Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 29/06/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: I am not sure that in case of disagreement (like our "disagreement" with Torgny), changing the vocabulary is a good idea. This will not make the problem going away, on the contrary there is a risk of introducing obscurity. DN: Yes. this s

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Le 28-juin-07, à 17:56, David Nyman a écrit : > On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi Bruno > > The remarks you comment on are certainly not the best-considered or > most cogently expressed of my recent posts. However, I'll try to > clarify if you have specific questions

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Hi Bruno The remarks you comment on are certainly not the best-considered or most cogently expressed of my recent posts. However, I'll try to clarify if you have specific questions. As to why I said I'd rather not use the term 'consciousness

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Le 21-juin-07, à 01:07, David Nyman a écrit : > > On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our own >> consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that >> consciousness could be about. > > I agree wi

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 28/06/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: I agree completely. DN: A good beginning! BM: .but I am not yet convinced that you appreciate my methodological way of proceeding. DN: That may well be so. In that case it's interesting that we reached the same conclusion. B

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David, Le 17-juin-07, à 18:28, David Nyman a écrit : > IMHO this semantic model gives you a knock-down argument against > 'computationalism', *unless* one identifies (I'm hoping to hear from > Bruno on this) the 'primitive' entities and operators with those of > the number realm - i.e. you make

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

DN: 'MP: That is to say, all our knowledge _of_ > the world is embodied in qualia which are _about_ the world. > They are our brains' method of accounting for things. Naive > realism is how we are when we 'mistake' qualia for the world > they represent. > > DN: OK, if one's self-relating emer

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Wed, Jun 27, 2007 at 03:03:35AM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > RS: Furthermore, I would make the stronger claim that self-other boundary > must be such that neither the self nor the environment can be > computable, even if together they are. We've had this discussion > before on this list. > > D

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 26/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: There is, in a sense, a certain arbitrariness in where one draws the boundaries. But I strongly support the notion that there can be no consciousness without an environment (aka appearance of a physical world to the conscious entity). O

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 26/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: This sounds to me like you're paraphrasing Bruno's programme. DN: Yes, but I only realised this after I'd painfully thunk myself into it during my exchange with Brent. But I think I learned something in the process, even tho' I'm not

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 26/06/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: MP: Your second may shoot me if I waffle.. DN: No, he'll just tickle you until you become more coherent ;) MP: The main reason for the word 'challenge' above is due to the way you were using the word 'sensing' for physical and chemical inter

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 01:36:56PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > > DN: Now this seems to me crucial. When you say that self-awareness emerges > from the physics, ISTM that this is what I was getting at in the bit you > didn't comment on directly: > > "My claim isthat if (machines) are (consc

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 10:17:57PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > > Here's what's still not completely clear to me - perhaps you can assist me > with this. We don't know *which* set of physical events is in effect > selected by the functionalist account, even though it may be reasonable to > believ

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 26/06/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: JM: You mean a hallucination of x, when you * 'I just see x, hear x, feel x' and so forth' *. is included in your knowledge? or even substitutes for it? Maybe yes... DN: "I am conscious of knowing x" is distinguishable from "I know x". The fo

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 6/23/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Hi John (just your Italics par-s quoted in this reply. Then "JM: means present text)): *DN: Since we agree to eliminate the 'obsolete noumenon', we can perhaps re-phrase this as just: 'how do you know x?' And then the answers are of

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > Mark: > > Accepting broadly your summary up to this point... > > MP: But I have to *challenge you to clarify* whether what I write > next really ties in completely with what you are thinking. > > DN: My seconds will call on you! > > MP: Consciousness is so

Re: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Mark: Accepting broadly your summary up to this point... MP: But I have to *challenge you to clarify* whether what I write next really ties in completely with what you are thinking. DN: My seconds will call on you! MP: Consciousness is something we know personally, and through di

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 25/06/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: If I understand you, I would agree with the clarification that this convergence has been performed by evolution; so that for us it is in the most part hardwired at birth. And this hardwired interpretation of the world is something that co-

