Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 21:31:18 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Ken Johnson wrote:
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections. In a zero-info
election with five candidates,
Ken Johnson wrote:
>
> >Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700
> >From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >...
> >IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections. In a zero-info
> >election with five candidates, where my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, I
> >would vote something like:
> >
> >A(1.0)
Date: Mon, 24 May 2004 21:55:40 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
IRNR seems equivalent to repeated runoff elections. In a zero-info
election with five candidates, where my preferences are A>B>C>D>E, I
would vote something like:
A(1.0) > B(0.001) > C(0.01) > D(0.1) > E(0
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
> > If you're voting strategy is based on who you think is or is not likely
> > to win, that suggests an IR-type approach, such as Brian Olson's
> > "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR),
> > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-May
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> >From: Adam H Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >... My first guess at a strategy:
> >
> >1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them.
> >2) Give your favorite frontrunner a 10, your less favored frontrunner a 0, and
> >ev
From: Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 23:49:13 -0700
...
(2) Apply an additive shift to each voter's CR profile so that the sum
of the absolute values is minimized.
...
With the exception of step 2, I've simulated this.
Step 2 is an obvious zero-info strategy that s
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 23:26:40 -0500 (EST)
From: Adam H Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
... My first guess at a strategy:
1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them.
2) Give your favorite frontrunner a 10, your less favored frontrunner a 0, and
everyone else a 5.
This maxi
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> >This is not realistic unless you think voters are all extremists and only the
> >candidates show moderation.
>
> It's not so much a matter of them being extremists as being simpletons.
You're mistaken. When you say Plurality picks the c
Gervase Lam wrote:
>
> 1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them.
> 2) Give your favorite frontrunner plus the runners who you think are
> better than your favorite frontrunner a score of 2.
> 3) Give your less favored frontrunner plus the runners who you think are
> wo
> Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 23:26:40 -0500 (EST)
> From: Adam H Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Efforts to improve on CR's strategy
> 1) Identify the two frontrunners, and pick your favorite among them.
> 2) Give your favorite frontrunner a 10, your less favo
On May 22, 2004, at 9:15 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
Which brings me back to the original topic: Can CR be improved? I hope
someone will pick up on this topic because I would be very interested
in people's opinions about this. The proposed "Normalized CR" method
is as follows:
(1) Voters give candida
Ken Johnson wrote:
>The proposed "Normalized CR" method is as
>follows:
>(1) Voters give candidates CR ratings. There no need for any range limit
>- any finite CR value, positive or negative, can be allowed.
>(2) Apply an additive shift to each voter's CR profile so that the sum
>of the absolut
Message: 1
Date: Fri, 21 May 2004 22:06:52 +0200 (CEST)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
This is not realistic unless you think voters are all extremists and only the
candidates show moderation.
...
Kevin Venzke
Kevin,
It's not so much a matter of them being extremi
Brian Olson wrote:
>
> Nonsense! It can be highly valuable to have a 'none-of-the-above'
> election. If no one wins a sufficient vote, Junk all the candidates,
> disqualify them from the next election, and have a new election.
Some people favor that approach, but then you have a different electi
Ken,
You wrote to Chris:
>Here's a more explicit illustration of the scenario. There are 10
>Candidates A ... J with the following CP's:
>A: +0.9, B: +0.7, C: +0.5, ... J: -0.9
>(<-- liberal ... conservative -->)
>There are 100 voters with the following sincere CR profiles:
>51 voter
Date: Sat, 22 May 2004 12:44:15 +0930
From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
In this scenario, if the "Candidate Positions" are evenly spaced,
the sincere CR winner would be the LEAST liberal
candidate. ...
Chris,
Here's a more explicit illustration of the scenario. There are 10
candida
On May 20, 2004, at 8:54 PM, Bart Ingles wrote:
I see that now. What you call "ExaggerateCR" is what I would call
"sincere CR", since the voter should at least give maximum points to
his
favorite, and minimum to his least favorite. Otherwise the voters
aren't sincere, they're just being stupid,
From: Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 20 May 2004 20:50:28 -0700
...
I think it's simply the case that with 1 issue, all voters' CR
profiles are precisely correlated (i.e., any two profiles differ only
by a multiplicative scale factor), so all these methods become
equivalen
Clarification:
> Here's what I think of as a single-issue trial:
>
> Assume a single (unnamed) issue, in which any voter or candidate can
> take a position pro or con. You have 3 candidates (A, B, and C) who are
> at positions +.7, +.2, -.5. You also have a number of voters who each
> can be p
Ken Johnson wrote:
> >
> >From: Bart Ingles
> >
> >... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
> >for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and Plurality
> >all yield exactly the same average across 100,000 elections? It looks
> >like top-two Runoff is withi
On May 20, 2004, at 4:46 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 23:24:29 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and
Plurality
all yield exactly the same average
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 23:24:29 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and Plurality
all yield exactly the same average across 100,000 elections? It looks
like top-two
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> The usual "sincere strategy" is to approve
> all candidates where CR is greater than the mean CR of all candidates.
I'm not sure if that was clear. In other words, if a voter assigns a CR
of -0.4, 0.2, and 0.9 to each of three candidates in a 3-way election,
the voter s
Ken Johnson wrote:
>
> Bart,
>
> Here's a link to #597,
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012689.html
> (Search the text for "num_candidate=10".)
Thanks. In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerat
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 01:13:04 -0700
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
I have no idea how to locate "Vol 1 #597", so I don't know what Ken
means by "exhibited abysmal performance". Was this a series of
simulations? A single example?
In Merrill's 'Monte Carlo' simulations, approval votin
On Tue, 18 May 2004, Ken Johnson wrote:
>
> >Message: 2
> >From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> >Ken,
> >...
> >I did not test Plurality. I think it is very strange that you found it to
> >be better than Approval. ...
> >
> >Kevin Venzke
> >[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >
> >
>
Ken Johnson wrote:
> >
> Here's an example of the kind of Bad Thing that can happen with
> Approval. There are 3 candidates (A, B, C) and 10 voters. I am using
> signed CR's in the range -1 to 1 (CR>0: approve, CR<0: disapprove).
> Following are the sincere CR's:
>
> 9 voters: A(-1), B(0.1), C(1)
Ken Johnson wrote:
>
> I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to
> demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over
> rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should
> maximize "social utility" as defined by sincere CR. (See my ea
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> Here's an example of the kind of Bad Thing that can happen with
> Approval. There are 3 candidates (A, B, C) and 10 voters. I am using
> signed CR's in the range -1 to 1 (CR>0: approve, CR<0: disapprove).
> Following are the sincere CR's:
Message: 2
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Ken,
...
I did not test Plurality. I think it is very strange that you found it to
be better than Approval. ...
Kevin Venzke
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message: 3
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
...
That's odd. Approval turned out pretty well
On May 17, 2004, at 9:04 AM, Ken Johnson wrote:
> I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to
> demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over
> rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should
> maximize "social utility" as defined
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> I was, until recently, a fanatical advocate of Approval. I tried to
> demonstrate by empirical simulation the superiority of Approval over
> rank methods, based on the criterion that the election method should
> maximize "social utility"
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Mon, 17 May 2004 01:04:39 +
Ken Johnson wrote:
As
I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically
equivalent to Approval.
I reply:
That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us
who like Approv
Ken Johnson wrote:
As
I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically
equivalent to Approval.
I reply:
That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us
who like Approval, CR's strategic equivalence to Approval isn't a problem.
It's what makes CR o
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