Since Adam suggested that those using the 1-person-1-vote criterion
(1p1v) should justify it, instead of just expecting people to take
it as a given, I haven't noticed anyone trying to justify 1p1v.
Of course I've been saying that standards don't need justification,
but that isn&#
Blake wrote:
So, you might ask, how would I convince someone who thinks they "should"
increase suffering that they are wrong? But that's the wrong question.
How they define "should" is only a question of definition. The real
question is how can someone who is trying to increase suffering be
conv
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Blake continues:
>
> Do you have to explain why I believe that there's a genuine objective
> absolute best candidate? No you don't. I've already done that.
> Instead you should try to refute my arguments.
>
> I reply:
>
> Maybe it's possible to show you that the
http://www.fec.gov/pages/VSSAPRegnotice.htm
Register Now for the
2002 Voting Systems Standards and
Advisory Panel Meetings
The Federal Election Commission's Office of Election
Administration invites you to attend a meeting introducing the updated
Voting Systems Stan
> > Do I have to try to explain why you believe that there's a genuine
> > objective
> > absolute best candidate? Obviously that belief of yours has great
> > influence on your standards, since your main standard is finding
which
> > candidate is most likely to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> Blake replied:
>
> But what your saying is that you can't possibly rationally defend your
> standards.
>
> I reply:
>
> That's right.
>
At least we've got that settled.
>
> Some people speak of symmetry as i
I'd said:
>We don't defend standards dogmatically (though I shouldn't
>speak for you). We describe standards, and if someone likes them they
>do, and otherwise they don't. That's it. We can point to the popularity
>of a standard, and suggest that a less po
http://www.fec.gov/pages/vss/vss.html
More info about voting systems in the FEC.
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> Your standard, you once said, is to elect the candidate most likely
> to be the absolute best. But most would probably agree that there's
> no such thing as the best candidate, in an absolute sense. Some
> candidates are best for some people, other candidates are best f
http://www.fec.gov/press/121101vss.html
News Releases, Media Advisories
For Immediate Release
December 11, 2001
Contact:
Ron Harris
Ian Stirton
Kelly Huff
COMMISSION SEEKING PUBLIC COMMENT
ON VOLS. I & II OF VOTING SYSTEMS STANDARDS
WASHINGTON
The Federal Election Commission on Dece
single over-riding issues. So, I
> reject this method as a standard by which other methods may be judged.
It occurs to me that extremist voting problems should be excluded from
the question of rating-based standards, just as strategy considerations
are. An actual election method would need to
Blake Cretney wrote (directly to me):
> >>
> >Example: 2 voters with rankings ABC, CBA. I would say B was a
> >reasonable compromise. Presumably you would insist on a draw.
>
> According to what I've been advocating, this should be a draw. The
> winner should be chosen by picking one of the two
On Fri, 30 Oct 1998 11:14:41 Bart Ingles wrote:
>I've been out of town for several days, sorry if the next few replies
>are excessively outdated.
>
>
>Blake Cretney wrote:
>> [...]
>> Perhaps even more obvious is the argument against methods that
>> are reverse-inconsistent. That is, consider a
In response to:
> From: "Blake Cretney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: More Standards
>
> Perhaps even more obvious is the argument against methods that
> are reverse-inconsistent. That is, consider a method that says
> the best candida
I've been out of town for several days, sorry if the next few replies
are excessively outdated.
Blake Cretney wrote:
> [...]
> In more complicated examples, not everyone even agrees on what
> majority rule means. In fact, we all seem to have our own
> definitions to fit whatever method we advo
On Sun, 25 Oct 1998 17:44:18 DEMOREP1 wrote:
>Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
>
>Here's an example of what I mean. I consider 3 alternatives, the first
>two are candidates, the third (C) is whatever happens if no candidate
>gets an absolute approval majority.
>
>Sincere preference
>A > B > C
>None
's reasonable for me to say what's
important to me, the standards & criteria that have the most
weight must be the ones that many people say are important to
them.
Mike Ossipoff
Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
Here's an example of what I mean. I consider 3 alternatives, the first
two are candidates, the third (C) is whatever happens if no candidate
gets an absolute approval majority.
Sincere preference
A > B > C
None absolutely approved of.
---
D- Choice C is obviously the
Mr. Cretney wrote-
Of course, I don't think we can expect to find a method that finds
the best candidate ALL the time. After all, much of the time the
voters themselves will be wrong. However, I think our goal should
be a method that finds the most likely best candidate based on the
ballots.
F
>
> On Tue, 20 Oct 1998 21:02:32 Mike Ositoff wrote:
> >
> >Blake proposes a Marginal Majority Criterion, but, except for
> >the fact that any pairwise proposition can be called a
> >"majority", his criterion isn't about majority. It's about
> >margins. It should just be called "Margins Criteri
On Tue, 20 Oct 1998 20:32:37 DEMOREP1 wrote:
>Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
>
>Definition of Sincere Voting
>
>There should be some standard that makes sure a method
>matches what we consider a definition of a sincere vote. For example,
>some people advocate Approval and define a sincere vote to m
On Tue, 20 Oct 1998 21:02:32 Mike Ositoff wrote:
>
>Blake proposes a Marginal Majority Criterion, but, except for
>the fact that any pairwise proposition can be called a
>"majority", his criterion isn't about majority. It's about
>margins. It should just be called "Margins Criterion".