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > On 25/06/07, *Russell Standish* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: ... > RS: The conscious entity that the computer implements would know about > it. It is not imaginary to itself. And by choosing to interpret the > computer's program in that way, rather

Re: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David, We have reached some understanding in the 'asifism' thread, and I would summarise that, tilted towards the context of this line of this thread, more or less as follows. Existence - * The irreducible primitive is existence per se; * that we can know about this implies different

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 25/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: Its more actually "out there in the Multiverse", rather than the Plenitude, as the Multiverse is a necessary prerequisite of observation. Its at least one level of emergence up from the bitstring plenitude. DN: OK RS: Emergence is ent

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sun, Jun 24, 2007 at 08:20:49PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > RS: In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already > out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in > effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the > new consciousness. > > I t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 24/06/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: I think I agree with your concern DN: Ah... BM: and I think the answer is that "conscious" implies "conscious of something". For a computer or an animal to be conscious is really a relation to an environment. DN: Yes BM: So for a c

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

OOPS! I accidentally hit the "send" button on the wrong copy. Here's what I intended to send below: David Nyman wrote: > On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in > each camp. That co

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in > each camp. That could be be very productive! > > I hope so! Let's see... > > RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 23/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in each camp. That could be be very productive! I hope so! Let's see... RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to me. Phew!! Well, that's a good start. RS: I hope I've answered

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sat, Jun 23, 2007 at 03:58:39PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > On 23/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in > disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us > trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 23/06/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: Changing the description would be analogous to changing the reference frame or the names on a map. DN: I agree. BM: The two processes would still be parallel, not orthogonal. DN: But the inference I draw from your points above is that

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > On 23/06/07, *Brent Meeker* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine > level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact > he could switch back and forth. Causa

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 23/06/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: BM: But he could also switch from an account in terms of the machine level causality to an account in terms of the computed 'world'. In fact he could switch back and forth. Causality in the computed 'world' would have it's corresponding causa

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > Hi John > > JM: You may ask about prejudice, shame (about goofed situations), humor > (does a > computer laugh?) boredom or preferential topics (you push for an > astronomical calculation and the computer says: I rather play some Bach > music now) > Sexual preference (ev

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 23/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two cultures. You are obviously comfortable with the world of literary criti

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 02:06:14PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > RS: > Terminology is terminology, it doesn't have a point of view. > > DN: > This may be a nub of disagreement. I'd be interested if you could clarify. > My characterisation of a narrative as '3-person' is when (ISTM) that it's an >

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi John JM: You may ask about prejudice, shame (about goofed situations), humor (does a computer laugh?) boredom or preferential topics (you push for an astronomical calculation and the computer says: I rather play some Bach music now) Sexual preference (even disinterestedness is slanted), or la

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Dear David. do not expect from me the theoretical level of technicality-talk er get from Bruno: I talk (and think) common sense (my own) and if the theoretical technicalities sound strange, I return to my thinking. That's what I got, that's what I use (plagiarized from the Hungarian commi joke: wh

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 21/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: RS: It seems you've miscontrued my "bashing", sorry about that. I was, perhaps somewhat colourfully, meaning "extracting some meaning". Since your prose (and often Colin's for that matter) often sounds like gibberish to me, I have to work at

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 12:22:31AM -, David Nyman wrote: > > On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to > > bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung > > about at

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to > bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung > about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to > illustrate poi

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 08:44:54PM -, David Nyman wrote: > There is no analogy between the two cases, because > Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way > of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations. > This is magic with a vengeance. You ass

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 21, 8:42 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > David, you are still too mild IMO. I try not to be churlish. > I like your quest for "de-formalized participants" (like e.g. energy?) Not sure - can you say more? > The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 21, 8:24 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, "Participatorily intuit the > magic of the de-formalized ding an sich." I'd be happy with that sign, if you substituted a phrase like 'way of being' for 'magic'. There is no analogy be

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David wrote: < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote: "... "there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'". I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon the outcome of certain

