EM] Approval vs. IRV
The requirement to rank all the
candidates also results in some odd side effects (like 'how to vote'
cards, and the horrific 'donkey vote').
May be it is not strictly a 'how to vote' card
On Oct 12, 2004, at 8:34 PM, James Cooper wrote:
I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
the plurality system here. We have a state-wide inititiative trying
to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/). It proposes
using IRV. In addition, it would eliminate
At 8:34 PM -0700 10/12/04, James Cooper wrote:
I am convinced of the technical superiority of Condorcet over other
methods. However, the lack of any real world implementations to point
to, and the difficulty of explaining the tie-breaker make it very
difficult to explain to voters.
If you would
Hi James,
To me, it comes down to this:
a) In IRV, if everyone acts sincerely, bad things can happen
b) In Approval, if someone acts insincerely and nobody notices, bad
things can happen
Ultimately, I'd rather reward sincerity and encourage people to watch
out for insincerity.
Rather than vice
hi everyone,
I'm a activist in Washington state who is interested in eliminating
the plurality system here. We have a state-wide inititiative trying
to get on the ballot in 2005 (http://www.irvwa.org/). It proposes
using IRV. In addition, it would eliminate the general primaries in
Dear election methods fanatics,
Whenever we list-dwellers debate approval vs. IRV (and I have no
illusions that this will be the last time it happens), I'd like to suggest
that people keep equal rankings IRV (whole votes) in mind as much as
possible.
Does ER-IRV(whole) have any
Here is a definition of the majority loser criterion that is designed so
that limited-rank-ballot methods such as plurality and approval can't
weasel their way out of it:
If a candidate is the sincere last choice of a majority of voters, and
that majority votes sincerely, then that
James Green-Armytage wrote:
So, 80% of the voters strictly prefer every other candidate to
candidate
L. And yet L wins using approval, because everyone only approves of their
favorite. Yikes! It's crazy!
You've shown that approval is exactly as bad as plurality, when people
choose to
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