Dear Andrew and Stephane!
Andrew wrote:
Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
following election with 100 voters:
23 ABC
25 ACB
3 BAC
26 BCA
3 CAB
20 CBA
Therefore we have A preferred to B 51-49, A preferred to C 51-49, and B
preferred to C
: Andrew Myers [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: 2005/09/13 mar. AM 12:19:55 GMT-04:00
À: Stephane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Objet: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 04:47:19PM -0400, Andrew Myers wrote:
On Mon
On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 09:45:12AM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Andrew and Stephane!
Andrew wrote:
Actually even this weaker claim (as I understand it) is wrong. Consider the
following election with 100 voters:
23 ABC
25 ACB
3 BAC
26 BCA
3 CAB
20 CBA
Therefore
On Sun, Sep 11, 2005 at 04:47:19PM -0400, Andrew Myers wrote:
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM -0400, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
On Sep 5, 2005, at 23:13, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The method consists of two rounds. If the first round produces a
Condorcet winner, the second round is not needed. Otherwise the second
round will be held and also the tie breaking method is used if
Might this be getting too deep?
A cycle is a near tie among at least 3 candidates, together with second
choices linking the members together (even with near ties, second choices
can be incompatible with cycles).
Plotters might, assuming they have accurate prediction plus control of
enough
On Sep 3, 2005, at 22:15, Andrew Myers wrote:
I would like to have a statement
about strategic immunity that doesn't rely on people judging the
difficulty of
creating a top cycle.
The best I can offer when it comes to freeing people of judging and
deciding strategies is the following
Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The method consists of two rounds. If the first round produces a
Condorcet winner, the second round is not needed. Otherwise the second
round will be held and also the tie breaking method is used if there is
a top cycle. (Clearly non-winning candidates could
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners
(ones which have a
I see some to applaud here:
On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:56:32 -0400 Andrew Myers wrote:
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:51:40 -0400
From: Andrew Myers [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stephane Rouillon [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Citation for immunity to strategic voting?
On Mon, Sep 05, 2005 at 05:55:01PM
Hi All,
What would you say about the truth value of a one step more modest
claim Condorcet methods are immune to strategic voting when there is
no top level loop and modified votes do not generate one?
BR, Juho
On Sep 3, 2005, at 05:40, Andrew Myers wrote:
Hi all,
I'm writing a short
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