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David Nyman wrote: > On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our >> everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from >> virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactl

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our > everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from > virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? > (Other than sensing b

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 12:45:43PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > > > OK, so by necessary primitive, you mean the syntactic or microscopic > > layer. But take this away, and you no longer have emergence. See > > endless discussions on emergence - my paper, or Jochen Fromm's book for > > instance. D

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

down a wys.. === Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 03:47:19PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: >> Hi, >> >> RUSSEL >>> All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have >> introduced a new term "necessary primitive" - what

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our own > consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that > consciousness could be about. I agree with this, but I would prefer to stop using the term 'conscio

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 20, 3:35 am, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Methinks you 'get it'. You are far more eloquent than I am, but we talk of > the same thing.. Thank you Colin. 'Eloquence' or 'gibberish'? Hmm...but let us proceed... > where I identify <<>> as a "necessary primitive" and comment th

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Dear David, (see below.. I left your original text here... = > 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind > utterly unrelated to the componentry. Hi Colin I think there's a link here with the dialogue in the 'Asifism' t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

ere's no such thing as > > 'mechanical' there's no such thing as 'chemical'. These are all > > metaphors > > in certain contexts for what is there...space and charge (yes...and > mass > > associated with certain charge carriers)

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? - this looks best in fixed space font

my a/, b/, c/, look terrible in variable spaced font, they were prepared and sent in fixed font but the message I got back put them in variable spacing and so out of alignment. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Mark Peaty wrote: > [Grin] I just fou

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

the brain is synaptic, anyway! The dominant cortical process is actually > an astrocyte syncytium. (look it up!). I would be very silly to > ignore the > single biggest, most dominant process of the brain that is so far > completely correlated in every way with qu

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 09:40:59AM -, David Nyman wrote: > > On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I > > haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what you > > were talking a

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I > haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what you > were talking about. :( Really? I'm surprised, but words can indeed be very slippery in

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 11:17:50PM -, David Nyman wrote: > > All this has massive implications for issues of will (free or > otherwise), suffering, software uploading of minds, etc., etc. - which > I've indicated in other posts. Consequently, I'd be really interested > in your response, beca

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

ocess of the brain that is so far > completely correlated in every way with qualia...in favour of any other > cause. > --- > > Once again I'd like to get you to ask yourself the killer question: > > "What is the kind of universe we must live in if the elect

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 14, 7:19 pm, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kant saw > this clearly in terms of his 'windowless monads', but these, separated > by the 'void', indeed had to be correlated by divine intervention, > since (unaware of each other) they could not interact. Er, no he didn't. Leibniz

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 03:47:19PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > Hi, > > RUSSEL > > All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have > introduced a new term "necessary primitive" - what on earth is that? But > I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. > > COLIN > Oh no

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Colin Hales wrote: > Dear Brent, > If you had the most extravagent MRI machine in history, which trapped > complete maps of all electrons, neuclei and any photons and then plotted > them out - you would have a 100% complete, scientifically acquired > publishable description and in that description

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Dear Brent, If you had the most extravagent MRI machine in history, which trapped complete maps of all electrons, neuclei and any photons and then plotted them out - you would have a 100% complete, scientifically acquired publishable description and in that description would be absolutely no predi

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 17, 2:33 am, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > You're obviously suggesting single neurons have qualia. Forgive me for > being a little sceptical of this suggestion... Russell, this is daft! Surely the argument is getting completely lost in the terminology here. What on earth

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 17, 6:47 am, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Magical emergence is when but claim Y exists but you can't > identify an X. Such as: > > Take away the X: No qualia > > but thenyou claim qualia result from 'information complexity' or > 'computation' or 'function' and you fail to s

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi Quentin, > "What is the kind of universe we must live in if the electromagnetic field > structure of the brain delivers qualia?" > > A. It is NOT the universe depicted by the qualia (atoma, molecules, > cells...). It is the universe whose innate capacity to deliver qualia is > taken advantage

