On 06 Feb 2017, at 18:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon., 6 Feb. 2017 at 11:06 pm, Ronald Held
wrote:
Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad
Authors: Sean M. Carroll
Comments: 27 pages. Invited submission to a volume on Current
Controversies in Philosophy of Science, eds. Shamik Dasgupta and
On 2/6/2017 9:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon., 6 Feb. 2017 at 11:06 pm, Ronald Held <mailto:ronaldh...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad
Authors: Sean M. Carroll
Comments: 27 pages. Invited submission to a volume on Current
Controv
On Mon., 6 Feb. 2017 at 11:06 pm, Ronald Held wrote:
> Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad
> Authors: Sean M. Carroll
>
> Comments: 27 pages. Invited submission to a volume on Current
> Controversies in Philosophy of Science, eds. Shamik Dasgupta and Brad
> Weslake
> Subjects
Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad
Authors: Sean M. Carroll
Comments: 27 pages. Invited submission to a volume on Current
Controversies in Philosophy of Science, eds. Shamik Dasgupta and Brad
Weslake
Subjects: High Energy Physics - Theory (hep-th); Cosmology and
Nongalactic Astrophysics (astro-ph.CO
Hi Bruno,
> I don't understand what you mean by computations being infinitely far
> away. In the UD deployment, which I will wrote UD*, all computations
> begins soon or later (like all dominoes falls soon or later in the
> infinite discrete dominoe-sequences). All computations reach any of
On 09 Jan 2009, at 20:12, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>> and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
>> indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
>
> No, you misunderstand me there - I just meant that we need to take the
> step to i
Hi Bruno,
> and Cantor get a contradiction from that. You assume the diagram is
> indeed a piece of an existing bijection in Platonia, or known by God.
No, you misunderstand me there - I just meant that we need to take the
step to infinity - see below.
> that you get by flipping the 0 and 1
Hi Günther,
On 07 Jan 2009, at 22:47, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
>
>>> showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the
>>> limit_
>>> there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to
>>> also
>>> take into a
- Original Message -
From: "Günther Greindl"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2009 4:47 PM
Subject: Re: Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time
> We need only turing emulability, because quantum states,
> although not copyable, are "prepar
Hi Bruno,
thanks for your comments, I interleave my response.
>> showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
>> there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to also
>> take into account infinite delay, we must take this limit into account
>> and have
Hi Günther,
I agree with your main point. My comments below concerns only details.
On 03 Jan 2009, at 23:53, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
>
> You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery;
Hi Stephen,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Nice post! Coments soon.
Thanks :-) Looking forward to the comments.
> Speaking of Svozil's work, please see: Cristian S. Calude, Peter H.
> Hertling and Karl Svozil, ``Embedding Quantum Universes in Classical Ones'',
> Foundations of Physics 29(
) Goldblatt, R. I. (1974). Semantic Analysis of Orthologic. Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 3:19-35. Also in Goldblatt, R. I. (1993).
Mathematics of Modality. CSLI Lectures Notes, Stanford California,
page 81-97.
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Günther Greindl&qu
2009 5:53 PM
Subject: Re: Boltzmann Brains, consciousness and the arrow of time
Hi Bruno,
first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery; it
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in th
Hi Bruno,
first of all thanks for the long answer, and yes, it was very helpful.
You described the production of all reals with a very vivid imagery; it
showed a glimpse of the vastness of the UD. And, I agree, _in the limit_
there will be an infinite number of histories. So, as we have to als
Hi Günther,
On 01 Jan 2009, at 23:58, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
>
>> Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
>> universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
>
>> also on all non inter
On 31 Dec 2008, at 23:53, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> The present moment in quantum cosmology: challenges to the arguments
> for the elimination of time
> Authors: Lee Smolin
> (Submitted on 29 Apr 2001)
> Abstract: Barbour, Hawking, Misner and others have argued that time
> cannot play an essent
Bruno,
I have also wanted to ask how you come to 2^aleph_zero
> Well, in part this results from the unbounded dumbness of the
> universal doevtailing procedure which dovetails on all programs but
> also on all non interacting collection of programs (as all interacting
> one).
How do you
ith materialism (and I say this having arrived
on this list being a materialist ;-).
