Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>> The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas.> > > Ah?
>>> OK, surely you
>>> know a better resume?
>
>
> Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html
>
> Quoting:
>
Then Chalmers proceeds to
Thanks for digging out that summary. I met Chalmers in January this
year on a trip to Canberra, but I wasn't completely sure what his
position was.
Fromthis summary, his position actually sounds very close to that
which I argue in Theory of Nothing, however I attach a label to it:
"Emergence". Th
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas.> > > Ah? OK, surely you know a better resume?
Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html
Quoting:
>>>Then Chalmers proceeds to present his own theory of consciousness, that he calls
John Mikes writes (quoting SP):
> you wrote: (excerpt):> <...The simplest explanation that comes to mind is that a brain or computer > can interact with its environment, and it is only those computations which > interact with their environment of which we can be aware. A rock may be > implement
1Z wrote:
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> > But "natural laws" are usually taken to be contingent, we can imagine
> > possible worlds where they are different--can you have "supervenience"
>under
> > logical laws, or any other laws which must be the same in all possible
> > worlds?
>
>natural laws ae th
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> But "natural laws" are usually taken to be contingent, we can imagine
> possible worlds where they are different--can you have "supervenience" under
> logical laws, or any other laws which must be the same in all possible
> worlds?
natural laws ae the same in all naturally
1Z wrote:
> >
> > Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends
>on
> > what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a
> > conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing
>a
> > certain computation, I suppose Chalmers wou
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> >
> > > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> >
1Z wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non compu
- Original Message -
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2006 11:30 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument
>
> Stathis Papaioannou:
>
>>
>>
>>Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
SKIP
JeMa:
> But just because you can map any physical activity to any computation with
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
>Le 19-juil.-06, à 17:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal writes:
> >>
> I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin
> argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to
> >>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :
> >> and I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
> >> quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett
> >> ...).
> >
> > Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?
Dear Bruno,
I appreciate your efforts to 'enlighten' me (and
maybe others as well). my case there is more ignorance interfering with the
explanations and I will re-re-read your post before I come to a
conclusion.
As I tried to tell, when you "matter-of-factly"
handle concepts of your 'daily
Le 20-juil.-06, à 05:31, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> I mainly agree with you, except perhaps that I would not go so quickly
> from
> "any sufficiently complex physical system implements any finite
> computation" to
> "any computation can be mapped to any
Le 20-juil.-06, à 12:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>> I met David Chalmers in Brussels in 2000 (at the Brussels ASSC
>> meeting). He *is* indeed quite coherent, in the sense that he
>> considers
>> that in the self-duplication Washington/Moscow experiment the first
>> person must feel to b
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2006 5:28 AM
Subject: RE: Bruno's argument
you wrote: (excerpt):
<...The simplest explanation that comes to mind is that a brain or computer
can interact with its environment, and it is
John,
Le 19-juil.-06, à 18:01, John M a écrit :
Bruno,
George wrote an admirably wise note and you picked positively on the roadmap with the fruitful mind of a logician.
It looks like you both start out from "not agreeing because of non-understanding math sufficiently" - which may be true, but
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
> hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non co
Jesse Mazer writes:
> But just because you can map any physical activity to any computation with
> the right mapping function, that doesn't necessarily mean that some physical
> processes don't contribute more to the measure of certain observer-moments
> than others--Chalmers would say that th
Le 19-juil.-06, à 17:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
> Stathis Papaioannou:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal writes:
>>
I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin
argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to
occur:
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a bit harder, no dou
Hi all,
It's very interesting to see these ideas. Common people can understand
common languages (like English, Chinese etc.).
So I think even the most difficult math. or physics theories can be
translated into other common languages that
common people can understand easily.
I don't see why com
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