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Colin Hales wrote: > Hi, > > RUSSEL >> All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have > introduced a new term "necessary primitive" - what on earth is that? But > I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. > > COLIN > Oh no you don't!! It matters. Bigtime... > > Take

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi, RUSSEL > All I can say is that I don't understand your distinction. You have introduced a new term "necessary primitive" - what on earth is that? But I'll let this pass, it probably isn't important. COLIN Oh no you don't!! It matters. Bigtime... Take away the necessary primitive: no 'qualit

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sun, Jun 17, 2007 at 10:02:28AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > Hi, > I am going to have to be a bit targetted in my responses I am a TAD > whelmed at the moment. > > COLIN > >> 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind > utterly unrelated to the componentry. >

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Sunday 17 June 2007 02:02:28 Colin Hales wrote: > "What is the kind of universe we must live in if the electromagnetic field > structure of the brain delivers qualia?" > > A. It is NOT the universe depicted by the qualia (atoma, molecules, > cells...). It is the universe whose innate capacity t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

to ask yourself the killer question: "What is the kind of universe we must live in if the electromagnetic field structure of the brain delivers qualia?" A. It is NOT the universe depicted by the qualia (atoma, molecules, cells...). It is the universe whose innate capacity to deliver qualia

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

David, Tom, Stephen, I keep your posts and I will comment them the week after the next one. I have also to finish a post for Stephen Paul King about bisimulation and identity. I'm out of my office the whole next week. I hope my mail-box will survive :) Best Regards, Bruno Le 15-juin-07, à

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Le 14-juin-07, à 18:13, John Mikes a écrit : > I wonder about Bruno's (omniscient) Lob-machine, how it handles a > novelty. Did you receive my last mail? I quote below the relevant part. To be sure, there is a technical sense, in logic, of "omniscience" in which the lobian machines are "omn

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 15, 1:13 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: What do we lose if we say that it is organisation which is > intrinsically capable of sense-action, but it takes a substantial amount of > organisation of the right sort to in order to give rise to consciousness? > This drops th

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 15/06/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Jun 14, 4:46 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Of course all that is true, but it doesn't explain why neurons in the > cortex > > are the ones giving rise to qualia rather than other neurons or indeed > > peripher

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 14, 4:46 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Of course all that is true, but it doesn't explain why neurons in the cortex > are the ones giving rise to qualia rather than other neurons or indeed > peripheral sense organs. Well, you might as well ask why the engine drive

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

you include "must be produced by a conscious being" as part of > the definition of technology. > > COLIN > There's obvious circularity in the above sentence and it is the same old > circularity that endlessly haunts discussions like this (see the dialog > with Russel

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 14, 3:47 am, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 4) Belief in 'magical emergence' qualitative novelty of a kind > utterly unrelated to the componentry. Hi Colin I think there's a link here with the dialogue in the 'Asifism' thread between Bruno and me. I've been reading Galen S

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

that endlessly haunts discussions like this (see the dialog with Russel). In dealing with the thread Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious? my proposition was that successful _novel_ technology i.e. a entity comprised of matter with a function not previously observed an

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Thu, Jun 14, 2007 at 12:47:58PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > RUSSEL > > What sort of misconstruals do you mean? I'm interested... > > 'organisational complexity' does not capture the concept I'm after. > > COLIN > 1) Those associated with religious 'creation' myths - the creativity > ascribed t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 14/06/07, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Colin > This point is poised on the cliff edge of loaded word meanings and their > use with the words 'sufficient' and 'necessary'. By technology I mean > novel artifacts resulting from the trajectory of causality including human > scientists.