Cheers,
Günther
Hal Finney wrote:
> Sometimes we consider here the nature of consciousness, whether observer
> moments need to be linked to one another, the role of causality in
> consciousness, e
ler generates all such gaz universes
>> generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
>> implemented by a particular Boltzmann brain is null, as it is null
>> for
>> any particular. With the comp supervenience you have to "attach"
>> consciousness o
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
> physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
>
> In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
> generating the Boltzmann brains. Now th
It seems to me that your reasoning illustrates well the problems with
physical supervenience and physicalism, and perhaps ASSA.
In any case the Universal Dovetailer generates all such gaz universes
generating the Boltzmann brains. Now the probability that you are
implemented by a
ccur though interesting pathways than winding down, this
would imply that at any point, we have about an equal chance of living
in the winding up as the winding down phase: we would have no way of
knowing. This would be the case whether we are ordinary brains or
Boltzmann Brains, since in either case
Hal Finney wrote:
Sometimes we consider here the nature of consciousness, whether observer
moments need to be linked to one another, the role of causality in
consciousness, etc. I thought of an interesting puzzle about Boltzmann
Brains which offers a new twist to these questions.
As most
Sometimes we consider here the nature of consciousness, whether observer
moments need to be linked to one another, the role of causality in
consciousness, etc. I thought of an interesting puzzle about Boltzmann
Brains which offers a new twist to these questions.
As most readers are aware
On 19 Jun 2008, at 02:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Günther Greindl wrote:
>> Brent,
>>
>>> scientific theory. Occams razor is a vague desiderata. You can
>>> justify
>>> almost anything by choosing your definition of "complex", e.g.
>>> theists
>>> say, "God did it." is the simplest possibl
Günther Greindl wrote:
> Brent,
>
>> scientific theory. Occams razor is a vague desiderata. You can justify
>> almost anything by choosing your definition of "complex", e.g. theists
>> say, "God did it." is the simplest possible theory.
>
> no you can't:
> http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/
Brent,
> scientific theory. Occams razor is a vague desiderata. You can justify
> almost anything by choosing your definition of "complex", e.g. theists
> say, "God did it." is the simplest possible theory.
no you can't:
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/09/occams-razor.html
most relevant
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 17, 2008 at 09:24:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>> scientific theories (doing so by definition). The reason it is
>>> rejected is because of the arbitrary nature of the date makes it a
>>> more complex theory (in the Occam's razor sense).
>>>
>>
On Tue, Jun 17, 2008 at 09:24:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > scientific theories (doing so by definition). The reason it is
> > rejected is because of the arbitrary nature of the date makes it a
> > more complex theory (in the Occam's razor sense).
>
> And it is not POVI.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 15, 2008 at 01:40:09AM -0700, Greg Egan wrote:
...
>>> But we do this all the time. Why is it we reject crackpot claims that
>>> the world will end on such and such a date for instance?
>> We reject those claims because they flow from theories that we reason
>
Hi Greg,
>
> Thanks very much, everyone, for an interesting discussion, and thanks
> for your patience towards someone who hasn't read your previous
> debates on these issues.
You are welcome Greg.
>
> I hope to find time to follow up all the links people gave. Russell,
> that link to the "
Sorry about that. It seems one needs the stuff after the domain - try
http://everythingwiki.gcn.cx/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page
Cheers
On Sun, Jun 15, 2008 at 07:34:39PM -0700, Greg Egan wrote:
>
> Thanks very much, everyone, for an interesting discussion, and thanks
> for your patience towa
Thanks very much, everyone, for an interesting discussion, and thanks
for your patience towards someone who hasn't read your previous
debates on these issues.
I hope to find time to follow up all the links people gave. Russell,
that link to the "Everything Wiki" currently gives a 403.
--~--~
On Sun, Jun 15, 2008 at 01:40:09AM -0700, Greg Egan wrote:
>
> > My attributes (eg
> > height, weight and so on) are all drawn from distributions of such
> > attributes. Why not some hypothetical property like "observer class"
> > as set up in this toy problem?
>
> Why is your height and weight
Hi Greg,
On 15 Jun 2008, at 10:40, Greg Egan wrote:
>>
>> My attributes (eg
>> height, weight and so on) are all drawn from distributions of such
>> attributes. Why not some hypothetical property like "observer class"
>> as set up in this toy problem?
>
> Why is your height and weight drawn fro
On Jun 15, 1:27 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> What sparked our/my interest is that you seemed to have
> interesting argument against the use of anthropic reasoning.
