a paper by Karl Svozil

Hi Folks, For your amusement, delight and (hopefully) comment, I present a paper: http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0305048 Computational universes Karl Svozil (Submitted on 12 May 2003 (v1 ),

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 10/20/2012 5:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote: A UD generates and executes all programs, many of which are equivalent. So some programs are represented more than others. The COMP measure is a function over all programs that captures this variation in program respresentation. Why should this be u

Re: Re: Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive

On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 08:18:16AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Russell Standish > > But the robot plants could not grow more robot structure > for free nor produce seeds. Or produce beautiful sweet-smelling > flowers. If they could produce more robot structure, > we ought to use them to produ

Re: Code length = probability distribution

On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 at 09:16:54PM +0200, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > This is not a consequence of the shannon optimum coding , in which the > coding size of a symbol is inversely proportional to the logaritm of the > frequency of the symbol?. Not quite. Traditional shannon entropy uses probabili

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 10/20/2012 5:16 PM, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, especially in my identification as "responding to relations". Now the "Self"? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitel

Re: Continuous Game of Life

Bruno, especially in my identification as "responding to relations". Now the "Self"? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute because WE identify it th

Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt

On 10/20/2012 3:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:19:46 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/18/2012 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: > Is anyone here aware of the following? > > http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisen

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On 10/20/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Stephen, On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona mailto:agocor...@gmail.com>> 2012/10/17 Bruno Ma

Re: The Peirce-Leibniz triads Ver. 2

Cool Roger, It mostly makes sense to me, except I don't understand why I. is associated with objects and substance when it is feeling, perception, and first person quale. To me, thinking is just as much first person as feeling, and they both are subjective qualia. Thinking is a meta-quale of f

Re: A test for solipsism

On 10/20/2012 5:48 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/20 Roger Clough mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>> Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms w

Re: Code length = probability distribution

This is not a consequence of the shannon optimum coding , in which the coding size of a symbol is inversely proportional to the logaritm of the frequency of the symbol?. What is exactly the comp measure problem? 2012/10/19 Stephen P. King > Hi, > > I was looking up a definition and found t

Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt

On Thursday, October 18, 2012 11:19:46 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 10/18/2012 2:16 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: > > Is anyone here aware of the following? > > > > > http://www.tgdaily.com/general-sciences-features/66654-heisenbergs-uncertainty-principle-in-doubt > > > > > Doe

Re: What's the difference between sense and sensation ?

On Saturday, October 20, 2012 7:10:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > The dictionary makes little or no differentiation between sense and > sensation, > but there is a difference to psychology. Senses come from the body, > sensations are what the mind makes of the the sensual input. Psychology

Re: Measurability is not a condition of reality.

Then the measure addict people believe in a lot of things that are not measurable: they believe in an external reality . They believe in a certain pitagoric cult to measurement, that is not measurable. They believe that their perception is transparent, and that his mind play no role, because it tra

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Saturday, October 20, 2012 1:47:28 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Oct 15, 2012, at 4:10 AM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > >> But since you misunderstand the first assumption you misunderstand the >> >> whole argument. >> > >> > >> > Nope. You misunderstand my argument completely.

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is"

On Saturday, October 20, 2012 12:50:55 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 Craig Weinberg >wrote: > > > If you can do something for your own personal reasons then you have free >> will. If you demand that personal reasons still must always come from >> outside of the person th

Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists

On 10/20/2012 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the ma

Re: A test for solipsism

On 10/20/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes br

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Oct 15, 2012, at 4:10 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> But since you misunderstand the first assumption you misunderstand the >> >> whole argument. >> > >> > >> > Nope. You misunderstand my argument completely. >> >> Perhaps I do, but you specifically misunderstand that the argument >

Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive

On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 Roger Clough wrote: > Creating structure out of a random environment requires intelligence, the > ability to make choices on one's own. Thus we can conclude that when the sun evaporates salty water salt crystals do not form because a liquid is a amorphous collection of mo

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I have no idea what that means, not a clue >> > > > Probably for the same reason that you stop at step 3 in the UD Argument. > Probably. I remember I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before

I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" rather than "is"

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 11:23 PM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: >> The universe is algorithmic insofar as a small number of physical rules >> gives rise to everything that we see around us. > > > Only if we infer that is the case. Physical rules don't give rise to > anything, especially beings which exp

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Dear Stephen, On 19 Oct 2012, at 19:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona 2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Life may suppor

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Saturday, October 20, 2012 1:01:51 AM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 12:56 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > >> So lets see, "a giant junkyard magnet" is a devastating logical >>> argument but "a junkyard car crusher" is not. Explain to me how that works. >>> >> >>

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On Friday, October 19, 2012 3:29:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 17 Oct 2012, at 17:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:16:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> Two men and two women live togethe

Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 20 Oct 2012, at 07:15, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 10:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Darwin does not need to be wrong. Consciousness role can be deeper, in the "evolution/selection" of the laws of physics from the coherent dreams (computations from the 1p view) in arithm

Re: A test for solipsism

On 19 Oct 2012, at 23:41, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote: A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. man

Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists

On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary

Re: Solipsism = 1p

On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual env

Re: a criticism of comp

On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Comp cannot give subjective content, This is equivalent to saying that comp is false. By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get the right computer, featuring the brain at a genuine description level.

Re: A test for solipsism

On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and supposed to be treate

Measurability is not a condition of reality.

Hi Alberto G. Corona I have no problem with that, the problem I have is that I believe that nonphysical things (things, like Descartes' "mind", not extended in space) like spirit, truly exist. But to materialists, that's nonsense, because being inextended it can't be measured and so doesn't ex

Re: Re: A test for solipsism

Roger Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses. So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them. A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car. With no

Re: RE: RE: A test for solipsism

Hi William R. Buckley Thank you for reminding me that materialists do believe that there is a mind identical to or in some fashion related to the brain. Since I see no possibility that one substance (mind) can act on another substance (brain), I don't take their concept of mind seriously, but

Re: Re: Re: Re: The objective world of autopoesis

Hi Terren Suydam Thanks, I have been confusing what the senses provide (which I call senses) with what the mind converts them into (which I call sensations). I don't know how Dennett could know "the ways things seem to us" without a mind. Apparently he thinks "seems" is a derogatory word. But

Re: Re: Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive

Hi Russell Standish But the robot plants could not grow more robot structure for free nor produce seeds. Or produce beautiful sweet-smelling flowers. If they could produce more robot structure, we ought to use them to produce more manf capabilities (including producing more chips for free). Roge

The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists

Hi Bruno Marchal This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind but it can still behave just as a real person would. But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least to a reali

Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? Same is true

a criticism of comp

Hi Bruno Marchal Comp cannot give subjective content, can only provide an objective simulation on the BEHAVIOR of a person (or his physical brain). This behavioral information can be dealt with by the philosophy of mind called "functionalism": http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/

What's the difference between sense and sensation ?

The dictionary makes little or no differentiation between sense and sensation, but there is a difference to psychology. Senses come from the body, sensations are what the mind makes of the the sensual input. Psychology has this to say: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensation_%28psychology%29 "

Sense and sensation

Hi Bruno Marchal Obviously, my statement wasn't very clear. All living things can sense their environments. Plants turn themselves sometimes to the light and know night from day. I don't know if they have the sensation of light, which is a clear indication of what is produced in the mind by co

Re: Re: A test for solipsism

Hi Bruno Marchal In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red is what the body gives you, the sensation of red is what the mind transf