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi, >> COLIN >> I don't think we need a new wordI'll stick to the far less ambiguous >> term 'organisational complexity', I think. the word creativity is so loaded that its use in general discourse is bound to be prone to misconstrual, especially in any discussion which purports to be assessi

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi Stathis, Colin >The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... >'Humans are complex and are conscious' >'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' >therefore >'The biosphere is conscious' > > Stathis That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-conscious e

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Thu, Jun 14, 2007 at 10:23:38AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > COLIN > It may be technically OK then, but I would say the use of the word > 'creativity' is unwise if you wish to unambiguously discuss evolution to a > wide audience. As I said... > > COLIN > I don't think we need a new wordI

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

LIN >> The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... >> 'Humans are complex and are conscious' >> 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' >> therefore 'The biosphere is conscious' RUSSEL > Perhaps so, but not from me. > To return to y

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

re). > > The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... > 'Humans are complex and are conscious' > 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' > therefore > 'The biosphere is conscious' > Perhaps so, but not from me. To return to your original clai

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 12/06/07, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The bogus logic I detect in posts around this area... > 'Humans are complex and are conscious' > 'Humans were made by a complex biosphere' > therefore > 'The biosphere is conscious' That conclusion is spurious, but it is the case that non-cosci

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi again, Russel: I'm sorry, but you worked yourself up into an incomprehensible rant. Is evolution creative in your view or not? If it is, then there is little point debating definitions, as we're in agreement. If not, then we clearly use the word creative in different senses, and perhaps defint

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Fri, Jun 08, 2007 at 10:03:16AM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: > > Russel > > I gave a counter example, that of biological evolution. Either you > should demonstrate why you think biological evolution is uncreative, or > why it is conscious. > > Colin > You have proven my point again. It is not a

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

SP: 'This just confirms that there is no accounting for values or > goals rationally.' MP: In other words _Evolution does not have goals._ Evolution is a conceptual framework we use to make sense of the world we see, and it's a bl*ody good one, by and large. But evolution in the sense of the

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Colin >> like the functionality of a scientist without involving ALL the functionality (especially qualia) of a scientist must be based >> on assumptions - assumptions I do not make. Russel > I gave a counter example, that of biological evolution. Either you should demonstrate why you think biolo

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 08/06/07, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many children as > you can raise through puberty. Avoiding death should only be a subgoal. > Yes, but evolution doesn't have an overseeing intelligence which figures these things out,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Brent Meeker wrote: > The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many > children as you can raise through puberty. Avoiding death should > only be a subgoal. It should go a little further than puberty--the accumulated wisdom of grandparents may significantly enhance the surviva

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] * > <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote: > > Evolution doesn't care about the survival of individual organisms > directly, the actual goal of evolution is only to maximize > r

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Hi, > > 2007/6/7, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> >> >> On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >>> Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive >>> technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal "reprodu

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Evolution doesn't care about the survival of individual organisms > directly, the actual goal of evolution is only to maximize > reproductive fitness. > > If you want to eat a peice of chocolate cake, evolution explains why > you like the t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 7, 7:50 pm, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I have to disagree, if human goals were not tied to evolution goals > then human should not have proliferated. > > Quentin- Hide quoted text - > Well of course human goals are *tied to* evolution's goals, but that doesn't mean

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

Hi, 2007/6/7, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive > > technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal "reproduce", and see the goal > > "

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 7, 3:54 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Evolution has not had a chance to take into account modern reproductive > technologies, so we can easily defeat the goal "reproduce", and see the goal > "feed" as only a means to the higher level goal "survive". However, *t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 07/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Nope. You are confusing the goal of evolutions ('survive, feed, > reproduce') with human goals. Our goals as individuals are not the > goals of evolution. Evolution explains *why* we have the preferences > we do, but this does not mean t

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 6, 10:01 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I was not arguing that evolution is intelligent (although I suppose it > depends on how you define intelligence), but rather that non-intelligent > agents can have goals. Well, actually I'd say that evolution does have a *l

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On 06/06/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Evolution could be described as a perpetuation of the basic > > program, "survive", and this has maintained its coherence as the top > level > > axiom of all biological systems over billions of years. Evolution thus > seems > > to easily,

Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

On Jun 5, 10:20 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Why would you need to change the goal structure in order to improve > yourself? Improving yourself requires the ability to make more effective decisions (ie take decisions which which move you toward goals more efficient

  1   2   >