I'm certainly not arguing against *all* anthropic reasoning; every
argument needs to be examined on a case by ca
distinguish theory A or B, unless I actually received less than X
kJ/day, which, by assumption is not the case. I don't see how
anthropic reasoning makes a difference in this case.
>
> A cosmologist who hopes to distinguish between cosmological theories
> based on their predicti
s to distinguish between cosmological theories
based on their predictions about future populations of Boltzmann
brains is in exactly the same situation. The data to which she has
access does not discriminate between the theories. It is pointless
for her to note that one theory implies that the over
more likely to
continue being right when tested with future observations.
> The context in which I was discussing this at the N-Category Café is
> the claim by some cosmologists that we ought to favour A-type
> cosmological theories in which class 2 observers like us, with a clear
> Dar
cosmological theories in which class 2 observers like us, with a clear
>> Darwinian history, will not be outnumbered (over the whole history of
>> the universe) by class 1 observers (Boltzmann brains).
>
> There is also the argument that the appearance of having a "clear
> Da
not be outnumbered (over the whole history of
> the universe) by class 1 observers (Boltzmann brains).
There is also the argument that the appearance of having a "clear
Darwinian history" is not necessarily evidence that we are not
Boltzmann brains. This is because the problem of
the present
> moment -- we do not have access to the probabilities p(1|A), p(2|A),
> p(1|B), p(2|B) that you describe.
>
> The context in which I was discussing this at the N-Category Café is
> the claim by some cosmologists that we ought to favour A-type
> cosmological theories in w
Darwinian history, will not be outnumbered (over the whole history of
the universe) by class 1 observers (Boltzmann brains). My contention
is that we have no empirical data at the present time that tells us
anything at all about the relative frequencies (over the whole history
of the universe) of clas
ot the case in his absurd
example. It may be relevant to the BB argument though. If theory A was
"we are a statistical fluctuation (ie Boltzmann brains)", and theory B
was "evolved by Darwinian evolution", then p(A) << p(B). One cannot
comment on whether one
On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 10:28:28AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Is the ensemble of observer moments generated by the postulated BB's
> different from the ensemble of all possible observer moments?
>
I don't see how it could be different. AFAICT BBs are nothing other
than the infamous w
2008/6/13 Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> Hi all,
>
> someone on another list alerted me to this post, there is a very
> interesting discussion going on on that blog related to Observer Moments:
>
> http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2008/06/urban_myths_in_contemporary_co.html
Is the ens
Hi all,
someone on another list alerted me to this post, there is a very
interesting discussion going on on that blog related to Observer Moments:
http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2008/06/urban_myths_in_contemporary_co.html
Greg Egan has posted too; and has some very interesting things to s
On Sat, Jul 07, 2007 at 07:56:57AM -0700, LauLuna wrote:
>
> I have never been able to understand how a singularity can be highly
> ordered. Is there any room for order in such a tiny thing?
>
> Best
Highly ordered means small entropy. All you need is a small number of
states, so small things n
I have never been able to understand how a singularity can be highly
ordered. Is there any room for order in such a tiny thing?
Best
On May 31, 1:51 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I came across a reference to Boltzmann brains in a recent issue of New
> Scientis
On 02/06/07, "Hal Finney" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Another possibility is that Boltzmann Brains arising out of chaos are the
> > observer moments which associate to produce the first person appearance
> of
> > continuity of consciousness and an orderly unive
se we know that it(existence of such line) is not true for
us as conscious observers and if there's no such line... you know what
happens.
On 5/31/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I came across a reference to Boltzmann brains in a recent issue of New
> Sci
objects
> > to appear. This is extremely rare but still with infinite time to work
> > with, every object will appear an infinite number of times. That includes
> > disembodied brains, the so-called Boltzmann brains, as well as planets and
> > whole universes. But the sma
every object will appear an infinite number of times. That includes
> disembodied brains, the so-called Boltzmann brains, as well as planets and
> whole universes. But the smaller objects are vastly more common, hence it
> is most likely that our experiences are due to us being a Boltz
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I came across a reference to Boltzmann brains in a recent issue of New
> Scientist.
Coincidentally (or not) I was reading all about this last night, from
the fqxi.org web site Max Tegmark mentioned a few weeks ago. The new
blog entr
I came across a reference to Boltzmann brains in a recent issue of New
Scientist. The piece, quoted in full is:
Spikes in space-time
There is another way to think about why our universe began in a highly
ordered or "low entropy" state. In 2002, a group of physicists led by
Leonard S
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