On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 09:45:12AM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>
> Dear Andrew and Stephane!
>
> Andrew wrote:
> > Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
> > following election with 100 voters:
> >
> > 23 A>B>C
> > 25 A>C>B
> > 3 B>A>C
> > 26 B>C>A
> > 3 C>
gt; De: Andrew Myers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: 2005/09/13 mar. AM 12:19:55 GMT-04:00
> À: Stephane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Objet: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
>
> On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at
Dear Andrew and Stephane!
Andrew wrote:
> Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
> following election with 100 voters:
>
> 23 A>B>C
> 25 A>C>B
> 3 B>A>C
> 26 B>C>A
> 3 C>A>B
> 20 C>B>A
>
> Therefore we have A preferred to B 51-49, A preferred to C 51-49, a
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 04:47:19PM -0400, Andrew Myers wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> > Actually as many people will tell you,
> > this claim is wrong.
> >
> > I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
> >
> > Maybe you would like to know th
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> Actually as many people will tell you,
> this claim is wrong.
>
> I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
>
> Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
> criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of m
On Sep 5, 2005, at 23:13, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
The method consists of two rounds. If the first round produces a
Condorcet winner, the second round is not needed. Otherwise the second
round will be held and also the tie breaking method is used if the
I see some to applaud here:
On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:56:32 -0400 Andrew Myers wrote:
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:51:40 -0400
From: Andrew Myers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Stephane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
On Mon, Sep 05, 2
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:51:40 -0400
From: Andrew Myers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Stephane Rouillon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> Actually as many people will t
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners
(ones which have a m
Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>The method consists of two rounds. If the first round produces a
>Condorcet winner, the second round is not needed. Otherwise the second
>round will be held and also the tie breaking method is used if there is
>a top cycle. (Clearly non-winning candidates
On Sep 3, 2005, at 22:15, Andrew Myers wrote:
I would like to have a statement
about strategic immunity that doesn't rely on people judging the
difficulty of
creating a top cycle.
The best I can offer when it comes to freeing people of judging and
deciding strategies is the following method
Might this be getting too deep?
A cycle is a near tie among at least 3 candidates, together with second
choices linking the members together (even with near ties, second choices
can be incompatible with cycles).
Plotters might, assuming they have accurate prediction plus control of
enough vo
On Sat, Sep 03, 2005 at 12:58:05PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
> Hi All,
>
> What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
> claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
> no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
>
> BR, Juho
Thanks
Hi All,
What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
claim "Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one"?
BR, Juho
On Sep 3, 2005, at 05:40, Andrew Myers wrote:
Hi all,
I'm writing a short p
Hi all,
I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet voting.
I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic
voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve
the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is there
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