Maybe I s
In response to:
> To:Election Methods
> From: Blake Cretney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: More standards
> Here are the standards I nominate. They are not in order of my
> preference.
>
> Party manipulations
I agree with these.
>
Blake proposes a Marginal Majority Criterion, but, except for
the fact that any pairwise proposition can be called a
"majority", his criterion isn't about majority. It's about
margins. It should just be called "Margins Criterion".
Though I've already told why "random fill" isn't a problem,
I'd l
Mr. Cretney wrote in part-
Definition of Sincere Voting
There should be some standard that makes sure a method
matches what we consider a definition of a sincere vote. For example,
some people advocate Approval and define a sincere vote to mean absolute
approval. Others only think it means rel
Here are the standards I nominate. They are not in order of my
preference.
Party manipulations
One of the easiest ways the electoral process can be manipulated
is by presenting or withholding similar alternatives. If all of
a parties candidates are considered equivalent relative to
candidates
>
Bart writes:
> candidates first. People currently vote against candidates because they
> frequently have no other choice -- i.e. "lesser of two evils". I
> thought the reason for election reform was to get away from that
> necessity.
Of course, and, as Demorep will assure you, that's my m
New Democracy wrote:
>
> [deleted]
> Bart wrote:
> >2. If "most hated" candidates are to be excluded, there should be a way
> >to distinguish truly hated candidates from those who are ranked last
> >merely because they compete with the voter's favorite -- in other words,
> >there should be no adv
> Bart Ingles wrote:
> >
> > 1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
> > between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in the
> > middle because the most popular candidates are also the most hated.
Mike Osipoff wrote:
>
> Maybe that isn't possible.
Dear Bart Ingles,
You wrote:
>1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
>between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in the
>middle because the most popular candidates are also the most hated.
Donald: There is a way. Simply do not use more than one c
>
> 1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
My mailer failed to copy the beginning of this message, so I've
filled in the begioning of the 1st sentence:
[There should be a way to distinguish...]
> between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in t
>
> Greetings to the list,
>
> Yes, by all means let us each present our standards to be used to
> evaluate all single seat election methods. But, we should also vote on the
> steps of a single seat election. It may seem elementary, but we must set
> the foundatio
At 09:12 AM 10/6/98 -0400, you wrote:
So far the list stands at.
Honesty
Proven fraud magnets like written ballots and slow
counts are excluded.
Secrecy
You vote in secret. Your community votes in secret.
Simplicity
Its easy to understand the system. Half the voters
are below median I.Q. and 10%
At 09:12 AM 10/6/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Dear Charles Fiterman,
>
> You wrote: "We are nominating only goals not methods."
>
> Sorry Charles, but I am nominating standards to be used to evaluate
>methods.
>
> But I will nominate the following goal:
&g
Dear Charles Fiterman,
You wrote: "We are nominating only goals not methods."
Sorry Charles, but I am nominating standards to be used to evaluate
methods.
But I will nominate the following goal:
The goal of this exercise is to select the method that will
1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in the
middle because the most popular candidates are also the most hated.
2. If "most hated" candidates are to be excluded, there should be a way
to distinguish tru
Greetings to the list,
Yes, by all means let us each present our standards to be used to
evaluate all single seat election methods. But, we should also vote on the
steps of a single seat election. It may seem elementary, but we must set
the foundation.
Step 1: The first part of a
Since the subject line of Saari's letter is about standards, let
me remind him that, as I tried to explain to him, he isn't wrong just
because his standards aren't the same as ours, but (can you accept
this, Saari?), neither are our standards wrong because they aren't
the
Mr. Saari may have missed my earlier observations-
Number voting (1, 2, etc.) ONLY shows relative approval.
Such being the case, I suggest again that there also be a YES/NO vote on the
acceptability of each candidate (choice) for executive and judicial offices.
Only candidates that have YES majo
In a message dated 98-06-26 01:12:58 EDT, you write:
> it's the responsibility of anyone
>proposing or advocating a method, to state exactly some advantage
>of it, some standard or principle or criterion that it meets
>and that other methods don't meet.
In discussing a voting situation, two key
rence votes.
Of course that rule sounds good, and could be regarded as its
own standard. Nothing wrong with that. But it conflicts with other
standards that are important to us & many others, including the
standard that led us to want better single winner methods: Getting
rid of the lesser-of-2-
Recent postings by a prolific exponent of Condorcet may have overstated
both the existence of, and the necessity for, unanimity with respect to
the importance of certain underlying standards among those who prefer
Smith//Condorcet to IRO.
If IRO is politically the principal alternative to Smith
42 matches
Mail list logo
