On Wed, May 25, 2005 at 02:11:56PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
> >
> >If you mean by failure of induction, why an observer (under TIME)
> >continues to experience non-rubbish, then that is the white rabbit
> >problem I deal with in section 3. It comes down to a "robustness"
> >property of an observ
I could not find who suggested Plaga's paper recently, but
thanks to whoever it was. Whether Plaga is right or wrong,
his introductory remarks and general presentation are
simply superb.
There is even the very noteworthy (or humorous, I can't decide)
sentence which reads "Independent of what one t
At 08:51 PM 5/25/2005, Lee Corbin wrote:
At 09:33 PM 5/25/2005, you wrote:
Richard writes
> >How, essentially, does this differ from the casino game of
> >roulette?
LC: I don't believe that there are lucky people, except as a perfectly
ordinary and expected random fluctuation.
RM: Obviously
Richard writes
> >How, essentially, does this differ from the casino game of
> >roulette?
> And there are people who are good at it. Everyone calls them "lucky" which
> really doesn't explain much. Some of us routinely choose the wrong queue,
> others get the correct one (queuing theory and
Paddy writes
> > A new branch starts, or decoherence obtains, or an irreversible
> > transformation occurs, or a record is made. They all seem the
> > same to me. Why not?
> >
> > My main motivation is to get as far away from Copenhagen as possible,
> > and so thereby get free of observers and ob
Paddy writes
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > (b) In the multiverse, those worlds in which it is a frequent occurrence
> > that the laws of physics are temporarily suspended so that, for example,
> > talking white rabbits materialise out of thin air, may greatly
> > predominate. However, it
**
Interleaving;
***
Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can
understand why we
cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by
using purely
3-person description of those phenomena in some
theory.
>Stathis: I don't know if you can make a sharp distinction between the
> really weird universes where observers never evolve and the
> slightly weird ones where talking white rabbits appear now
> and then. Consider these two parallel arguments using a
> version of the anthropic principle:
>
Le 25-mai-05, à 17:59, aet.radal ssg a écrit :
From the initial page from the included link to the archive: "I'm no
physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications would
follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is
consistent
with the basics of quantum mechanics.
aet.radal ssg wrote:
From the initial page from the included link to the archive: "I'm no
physicist so I don't know for sure that >these implications would
follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is consistent
with the basics of quantum mechanics. The fact that this paper
Plaga's paper has been published:
''Proposal for an experimental test of the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics''
Found.Phys. 27 (1997) 559
arXiv: quant-ph/9510007
-Defeat Spammers by
launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Webs
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Benjamin Udell wrote:
The induction-friendly universe with so much detectable rubbish that a
wide variety of phenomena cannot be unified into a simple theory sounds
like a universe where induction works but surmise, or inference to the
simplest explanation, faces grave
- Original Message -
From: Patrick Leahy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Alastair Malcolm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: EverythingList
Sent: 24 May 2005 22:10
Subject: Re: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
.
.
> This is very reminiscent of Lewis' argument. Have you read his book? IIRC
> he claims that you can't
Patrick Leahy wrote:
66~~
* White Rabbit: cognizable universes require a high degree of regularity for
the survival of SAS (not to mention evolution), as above. Hence induction in
any cognizable universe will work most of the time (which is all it does
anyway), for a sufficient set of p
>-Original Message-
>From: Patrick Leahy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 12:25 PM
>To: Lee Corbin
>Cc: EverythingList
>Subject: Re: Observables, Measurables, and Detectors
>
>
>>
>> It looks as though you advocate a role for each of these:
>>
>> observables
>>
From the initial page from the included link to the archive: "I'm no physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications wouldfollow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is consistentwith the basics of quantum mechanics. The fact that this paper has notbeen published in pee
It was "contemptuous" of the information on decoherence, which is what popped up, when I clicked on the link. In particular the Julian Barbouresque "timelessness" prattle, "there are no particles", "there are no quantum jumps", etc. which seems far outside the definition of "decoherence". When I se
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, May 24, 2005 at 10:10:19PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
Lewis also distinguishes between inductive failure and rubbish
universes as two different objections to his model. I notice that in
your articles both you and Russell Standish more or
Le 25-mai-05, à 13:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Lee Corbin writes:
> But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
> implemented on a computer.
> We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
> experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
On Wed, 25 May 2005, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Consider these two parallel arguments using a version of the anthropic
principle:
(a) In the multiverse, those worlds which have physical laws and
constants very different to what we are used to may greatly predominate.
However, it is no surp
It looks as though you advocate a role for each of these:
observables
measurements
detectors
and for all I know
observers
It seemed to me that MWI allowed me to get away with a considerable
simplification. Gone were observers and even observations. Even
measurements, I discard. (After
Paddy Leahy writes:
Sure enough, you came up with my objection years ago, in the form of the
"White Rabbit" paradox. Since usage is a bit vague, I'll briefly re-state
it here. The problem is that worlds which are "law-like", that is which
behave roughly as if there are physical laws but not ex
Lee Corbin writes:
> But we *still* don't know what it feels like to *be* the code
> implemented on a computer.
> We might be able to guess, perhaps from analogy with our own
> experience, perhaps by running the code in our head; but once
> we start doing either of these things, we are replacin
Le 25-mai-05, à 10:34, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can understand why we
cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by using purely
3-person description of those phenomena in some theory.
With consciousness, the range of the debate goes from
non-exist
Patrick Leahy wrote
> To answer [the] initial question: interference effects are not branches.
> Actually they imply the absence of effective branching.
>
> You don't get branching in time because time is a parameter, not an
> observable: this means that there is no quantum uncertainty about wh
Stathis: Now, I think you
> >> will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this
> >> excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human
> >> conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea
> >> what the experience is actually like.
> >
> > Jonathan
Stathis writes
> Lee Corbin writes:
>
> > I anticipate that in the future it will, as you say so well,
> > be shown that "appropriate brain states necessarily lead to
> > conscious states", except I also expect that by then the
> > meaning of "conscious states" will be vastly better informed
> >
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