On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 10:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Jan 16, 10:26 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
> >
> > > On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > > Craig,
> >
> > > > Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong
On Jan 16, 10:26 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > Craig,
>
> > > Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the
> > > other questions I posed in my earlier post?
>
> > Sorry
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > Craig,
> >
> > Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the
> > other questions I posed in my earlier post?
> >
>
> Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier.
>
> O
Hi Craig,
On that we agree.
Onward!
Stephen
On 1/16/2012 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 16, 2:22 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:
Hi Craig,
The 1p is something that can have differences in degree not in kind
thus your argument is a bit off. Zombies simply do not exist.
The
On Jan 16, 2:22 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:
> Hi Craig,
>
> The 1p is something that can have differences in degree not in kind
> thus your argument is a bit off. Zombies simply do not exist.
The degree of 1p is always qualitative though, that's how it's
different from 3p. This text is a z
On 16 January 2012 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I do not need an extra God or observer of arithmetical truth, to interpret
> some number relation as computations, because the numbers, relatively to
> each other, already do that task. From their view, to believe that we need
> some extra-interpre
On 1/16/2012 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jan 16, 1:42 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:
Hi,
My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if
we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might
as well bet that they are. While I have found that the
On Jan 16, 1:42 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:
> Hi,
>
> My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if
> we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might
> as well bet that they are. While I have found that there are upper
> bounds on computational
On Jan 16, 12:15 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> Craig,
>
> Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the
> other questions I posed in my earlier post?
>
Sorry Jason, I didn't see your comment earlier.
On Jan 15, 2:45 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 9:39 PM, C
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
"So you believe that the theory according to which consciousness is a gift
> by a creationist God is as bad as the theory according to which
> consciousness is related to brain activity?"
>
If creationists could explain consciousness then I w
Hi,
My $.02. I am reminded of the argument in Matrix Philosophy that if
we cannot argue that our experiences are *not* simulations then we might
as well bet that they are. While I have found that there are upper
bounds on computational based content via logical arguments such as
David Deu
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
" I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie." [...]
> Zombie describes something which seems like it could be conscious from the
> outside (ie to a human observer) but actually is not.
>
As I have absolutely no way of direc
On 16 Jan 2012, at 17:08, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
" Consciousness theories are easy because there are no facts they
need to explain"
" What? With comp, not only you have to explain the qualia"
With ANY theory of consciousness you have
On 16 Jan 2012, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by
using only
addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in
elementary
arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence o
Craig,
Do you have an opinion regarding the possibility of Strong AI, and the
other questions I posed in my earlier post?
Thanks,
Jason
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Jan 16, 11:23 am, John Clark wrote:
> > On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg >wrote:
On Jan 16, 11:23 am, John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> " I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie."
>
>
>
> Then I would very much like to hear what it is. What really grabbed my
> attention is that you said it was " workable and usef
On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 7:20 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
" I think that I have a workable and useful notion of zombie."
>
Then I would very much like to hear what it is. What really grabbed my
attention is that you said it was " workable and useful", so whatever
notion you have it can't include t
On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
" Consciousness theories are easy because there are no facts they need to
>> explain"
>>
>
" What? With comp, not only you have to explain the qualia"
>
With ANY theory of consciousness you have to explain qualia, and every
consciousness t
On 16 January 2012 10:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Actually you can define computation, even universal machine, by using only
> addition and multiplication. So universal machine exists in elementary
> arithmetic in the same sense as in the existence of prime number.
That may be, but we were discus
On 15 Jan 2012, at 19:33, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If computationalism argues that zombies can't exist, therefore
anything that we cannot distinguish from a conscious person must be
conscious, that also means that it is impossible to create somethi
On 15 Jan 2012, at 18:14, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 at 1:56 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote:
> How would you generalize the Turing Test for consciousness?
By doing the exact same thing we do when we evaluate our fellow
human beings, assume that there is a direct link between intell
On 15 Jan 2012, at 09:13, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
What about the Turing test for a person in that state to check if he
still has consciousness?
As I said in another post, the very idea of the Turing test consists
in avoiding completely the notion of consciousness.
I do disagree with Turing
On 15 Jan 2012, at 00:17, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote:
On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:
Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few
people will bother reading it due to size. I ho
On 14 Jan 2012, at 18:51, David Nyman wrote:
On 14 January 2012 16:50, Stephen P. King
wrote:
The problem is that mathematics cannot represent matter other than by
invariance with respect to time, etc. absent an interpreter.
Sure, but do you mean to say that the interpreter must be physi
On 14 Jan 2012, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jan 14, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
> OK, but today we avoid the expression "computable number".
Why? Seems to me that quite a large number of people still use the
term. A computable number is a real number that can be computed to
any f
On 16 Jan 2012, at 07:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/1/16 Craig Weinberg
On Jan 15, 3:07 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2012/1/14 Craig Weinberg
>
> > Thought I'd throw this out there. If computationalism argues that
> > zombies can't exist, therefore anything that we cannot distinguish
>
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