Actually as many people will tell you, this claim is wrong. I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners (ones which have a more than 50% majority against every other candidate). Using margin as a criteria your claim is only valid for stronger Condorcet winners (having a 2/3 majority against every other candidate). Finally, no method is know to garantee the election of a weak Condorcet winner against unsincere preferences. This is understandable because absentees can always alter the balance against the Condorcet winner and hope to unsincerely create a cycle containing one of their better choice. Hope it helps, Steph. Andrew Myers a écrit : > Hi all, > > I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet voting. > I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic > voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve > the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is there > an appropriate paper to cite that makes this argument clearly? Thanks much, > > -- Andrew > ---- > Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
